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Preface 
 
 
The present monograph intends to get closer to understanding the mechanisms of handling of 
legal facts in cases, when Cicero’s defendees were charged with murder or attempted murder. 
Therefor five pieces of the orator’s life-work will be analysed more profoundly from legal and 
rhetorical aspects in terms of the lawyer’s handling of the facts of the case and rhetorical 
tactics applied by Cicero in these speeches.1 
The speeches given in defence of Sextus Roscius from Ameria in 812 and in defence of Aulus 
Cluentius Habitus in 66 were delivered in lawsuits brought by the charge of homicide—
par(r)icidium and veneficium. These two speeches were made at the very beginning of 
Cicero’s career—as he established his reputation as an orator by Pro Roscio Amerino as a 
twenty-six years old young man—and in the first third of it (preceding consulship in 63); so, 
the former oratio shows great promise of becoming the master of rhetorical strategy and 
demonstrates his handling of the facts of the case now constituting an individual system, yet 
not free from certain exaggerations of a young man, and the latter one reveals the orator’s 
ingenious tactics, now mature, leading (misleading) the court of justice with formidable 
assurance.  
The speech given in defence of Titus Annius Milo in 52 was made in a lawsuit brought by the 
charge of vis. Vis (publica) as crimen covered a general group of crimes that comprised 
several states of facts from violent disturbance of public order to certain cases of 
manslaughter. Pro Milone represents an exception in two aspects both among the speeches 
analysed in the volume and left to us as Cicero’s life-work: on the one hand, this is the oratio 
whose original was delivered by the orator in a lost lawsuit, however, later on, guided by 
political considerations, he published its revised version; on the other hand, Pro Milone is the 
speech of which we exactly know that the version published by Cicero and left to us is 
different from the oration given before the court of justice not only in style and structure but 
in its essence.  
By Pro Ligario Cicero defended Quintus Ligarius before Caesar as judge, who also took a 
position in the civil war against Caesar, and who—after he had been given acquittal in legal 
terms and pardon in view of the real political situation—appeared among Caesar’s assassins 
                                                 
1
 Despite the speech in defence of Caius Rabirius can be also regarded as a case of murder, because of its 
fragmentary text, it will not be analysed in this volume. 
2
 All dates relating to ancient events in this volume are BC. 
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on the Ides of March 44. The oratio made in defence of King Deiotarus is the fruit (if 
possible) of a both legally and rhetorically more delicate and critical situation: the judge of the 
case is identical with the injured party of the act brought as a charge, Caesar, that is, the 
proceedings, conducted in the absence of the accused, in which eventually no judgment was 
passed, should be considered manifestation of Caesar’s arrogance, who made mockery of the 
lawsuit, rather than a real action-at-law. All the three speeches have outstanding significance 
both in terms of the lawyer’s/orator’s handling of the facts of the case under circumstances far 
from usual or regular, and the development of the relation between Cicero and Caesar as well 
as the thoughts on the theory of the state framed by Cicero, the analysis of the fight against 
Caesar’s dictatorship gaining ground, for the sake of saving the order of the state of the 
Republic.  
 
Cluj Napoca, 13 February 2011 
          Tamás Nótári 
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Procedure of penal adjudication in Cicero’s age 
 
 
In the legal terminology of the age of the Republic the term “quaerere” indicated a body, 
which was operated under the control of the magistrate, consisting of iudices, and was to 
adjudge certain crimes. In what sense does the activity denoted by the verb quaerere apply to 
the operation of the court, or its specific elements? Most often quaerere denotes the activity 
of the magistrate controlling quaestio, sometimes that of iudices,1 however, it is not used for 
the parties’ activity in the lawsuit. It is unclear what the function quaerere originally covered. 
Theodor Mommsen supposed that as part of the quaerere activity the magistrate controlling 
quaestio addressed questions to the defendant and the witnesses regarding the case. It is hard 
to prove this assumption because descriptions are available only from the periods after Sulla, 
and in this epoch the role of the magistrate and the iudices were rather passive, the way the 
lawsuit was conducted was controlled by the parties. Thinking of the criminal proceedings of 
the archaic age it is hard to imagine—knowing the complicated structure of the Roman order 
of procedure of this age strictly adherent to form—that the magistrate was free to address 
questions to the parties. 
Furthermore, quaerere can be explained in two other ways: this term was used to denote the 
investigation conducted by the quaestio on the case, or the question of the magistrate 
controlling the quaestio addressed to iudices regarding the defendant’s guilt. The first 
interpretation fits the order of procedure used in the 1st century B.C., but cannot be applied—
as Theodor Mommsen’s assumption cannot be either—to the legal order of the archaic age. 
The latter interpretation can be seen as fully corresponding to the early order of procedure, 
and can be brought into harmony with the sources of the 1st century, if it can be supposed that 
the original meaning of the word had obscured, and that is why certain loci refer to iudices as 
the subjects of quaerere.2 It is in this sense quaestiones perpetuae can be postulated from the 
2nd century using Cicero’s formulation.3 These forums can be called permanent because at the 
beginning of the official year the praetor urbanus made a list enumerating the name of the 
members of the courts of justice typically assigned to adjudicating specific crimes, which was 
in effect throughout the year, so there was no need to set up new courts of justice in each case. 
In addition to quaestiones perpetuae, or ordinariae, there were quaestiones extraordinariae 
                                                 
1
 Mommsen 1899. 187. 
2
 Kunkel 1974b 35. 
3
 Cic. Brut. 106. 
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(although this term does not occur in sources), which were usually set up to adjudge cases 
with heavier political weight.1  
Several hypotheses have been made in the literature to explain the origin and development of 
the procedure of quaestio,2 and for a long time it was supposed that this form of procedure 
evolved not earlier than the 2nd century, so, for example, Theodor Mommsen discovered the 
analogy of the procedure of the recuperatores in it,3 and Hitzig tried to explain it with 
influence produced by Greek judicial process.4 However, taking the fact into account that both 
lex Calpurnia from 149 regulating quaestio repetundarum, the oldest form we have 
knowledge of, and lex Acilia repetundarum included provisions on the typical Roman legal 
institution sacramentum in action,5 then this theory becomes groundless. A drastically new 
and still prevailing result was attained by Wolfgang Kunkel, who believed that the Romans 
strictly separated the institutions of coercitio and iudicatio right from the outset; and—
contrary to Theodor Mommsen’s interpretation—the option of provocatio ad populum6 
referred only to the latter. The scope of comitial adjudication covered crimes of political 
nature, while other kinds of crime were assigned to the scope of iurisdictio by the magistrate, 
which meant nothing else than adjudging the case under the quaestio.7 
At the turn of the 3rd and 2nd centuries, in the organisation of the state having assumed the 
form of an empire, penal iurisdictio exercised solely by the magistrate and the popular 
assembly no longer seemed to be properly efficient because an institution system set for 
frameworks of a city-state could not be expected to survey matters increasingly extensive both 
in terms of territory and complexity and especially to judge them competently. For these 
reasons, more and more often they reached back to the legal institution of quaestiones 
extraordiariae applied earlier sometimes in judging political crimes.8 Livius gives an account 
of a case, which can be accepted as authentic, where originally they wanted to roll up a 
conspiracy in Capua—for this purpose a special dictator was elected, then, the control over 
the proceedings was taken over by the consuls—however, soon suspicion was cast on 
organisations set up in the city of Rome, suspicious of corrupt practices9 and the investigation 
                                                 
1
 See e.g. the Bona Dea trial. 
2
 See Lengle 1971. 25ff. 
3
 Mommsen 1887–1888. I. 182. 
4
 Hitzig 1909. 41f. 
5
 Lex Acilia 23. 
6
 Cf. Bleicken 1959 324ff; Lintott 1972. 226ff.; Martin 1970. 72ff. 
7
 Kunkel 1962. 21ff. 
8
 Kunkel 1974b 46. 
9
 Liv. 9, 26, 9.  
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was conducted thereafter following this track.1 Initially, similar kind of punitive court of 
justices were set up much rather for suppressing organising activity of the unruly allies,2 
however, from the first half of the 2nd century more and more often they used this legal 
institution also for investigating the cases of former Roman magistrates. Initially, the quaestio 
extraordinaria was set up in each case by senatus consulta,3 or by plebiscita too,4 yet, the 
senate continued to draw certain cases to its own powers.5  
The quaestio was chaired by some magistrate, who announced the judgment of the consilium 
iudicum; so, in the case of these quaestiones it is possible to speak about regular iudicium 
publicum. However, regarding all the matters that the accounts describe it should not be 
forgotten that they came into the limelight in relation to deeds or persons that aroused public 
interest, and presumably that is why the senate took great care to investigate and set the form 
of imposing sanction on them. As regards judging crimes of perpetrators from lower layers of 
people, not carrying any political significance, it is hard to imagine that in each case a senatus 
consultum or as well plebiscitum adopted specially for this reason would have dealt with 
them; it is more probable that they were decided by the tresviri capitales, who could proceed 
ex officio or on the grounds of reporting.6  
On the setup and order of procedure of iudicia publica prior to A C. Gracchus very few data 
have been preserved, but the following can be established with tolerable certainty: in the event 
of quaestiones extraordinariae constituted in some cases by senatus consulta and plebiscita 
the participants of the quaestio, as a matter of fact, had to be gathered again in each case, the 
head of the procedure (quaesitor) was appointed by the senate. Presumably the senate also 
had its say in selecting the members, but could also entrust a quaesitor to do so. A permanent 
list of senators eligible for being members in the quaestio most probably did not exist; all the 
more as the number of senators was too low to make it possible to set up several lists.7 
In view of the above it becomes clear that quaestio extraordinaria was nothing else but a 
committee established by the senate to investigate a particular case, which selected and 
delegated members from its own staff, whose composition was thus determined fairly 
arbitrarily, allowing ample ground for entertaining political sympathy and antipathy disguised 
                                                 
1
 Liv. 9, 26, 6f. 
2
 Liv. 10, 1, 3; 28, 10, 4; 29, 36, 10f. 
3
 In the early period of the Roman Republic quaestiones extraordinariae could be set up only by senatus 
consulta. 
4
 E.g. the case of M. Popilius Laenas (consul in 173-ban) and L. Hostilius Tubulus (praetor in 140).  
5
 Cf. Liv. 39, 41, 5; 40, 37, 4; Cic. Lael. 37; Val. Max. 4, 7, 1. 
6
 Cic. Caecil. 50; Cic. Cluent. 39. 
7
 Kunkel 1974b 51. 
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in law. In the development of the legal order it must have become an aim to create 
quaestiones perpetuae, that is, to set up lists including names of citizens who could be 
nominated and elected members of quaestiones that would stay in effect during the entire 
official year. This was, however, prevented by the low number of nominees since at that time 
the senate consisted of only three hundred persons, and the lists would have needed to include 
a multiple of the headcount necessary for conducting the proceedings. In theory there were 
two ways to eliminate this obstacle: either by raising the number of the members of the 
senate, or by terminating the privilege setting forth that only citizens ranked among senators 
were allowed to elect a member of the quaestio. During the times unsuccessful attempts were 
made on three occasions to raise the number of the members of the senate to six hundred 
persons,1 which later only Sulla managed to achieve for no other way did he see it possible to 
ensure the legislative monopoly of the senate.2 From the decades between C. Gracchus and 
Sulla sources report on the existence of a quaestio perpetua de veneficiis with full certainty, 
and the existence of quaestiones perpetuae can be assumed with great probability also in the 
event of crimes endangering the stability of public life (ambitus3 crimen maiestatis, 
peculatus4). Quaestiones were chaired by the iudex quaestionis, which office was established 
most probably by C. Gracchus. 
The date of creating quaestio de sicariis and quaestio de veneficis is not known; however, 
they certainly existed before 130 because at that time L. Cassius Longinus (consul in 127) 
provably fulfilled the chairman’s office of quaestio de sicariis.5 According to the general 
view, Sulla merged these two courts of justice (quaestio de sicariis et veneficis);6 yet, for 
example, Andrew Lintott presumes that they continued to operate separately.7 Nevertheless, 
this does not seem to be probable because in this case the two states of facts would have been 
regulated also by Sulla in two separate acts.8 At a locus Pomponius refers to Sulla’s court of 
justice purportedly set up for investigating par(r)icidium;9 however, competent literature 
agrees with the point that par(r)icidium also fell within the powers of quaestio de sicariis et 
                                                 
1
 All three attempts (made by Ti. Gracchus, C. Gracchus and M. Livius Drusus) to raise the number of the senate 
failed.  
2
 Cf. Plut. C. Gracch. 5; Liv. perioch. 60. 
3
 Val. Max. 6, 9, 14; Plut. Mar. 5, 3. 
4
 Plut. Pomp. 4, 1; Cic. Brut. 230; Val. Max. 5, 3, 5. 
5
 Auct. ad Her. 4, 41. 
6
 Cf. Santalucia 1998. 146. 
7
 Lintott 1978. 127. 
8
 Sáry 2001. 303. 
9
 Paul. D. 1, 2, 2, 32. 
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veneficis, and Sulla did not set up an independent quaestio de par(r)icidio,1 as it is proved by 
the oratio, Pro Roscio Amerino, analysed by us. Erich S. Gruen presumes the existence of an 
independent quaestio de par(r)icidio before Sulla;2 however, Cloud convincingly refutes this 
hypothesis, and points out that murder of relatives—depending on its means and form of 
committing—was to be judged before the quaestio de sicariis or quaestio de veneficis.3 
Sulla’s jurisdiction reforms kept and renewed the system of quaestiones perpetuae to the 
extent that only persons ranked among senators were allowed again to participate in the 
quaestio as jurors, and in 81 he stipulated the order of procedure in a law. From these laws no 
more have been preserved by sources, i.e., Cicero’s speeches and the writings of the jurists of 
the period of the Roman Empire, than what served their own purposes. That is, what can be 
discerned from the orators’ arguments regarding the process of the proceedings, and what 
continued to be in effect in the period of Augustus and in later legislation since the lawyers of 
the classical age of jurisprudence were mostly not interested in legal history. In the mirror of 
the above, we have sure knowledge of the existence of Sulla’s laws creating the following 
permanent quaestiones: de sicariis et veneficiis,4 lex Cornelia testamentaria nummaria,5 lex 
Cornelia de iniuriis,6 lex Cornelia maiestatis,7 lex Cornelia repetundarum.8 Concerning the 
existence of lex Cornelia de ambitu some doubt might arise; and no source on the existence of 
a possible lex Cornelia de peculatu is available.9 
Although several registers have been preserved with the list of the members of the quaestio, 
their composition, the form of assembling them, they mostly lack any systematic structure and 
are hard to survey, and give detailed account of cases that for some reason do not meet the 
usual order of procedure; so, they do not entitle the author to draw conclusions from them 
with full certainty with a view to answering the above questions. A point of reference is 
provided by the epigraphic material on the establishment of quaestio repetundarum 
introduced by C. Gracchus; yet, it cannot be considered the prototype of quaestiones.10 
Accordingly, the names of the potential members of quaestio repetundarum were included in 
a list consisting of four hundred and fifty persons to be compiled by the praetor peregrinus 
                                                 
1
 Santalucia 1998. 148. 
2
 Gruen 1968. 261f. 
3
 Cloud 1971. 41ff. 
4
 Coll. 1, 3, 1; 12, 5; Cic. Cluent. 148; Marci. D. 48, 1, 1. 3, 1; Marci. D. 48, 8, 1 pr.; Gai. D. 29, 5, 25 pr.–1. 
5
 Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 108; nat. 3, 74; Paul. 5, 25; Inst. 4, 18, 7; D. 48, 10. 
6
 Ulp. D. 47, 10, 5 pr.–5; Paul. 5, 4, 8; Inst. 4, 4, 8. 
7
 Cic. Pis. 50; Tac. ann. 1, 72. 
8
 Cic. Rab. 9; div. in Caec. 17. 
9
 Kunkel 1974b 62. 
10
 Cf. Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 26.  
10 
 
within ten days from entering into office on the grounds of the census from the range of 
citizens who belonged to ordo equester. The members of quaestio who were to adjudge the 
given case were selected from this list—read out by the praetor before the contio and 
confirmed by taking an oath on its authenticity—as follows. First, the accused was obliged to 
name all the jurors with whom he were kin or brothers-in-law, or maintained fiduciary 
relation as a member of the same sodalicium or collegium. Then, in twenty days the 
prosecutor selected one hundred from the four hundred fifty jurors who were not allowed to 
maintain the above relations with the prosecutor (editio). After that, in forty days the accused 
was allowed to reject fifty from the one hundred designated jurors (reiectio). The fifty persons 
so produced constituted the jury of the quaestio repetundarum. Since only the lex 
repetundarum gives an account as a creditworthy source of the order of procedure of this 
period, the author can only presume that in the periods before Sulla the other quaestiones 
operated also on the grounds of the editio and reiectio principle.1  
Through Sulla’s legislation the exclusive right of participation in the quaestiones was restored 
to the ordo senatorius, and by that the range of potential jurors significantly narrowed, which 
did not allow the exercise of principle of editio and reiectio widely exercised formerly by the 
parties. Thereafter, jurors were selected on the basis of sortitio, and the parties’ right of 
rejection became very limited. The key sources on the order of procedure of this period are 
provided by Cicero’s speeches. He handled certain procedural issues in detail in several 
speeches, those against Verres and the one delivered in defence of Cluentius. The members of 
the quaestiones were designated on the grounds of the register of senators which was divided 
into ten decuriae, where each decuria included the names of sixty senators, of whom those 
who fulfilled some magistrates were not eligible as potential jurors; so, one decuria provided 
approximately forty-fifty senators. Each of these decuriae was assigned at the beginning of 
each official year to a specific quaestio,2 and in specific lawsuits it was from them that jurors 
were selected by drawing lots.3 Although both of the parties had the option of reiectio, albeit, 
within a narrow scope, an accused not belonging to the order of senatores was allowed to 
reject three, an accused belonging to the ordo senatorius was presumably allowed to reject 
somewhat more jurors.  
The quaestio established from the decuria of the senate through sortitio and reiectio had a 
much lower headcount than those before Sulla’s time. The composition of this body possibly 
                                                 
1
 Kunkel 1974b 69. 
2
 Cf. Cic. Verr. 1, 158; 2, 2, 79; Cluent. 103. 
3
 Cf. Cic. Verr. 1, 16. 
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further changed when any of them died, or did not take part in the work of the quaestio for 
reasons established and approved by law, in these cases the headcount was completed from 
another decuria of the senate.1 One of the most clearly observable cankers of Sulla’s 
quaestiones was liability to be bribed, which was enhanced by the low number of members. 
That is what made L. Aurelius Cotta praetor enact lex Aurelia iudiciaria in 70, which 
terminated the legislative monopoly of the order of senatores, and ordered to compile the list 
of jurors from each of the orders of senators, knights and aerar tribunes. Cicero reports that in 
this age three hundred senators were allowed to act as jurors. The lists were compiled at the 
beginning of his year of office by the praetor urbanus, most frequently he took over his 
predecessor’s list after having made necessary amendments. In particular lawsuits—as it can 
be ascertained from quite limited number of sources—the jurors were selected not from the 
list of nine hundred but from the chapters thereof divided into specific quaestiones. 
 
  
                                                 
1
 Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 158. 
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I. Lawsuit of Sextus Roscius from Ameria  
 
Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino is Cicero’s first “criminal case”, in which he tries to clear his 
defendant of the charge invented by his relatives and the dictator’s confidant under the pretext 
of Sulla’s massacres. Sextus Roscius junior was charged with patricide by his relatives 
asserting that he had his father murdered in June 81. By the assistance of Sulla’s confidant, 
Chrysogonus the relatives attained that the victim’s name—although he was considered the 
dictator’s adherent—should be included in the register of persons inflicted by proscriptio, and 
so his property could be sold by auction, of which both Chrysogonus and the relatives of the 
murdered man had their handsome share, except for, “as a matter of fact”, Roscius senior’s 
son, who was thus done out of his inheritance. To enjoy the treacherously obtained property in 
safety, they wanted to get the lawful inheritor out of the way by a well-thought out 
Justizmord, therefore, they charged him with par(r)icidium. The case covered a dangerous 
political swamp, so they thought that none of the illustrious advocates of the age would 
undertake the defence. However, the young Cicero resolved to represent the case that seemed 
hopeless not so much for legal but much more for political reasons; his undertaking—which 
was eventually crowned by success—required a lot of courage, precise handling of the facts 
of the case and rhetoric skill, yet, in the long run established the reputation of the ambitious 
advocate and launched his career as an orator and a man of public affairs. Afterwards, the 
orator speaks about the acknowledgement obtained through the successful statement of the 
defence, on the one hand; and, seriously criticises his own one-time overflowing, unrestrained 
style, yet, appreciating his own courage, on the other.  
 
I. 1. Historical background of Pro Roscio Amerino 
 
By his oration delivered in 80 in defence of Sextus Roscius from Ameria, the twenty-
six/twenty-seven years old Cicero assumed the role of counsel for the defence in a criminal 
action for the first time.1 This period of the Republic of Rome saw the so-called Sulla 
restoration, under which the commander had himself named dictator vested with powers 
entrusted with law-making and governance of the state (dictator legibus scribundis et rei 
publicae constituendae)—he was helped to obtain this procedure legitimising all his former 
                                                 
1
 See Kinsey 1967. 61ff. On Cicero’s political carreer see Barbu 1959. passim 
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acts by the interrex, the law proposed by L. Valerius Flaccus. After his victory, on 1 
November 82, at Porta Collina, Sulla proscribed the adherents of his enemies, Marius and 
Cinna, that is, on the grounds of lex Cornelia sive Valeria he imposed proscriptio on them.1 
Their names—through Sulla’s proscriptiones approximately four thousand seven hundred 
citizens were killed—were put on a table (the phrase pro-scribere comes from here), and 
citizens were obliged to capture the persons concerned and report the place where they stayed 
to the authorities. Twelve thousand denarius blood-money was offered for each person 
inflicted by proscriptio, and if the owner subjected to proscriptio was killed by his slave, in 
addition to money reward, he was given status libertatis and “Cornelius” as nomen gentile. 
Descendants of persons inflicted by proscriptio were deprived of eligibility; their property 
devolved to the state and was sold by auction on the Forum, which created a real state of 
paradise for professional buyers up (sectores).2 
Such danger-fraught historical times carry, by nature, the opportunity of abuses; the facts of 
the case providing grounds for Pro Roscio Amerino serves a text-book example for that. 
Sextus Roscius senior, a respected and well-to-do citizen of Ameria in Umbria, eighty-three 
kilometres north of Rome—who actually lived in Rome—in addition to his significant 
movable estate, owned thirteen estates in the provinces; he entrusted his son cca. forty years 
old at the time of the lawsuit to administer them, with whom he did not maintain a highly 
cordial relation (presumably due to their different conduct of life, the father’s urban, the son’s 
rustic attitude). After the lawful conclusion of the proscriptio and forfeiture of property, i.e., 1 
June 81, Roscius senior, who was returning home from a supper party, was murdered near the 
Circus Flaminius. The relatives, who maintained a hostile relation with the victim, Titus 
Roscius Capito and Titus Roscius Magnus notified L. Cornelius Chrysogonus, Sulla’s 
libertine and confidant. Chrysogonus attained that Roscius senior’s name—although he was 
from first to last Sulla’s committed adherent—was put, subsequently, beyond the statutory 
deadline, on the list of persons inflicted by proscriptio; his goods were confiscated and sold 
by auction. Chrysogonus acted as the professional purchaser—nobody dared to make any bids 
against him—and acquired the property worth six million sestertii for two thousand (!) 
sestertii. And the Roscii were granted great reward; Capito was given three estates, and 
Magnus became the administrator of Chrysogonus’s business affairs. Sextus Roscius junior, 
                                                 
1
 See Baker 1927. passim; Behr 1993. passim; Bloch–Carcopino 1935. passim; Christ 2002. passim; Diehl 1988. 
passim; Hantos 1988. passim; Heftner 2006. passim; Hurlet 1993. passim; Lehmann 2005. passim; Linke 2005. 
passim; Santangelo 2007. passim; Schur 1942; Volkmann 1958. passim 
2
 Krüger 1994. 143f.; Richter–Fleckeisen–Amon 1906. 1ff.; Mommsen 1899. 9381. Cf. Sall. Cat. 51. 
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to save his life, fled from Ameria to Rome where he found shelter in the house of Caecilia, 
who belonged to the notable gens of the Metelli. Chrysogonus, Capito and Magnus, who felt 
that the property so acquired was not secure from contest, decided to get the son of the victim 
out of the way by the invented charge of patricide. Although the charge was rather shaky, they 
trusted that paying regard to Chrysogonus’s relation to Sulla nobody would dare to act as 
counsel for the defence against the prosecutor of doubtful reputation, C. Erucius. Regarding 
this point, however, they were wrong. The young Cicero, who had until then accomplished 
only one case, Quinctius’s private law action, undertook and brilliantly solved the dangerous 
and delicate task. 
To refute the official charge did not seem to be a hard task since Erucius did not even try to 
make the version presented by him too believable,1 the only palpable argument against the 
accused was that he had not immediately interrogated the slaves present when his father was 
murdered and had not had minutes made out of that. When later on he wanted to do that, he 
no longer had the possibility to do so as by then the slaves had belonged to Chrysogonus’s 
suite. So, the difficulty implied in the lawsuit was of political nature. By amazing sense of 
tactics, Cicero hammered it again and again into the audience that just as Jupiter cannot care 
for every tiny problem of mortals,2 Sulla cannot know of the foul deeds of his liberated slave.3 
Likewise, he called upon the nobility—as they could thank to Sulla that they regained their 
old lustre and influence—to distance themselves from elements like Chrysogonus, thereby 
again serving Sulla’s intention, who placed great emphasis on fairness of court proceedings.4 
Accordingly, the structure of the speech is as follows.5 The introduction (exordium, 
prooemium) prepares the audience for what follows (conciliare)6 so that in the narratio7 the 
presentation of the facts of the case (docere) could be given proper emphasis. In the partitio8 
Cicero outlines the planned order of demonstration, which is followed by the argumentatio 
itself,9 meant to convince (probare). The argumentatio can be divided into three parts: Cicero 
first deals with Erucius,10 then with the Roscii,11 after that with Chrysogonus.12 The peroratio 
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of summary character intends to produce effect primarily on the audience’s emotions.1 This 
division is, of course, not carried through mechanically by the orator; at several points he 
makes digressions (egressio, digressio) where he again wants to win his audience’s feelings 
over to his case and his defendant.2 He somewhat separates the person of Sulla’s freedman, 
Chrysogonus from the Roscii, casting the suspicion of committing the crime on the latter, and 
does not omit to stress the victim’s political conviction, loyalty to Sulla, and the social role 
and responsibility of the nobles several times.3 The speech is characterised from first to last 
by a kind of harrowing pathos, which later on the orator himself attributed to his young age,4 
which he successfully threw off after his studies in Greece.5 In Pro Roscio Amerino he used 
excessive, archaising and everyday language elements more often; later on, as a mature orator 
he distanced himself from them.6 The oration—as Roscius junior was acquitted7—and 
undertaking the perils involved by it8 bore worthy fruit to Cicero too, since from then on he 
was kept in evidence as one of the prime advocates of Rome.9 
 
I. 2. Statutory regulation of the crime of par(r)idicium  
 
The charge brought against Sextus Roscius was par(r)icidium, that is, patricide, murder of 
father—similarly, in a broader sense, this phrase was used for the facts of the case when 
somebody knowingly, in bad faith killed a free man.10 Presumably, it goes back to Romulus 
that in accordance with law the Romans did not punish murder of relatives separately because 
they qualified killing of each Roman citizen patricide.11 Later on, the crime of homicide was 
ranked into three states of facts: they called manslaughter in general homicidium, highway 
murderers and robbers sicarii and poison mixers and vicious murderers venefici. To prosecute 
these acts, Sulla set up a separate quaestio by lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis, until then, 
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however, investigation against murderers was carried out by quaestores par(r)icidii.1 Albeit, 
folk etymology deduced par(r)icidium (often written in the form parricidium) from 
patricidium, that is, murder of father, even Theodor Mommsen did not consider it well-
founded in terms of history of language.2 Theodor Mommsen asserts that already in Cicero’s 
age erroneous folk etymology served the use of par(r)icidium, which originally meant 
voluntary manslaughter, as murder of father or relatives.3 
Lex Pompeia de par(r)icidiis discussed par(r)icidium again in a narrower sense, that is, it 
applied it to killing parents, relatives and dependants,4 once the ancient Roman par(r)icidium 
had been replaced by homicidium. Thus, Pompey ranked murder and attempted murder 
committed against relatives in the ascending and the descending line, siblings, parents’ 
siblings, their children, spouse, the betrothed, parents of spouses and the betrothed, child’s 
betrothed and spouse, step-parent, stepchild and liberating patronus under this law.5 The 
occurrence of par(r)icidium in a stricter sense—as our sources prove—was not very frequent 
in Rome; the first murderer of father known by name is known from the times following the 
second Punic war, L. Hostius. The case of the first murderer of mother documented by name, 
Publicius Malleolus was discussed by rhetoric manuals in sufficient details,6 and therefore we 
know the punishment imposed on par(r)icidae, sacking (poenae cullei) in proper details.7 In 
the beginning, poena cullei must have been a sacrifice conciliating higher powers, procuratio 
prodigii rather than a sanction.8 The Romans called the customary order, standstill of the 
world pax deorum, which meant gods’ peaceful attitude towards man, and if this order was 
upset, it could be always traced back to gods leaving this standstill.9 Upsetting the cosmic 
order, so, any extraordinary, new event was considered prodigium.10 Par(r)icidium was also 
such a phenomenon violating the cosmic order, pax deorum. 
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The etymology of the word prodigium is doubtful; in Alois Walde’s and Johann B. 
Hofmann’s interpretation prodigium comes from prod-aio, which claims that prodigium 
means foretelling and forepointing.1 This approach does not seem to be satisfactory because 
prodigium itself does not state anything, and definitely calls for interpretation; for this reason, 
pontifices used the Sibylline Books or haruspices to carry it out.2 It seems to be a more exact 
interpretation that the word comes from the compound prod-agere, consequently, prodigium 
is nothing else than “supernatural forces which hide behind the surface, breaking through 
this shell, come forth, become manifest”.3 Upon the occurrence of prodigium, be it of either 
private or state nature, once its meaning has been cleared up, that is, interpreted, procuratio 
had to be carried out, and proposition on its form was made also by the interpreters; if the 
same prodigium recurred more frequently, pontifices always ordered the same conciliation. 
The punishment of par(r)icida, that is, sacking/being sewn in a sack considered procuratio—
which was still in practice in the period of the Roman empire—was carried out as follows. 
After the sentence was delivered, the face of the convicted was covered with wolf skin and a 
wooden sole was tied to his feet so that his breath should not stain the air or his feet the earth. 
After that, he was whipped until he was covered with blood;4 then, he was sewn in a sack 
made of rawhide together with a monkey, a cock, a dog and a viper. This sack with the 
convicted and the animals was thrown into the sea,5 and so the person who had violated all 
natural laws could not be in direct contact with any natural elements, either with water or 
sunshine or earth or air, and could not deface them. Specific animals are often mentioned also 
by authors from the period of the Roman Empire,6 especially because emperor Claudius took 
exceptional pleasure in the spectacle of executing qualified death penalties.7 Why these 
animals were put into the sack beside the convicted cannot be decided with full certainty 
because—the sanction having become a symbol—in several cases antique authors themselves 
were reduced to conjectures.8 They might have played a part in this ceremony as follows: the 
dog as an actor fulfilling tasks of guarding and warning—or possibly failing to fulfil them—
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the monkey as the caricature of man, the snake as a treacherous enemy living in wilderness 
and the cock as the animal of the goddess of the night, Hecate.1 
This cruel punishment, of course, did not threaten Roscius in reality as he would have had the 
opportunity—in view of the fact that he was not par(r)icida manifestus—to exercise ius 
exulandi, that is, the right of going into voluntary exile, which every Roman citizen was 
entitled to in the event that the proceedings conducted against him due to crime sanctioned by 
capital punishment took a turn unfavourable for him and he had to be afraid of being declared 
guilty. So, it is a rhetorical exaggeration by Cicero to repeat it again and again that 
Chrysogonus was thirsting by all means for Roscius’s blood.2 Consequently, exilium was not 
punishment but fleeing from punishment.3 If he had indeed had to be afraid of death penalty, 
Roscius would have had ample opportunity to do so, and the prosecutors would have been 
fully satisfied even with that.4 
The trial itself was held without either the facts of the case having been exactly cleared up or 
possible witnesses having been heard. The place and part of day of the crime was known, the 
date when it was committed was not—similarly, the number of perpetrators or assailants 
remained a mystery. Although Erucius brought out witnesses, to whom questions could be 
addressed by the parties, Cicero claimed that these witnesses were one by one bribed by the 
prosecutors’ money. Slaves’ testimony could be taken into account on the merits in a lawsuit 
only if it was taken from them under torture (tormentum, eculeus). Two slaves could have 
served additional information on the merits in the lawsuit indeed, and the accused could 
deliver his slaves voluntarily for being questioned by torture (in quaestionem polliceri).5 
Sextus Roscius would have done that with pleasure as his slaves could have proved his 
innocence, but these slaves had been removed from his ownership due to forfeiture of 
property imposed on him, and now he could demand extradition of the slaves only from T. 
Roscius Magnus administering Chrysogonus’s property (in quaestionem postulare). Magnus 
refused to do so; and at that time the rule adopted in the period of the Roman empire was not 
in effect yet that during the action, on the parties’ demand, even in spite of the owner’s will, 
this part of the demonstration, that is, questioning of slaves by torture, could be conducted.6 In 
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such cases the judge had to decide if the slaves made testimony only upon the effect of torture 
or their confession reflected reality.1 
 
I. 3. Handling the facts of the case in Pro Roscio Amerino 
 
In order to reconstruct the facts of the case of Pro Roscio Amerino, it is evident to set out of 
the narratio2 of the speech. Roscius senior could come and go with a clear conscience in 
Rome even during the time of Sulla’s proscriptiones3 as he had several friends from the 
circles of the nobility, who later on—when the oration was delivered—ran to help his son 
charged with patricide.4 Doom struck him from elsewhere: two of his relatives,5 T. Roscius 
Capito and T. Roscius Magnus, with whom he had maintained a hostile relation for a long 
time, allied to murder him.6 Regarding the details of implementing the murder Cicero does 
not make any effort to clear up mystery either:7 Roscius senior was killed in Rome, 
sometimes in one of the evenings of the autumn of 81, just when he was going home from a 
supper party.8 The news of murder reached Ameria the same evening, however, the 
messenger, Mallius Glaucia—Roscius Magnus’s friend—runs to the house of Roscius Capito, 
instead of the victim’s son to tell the news.9 Ensuing events reveal the goal that moved the 
murderers: to grab Roscius’s property.10 The relatives straight away inform Sulla’s libertine, 
Cornelius Chrysogonus, who was just staying in Volaterrae,11 and ask for his help to obtain 
disposal over the property. Chrysogonus appears helpful: although the deadline of 
proscriptiones expired months before, he has Roscius senior put on the list of persons 
inflicted by proscriptio,12 and from that moment his property worth six million sestertii 
becomes confiscable, and it is acquired by Chrysogonus himself for two thousand sestertii.13 
Roscius Magnus is entrusted with administering the property in his capacity as procurator, 
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and he is not slow in grasping the opportunity of getting rich quickly;1 from the victim’s 
thirteen estates Roscius Capito seizes three,2 and they simply chase the son of the murdered 
man away from his father’s house.3 
To demonstrate their indignation, citizens of Ameria send a mission to disclose Roscius’s 
political belonging to Sulla—that he is an adherent loyal to Sulla—and the injury suffered by 
Roscius junior.4 The delegates, however, include Roscius Capito too, who does everything to 
mislead his fellow-delegates;5 and Chrysogonus arranges that the people from Ameria could 
not get before Sulla, and promises them that he himself will take measures to get the 
subsequent proscriptio declared invalid and the victim’s son reinstated in his father’s 
property.6 The naive country kinsmen, getting richer with a resolute false promise, return 
home without having fulfilled their duty; Chrysogonus and his accomplices resolve that they 
need to kill Sextus Roscius junior too so that they could enjoy the treacherously acquired 
property in peace7—the candidate for victim, however, escapes to Rome to his father’s 
friends.8 
Those who desired to keep the property had been left with no other choice than Justizmord: 
they brought a charge against the victim’s son by virtue of patricide.9 The representation of 
the charge was undertaken by Erucius, having already often acted as prosecutor,10 whom 
Roscius Magnus, administrator of Chrysogonus’s robbed property, served with a lot of 
“useful” advice11—yet, Roscius Magnus was not an accusator in the strict sense of the word: 
although, as Cicero claims, he is among the prosecutors,12 and he refers to him as accusator in 
the peroratio,13 the orator would certainly not have omitted to mention Roscius Magnus being 
a prosecutor as exceptional impudence.14 Roscius Capito acted as witness,15 and 
Chrysogonus, as Sulla’s confidant and influential mover of the events, was to assume the part 
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to prevent the real background of the facts from being disclosed.1 The prosecution pleaded 
that the murder arose from a family strife: Roscius junior had always hated his father,2 and 
when his father planned to disinherit his son, the son decided to kill his father to avert it.3 
Cicero asserts that only his action has unmasked the vile plot that Chrysogonus himself wants 
to keep Roscius senior’s property, and his accomplices are no other than the murderers 
themselves.4 
At first sight, Cicero’s form of presentation seems to be round and free from contradictions—
especially because young Cicero fulfilling the defence acts as a resolute and clean protector of 
justice and moral. According to several authors, for example, Richard Heinze,5 Gustav 
Landgraf,6 Ernst Lincke7 and Wilfried Stroh,8 Cicero does not properly justify the charge 
against the two Roscii. The motif of their act is logical as both profited from the murder,9 yet, 
at the moment when the murder happened they must have been far from being certain about 
the success of their plan. On the one hand, the period of proscriptions and forfeiture of 
property was long over at the time of the murder, and Chrysogonus did not side with the 
Roscii yet. On the other hand, according to Cicero’s narrative, Roscius Capito was given his 
three estates at the same time10 when Chrysogonus entrusted Roscius Magnus with 
administering the estate grabbed by him: later, however, Roscius Capito appears in the 
delegation of the citizens of Ameria, which wanted to speak for returning the goods of the 
murdered Roscius senior to his son. How come they delegated Roscius Capito to the mission, 
and how could he deceive the rest of the members of the delegation by conspiring with 
Chrysogonus—at least as Cicero claimed? Cicero’s explanation about the credulousness of 
the simple-minded kinsmen from the provinces is, according to Wilfried Stroh, simply a 
topos.11 If Capito was indeed sent to Volaterrae together with the delegation, then he could get 
the estate only later;12 Cicero, however, cannot disclose this version to the judges because he 
would inevitably substantiate the presumption that Chrysogonus bribed Capito as a member 
of the delegation, that is, the commencement of the community of interest between them 
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cannot be dated to the period preceding the murder. The interest of the defence requires that 
Capito should be “involved” in the chain of events as early as possible because that is what 
the hypothesis of the Roscius Magnus—Roscius Capito alliance can be founded on. 
The starting point of Cicero’s system of production of evidence should be looked for in the 
following: as the innocence of Roscius junior cannot be proved beyond any doubt—that is, he 
cannot completely refute either that the victim’s son stayed in Ameria and not on the scene of 
the act, in Rome, at the time of the murder or that making a profit as motivation of patricide 
can be clearly ruled out (being subsequently done out of the inheritance does not exclude hope 
for the inheritance at the time of the act)—he needs to find the perpetrator(s) who can be 
substituted for the role of Sextus Roscius junior mentioned in the charge; in other words, he 
needs to make his own version believable.1 It is quite interesting, however, that he does not 
choose the most obvious explanation, which would more or less run as follows: primarily 
Chrysogonus was behind the murder (perhaps with Roscius Magnus as joint offender) since it 
was him who benefited the most from the crime and it was him who prevented the 
interrogation of the eyewitness slaves—and Capito was, first, also indignant at the foul deed 
but was bribed by Chrysogonus and, so, he readily shut his eyes to the iniquity. Cicero knew 
very well that he could not directly attack Chrysogonus! It is not by chance that Cicero does 
not want to hear the delegates from Ameria as witnesses as they would probably testify that 
Sulla’s libertine bribed Roscius Capito and thereby his argumentation would be ruined. Nor is 
it in the interest of the representative of the prosecution, Erucius to hear these testimonies as 
thereby attention would be inevitably drawn to whom the murder was in the interest of in the 
first place—without any special logical skills anybody could infer the answer: the man who 
entrusted him, Chrysogonus. So, albeit, Cicero charges Sulla’s favourite, Chrysogonus, at the 
same time, he acquits him, and shifts the greater part of the weight of the crime onto Capito 
and Magnus.2 
Here, we come up against a rather paradoxical situation. Why did Chrysogonus want at any 
cost to have Roscius junior sentenced for patricide, although he himself put the victim on the 
list of persons inflicted by proscriptio, and it was paying regard to this circumstance that he 
could get his property through auction? Why did Cicero not use the fact of selling the victim’s 
property by auction (venditio bonorum) for proving the innocence of his defendant or lack of 
his motivation? To these questions Richard Heinze has given a highly probable explanation. If 
Roscius junior had wanted to prove his own innocence, more exactly, lack of crime by 
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referring to the fact of proscriptio, thereby, for that matter, he would have served 
Chrysogonus’s interests because he would have acknowledged the lawfulness of selling the 
father’s property by auction and would have deprived himself of the legal grounds for 
reclaiming the inheritance. Verdict of acquittal resting on this basis would have been all grist 
to Chrysogonus’s mill.1 With respect to one element, Wilfried Stroh specifies Heinze’s 
hypothesis, but thereby this explanation is even more confirmed. Citing Sulla’s proscriptio 
laws, Cicero himself distinguished between the two reasons for forfeiture of property and 
auction: on the one hand, the property of those who were actually subjected to proscriptio, on 
the other hand, the goods of those who were killed in armed conflicts with Sulla’s adherents 
were sold by auction ex officio.2 First, Cicero suggests that Chrysogonus was able to acquire 
Roscius senior’s property because he belonged to the first category,3 and at this point the 
orator’s form of expression becomes somewhat obscure; however, later on, when he 
investigates the fact of auction with a lawyer’s eyes, he makes it clear that Chrysogonus had 
intentionally ranked the murdered man to the group of citizens who were done away with 
during the fight against Sulla’s adherents.4 Consequently, not even in theory could Roscius 
junior defend himself by, albeit, acknowledging murder of his father but, paying regard to 
proscriptio, referring to the point that his act was legally not considered crime—even if he 
does not take the burden of patricide (in the present case, not to be sanctioned under criminal 
law, “merely” to be condemned morally) upon himself, it would have been sufficient for him 
to refer to fact that his father was killed during fights.5 The lawsuit would be by all means 
concluded with acquittal, yet, Chrysogonus would have invariably disposed over the 
inheritance—that is, the accused would have been compelled to play the role that he was 
meant to in accordance with the scenario forced upon him by the charge brought against him. 
It was exactly this cast that Cicero wanted to change! 
In his statement of the prosecution, Erucius does not mention either Chrysogonus’s name or 
the fact of venditio bonorum,6 from that moment—in accordance with the logic of the 
prosecution—the defence would be offered two options: either it would too not bring up the 
sale of the property of the murdered by auction or it would found the strategy of defence just 
on this piece of evidence, asserting that the fact of venditio bonorum would prove that 
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Roscius senior was killed in the fight against Sulla’s adherents and was not murdered by his 
son. If the defence tried to proceed along the first path, then, in the short run, Chrysogonus 
would become the winner in the case because the accused would be sentenced for patricide, 
yet, simultaneously, it would become clear that Sulla’s libertine unlawfully possesses the 
victim’s goods and could anytime expect a lawsuit brought by the Roscii laying claim to such 
goods. If, however, the defence chose the second path, and Roscius junior were acquitted 
based on Chrysogonus’s tactics—as the murder happened during the fights—then, 
Chrysogonus could keep the property of the murdered and by that the lawfulness of the 
auction would be also proved, and the victim’s son could not lay claim to paternal 
inheritance.1 Thus, Chrysogonus’s interest was exactly acquittal of the accused in such form! 
All this explains why Erucius’s statement of the prosecution was so weak as if he did not 
really strive for the conviction of the accused.2 Cicero claims that Erucius has compiled the 
counts of the indictment so carelessly because he hoped that nobody would dare to defend the 
accused as thereby he would oppose the influential Chrysogonus too—although, 
Chrysogonus’s name was not even mentioned in the statement of the prosecution. If, however, 
we presume that the conviction of the accused was not in the interest of the possessors of the 
property of the murdered—because the version on Roscius killed during the fights and selling 
the property lawfully by auction would have been more suitable for their plans—then, 
Erucius’s low-key statement becomes understandable: the outcome of a well-built effective 
statement of the prosecution would have been unpredictable as, in case of a weaker defence, 
the judges would have convicted the accused. So, the prosecution waited to see to what 
direction the defence wants to proceed: if they step in the trap of the tactics sparing the life of 
the accused but letting the property get lost, then Chrysogonus’s party has achieved their goal. 
If they don’t, then in the later phase of the lawsuit they can increase the pressure on the judges 
aimed at sentencing the accused. So, they have provided an excellent example of how 
brilliantly a bad statement of the prosecution can serve the interests of the prosecution! 
Another trick of the prosecution: Capito brings it to the knowledge of the accused what (either 
true or invented) facts he could disclose to the judges in his testimony. In general, it is not 
customary to “let the opponent into” the strategic secrets of the prosecution—except when 
dropping certain information is nothing else than intimidation. According to the well 
harmonised collusion between Erucius and Capito, although the representative of the 
prosecution retains certain information from the judges, the witness of the prosecution 
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“warns” the accused lest he should cherish excessive hopes based on the mild statement of the 
prosecution.1 
Cicero could choose (could have chosen) between the two paths “offered” by the prosecution 
and a third “own” path. If he accepts the lifeline thrown by the opponent, which states that the 
victim’s death was caused not by his son but military actions, he spares the life of the accused 
but he can say goodbye to his property for ever. (A less talented counsel for the defence 
perhaps follows this tactics, for we should not forget: even a hook will be a lifeline for 
somebody drowning!) If he does not bring up the auction not mentioned by the prosecution, 
his defendant can keep his property, yet, he does not clear him of the charge of patricide, his 
life will continue to be in danger. (Who knows what incriminating confessions Capito and his 
associates will come forward with in the lawsuit? The political climate would also make 
conviction for patricide probable—as it is admitted by Cicero too.2) As a matter of fact—and 
Chrysogonus had to think of that too—Cicero can unmask and prove the real intentions of the 
prosecution that the aim is nothing else than acquittal of the accused and thereby grabbing of 
his inheritance. Here, however, he might have argued as follows: if the defence doubted the 
lawfulness of venditio bonorum, then, on the one hand, it would put Sulla himself in negative 
light as all that took place on his behalf;3 on the other hand, the judges might include several 
senators who profiteered from the proscriptiones, so, to attack auctions “en bloc” would be a 
serious tactical error. Finally: if the victim was killed not in the fights and was not murdered 
by his son either, the question would righteously arise: who the actual murderer could have 
been. Pursuant to the cui prodest principle, of course, Chrysogonus would be suspected as 
instigator, however, it would call for highly great courage—much rather recklessness—for the 
defence to search for the perpetrator of the crime among Sulla’s direct confidants, whom the 
dictator has, besides, made the possessor of the goods of the deceased.4 
As a starting point, Cicero chooses the third path but he does not follow it through: on the one 
hand, he makes it clear that the primary purpose of the lawsuit is not to avenge Roscius 
senior’s death but to decide the fate of the property left by him; on the other hand, he leaves 
the effort of the prosecution in obscurity that the proceedings should be concluded by the 
acquittal of Roscius junior. He does everything to prevent the judges from realising the 
opponent’s strategy, what is more: from first to last he hammers into them that Chrysogonus 
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wants to have the victim’s son sentenced to death to enable him to grab the property. So, 
Cicero’s form of representation is much more pathetic than reality: the accused is fighting for 
his life rather than his property; and he does not beg the judges to reinstate the party injured 
by proscriptios in this property, he begs them to decide not to deprive the unlucky fellow, 
already done out of his property, of his life.1 He obscures his own tactics too, as its aim is, 
among others, just to get the property of the accused back.2 In the course of that, he, as a 
matter of fact, has to attack Sulla’s favourite, Chrysogonus, who, in his own words, produces 
huge impact on public affairs too3: Cicero claims that the liberated slave has unlawfully 
grabbed the property of the murdered man, and has commenced the lawsuit from the 
background against the victim’s son based on invented charge so that he could keep the 
property. It is literally a matter of life and death for the orator to separate the person of Sulla 
and Chrysogonus strictly from one another: the absolute ruler of the state knows nothing of 
the libertine’s proceeding for if he knew about it, he would not allow that such flagrant 
roguery could be committed under the protection of his name!4 Perhaps, the delegates from 
Ameria managed to appear before Sulla but the dictator refused their request in order to 
favour his confidant—it is not by chance that the counsel for the defence does not summon 
the members of the delegation as witnesses; yet, he is aware that the prosecutor cannot put 
this question to them either since thereby he would shed bad light on Sulla: Erucius is 
compelled to tolerate that Cicero clears Sulla of accusations in the case for if he contradicts 
him, he himself will denigrate the dictator.5 
At this point, in contrasting Sulla with Chrysogonus Cicero’s voice sounds rather false, yet, he 
cannot go too far in the outbursts against Chrysogonus: he can denigrate him just as much as 
it is absolutely necessary for the sake of the case, so, he must clear him of the charge of 
murder, provided that he finds a suitable murderer. That is where Roscius Capito and Roscius 
Magnus come into the picture. In the person of Capito, based on his conduct of life and 
depraved morals6 and the benefit of three estates gained from the victim’s goods, an ideal 
murderer could be found, but the fact that he was elected a member of the delegation sent to 
Sulla—for being a member of the board of the town council of Ameria,7 which otherwise 
makes the obvious character of depraved conduct of life questionable—seems to contradict all 
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this. In the case of Magnus, the situation is just the opposite: his conduct of life cannot be 
contested, and only indirectly does he benefit from the victim’s death but he stays in Rome at 
the time of the murder and Chrysogonus appoints him to be the administrator of the property 
acquired in the auction.1 So, one by one they are not suitable for the role of the murderer for 
Cicero, the two together, however, constitute a pair that perfectly fits in the orator’s form of 
presentation, and that is how Cicero creates from them the pair of Castor and Pollux of the 
case, who operate inseparably in unity of intention.2 
Here, the orator builds the disposition with amazing virtuosity: the usual prooemium should 
be followed by narratio expounding his own version created of the events and the 
argumentatio proving that. However, as his own narratio would not form a rounded whole, 
by placing the most important element of the argumentatio before the narratio he integrates it 
in the prooemium.3 At the very beginning of the speech, by a crushing tirade he brings it to 
the knowledge of the judges: the murder serves the interests of Chrysogonus and not of the 
accused, the purpose of the lawsuit is nothing else than that Chrysogonus could keep the 
unlawfully grabbed property. He has not yet said a word of the murder committed, he right 
away turns the cast of the lawsuit around: Roscius junior’s case itself is a statement of 
prosecution against Chrysogonus, and the representative of the prosecution can at best defend 
its points.4 The judges could not easily withdraw from this influence—they must have felt that 
Cicero has opened their eyes, and from then on they gladly shut their eyes to minor 
contradictions of the defence.5 It is not by chance that in the argumentatio embedded in the 
prooemium, the orator refrains from directly bringing up the murder or investigating after the 
perpetrators for if he does that, in the spirit of cui prodest, he would have cast the suspicion 
on Chrysogonus—and he had to carefully avoid that. So, he must give an account of the form 
of the murder in the narratio.6 After he describes Roscius senior at length, and he does not 
omit to emphasise that he was a committed adherent of the nobility and Sulla himself,7 he 
calls—and for that matter right away as an inseparable pair, in the inner circle of 
Chrysogonus—Capito and Magnus to the stage. 
It is at this point where he formulates his hypothesis on the motif and circumstances of the 
murder. Here come the arguments on the Roscii’s past: Cicero calls Capito an old gladiator, 
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which is quite a degrading appositio, and adds that Magnus became his follower too. At the 
same time, the statements regarding the perpetrators’ past can be inferred from the crime 
itself. The narratio follows the order of the events—of course, by increasingly highlighting 
dramatic moments—and breaks through the order of the events at one point only: according to 
the orator’s narrative Capito receives his share from the victim’s property as early as before 
his participation in the delegation, thereby the judges can see that it is proved that he was part 
of the conspiracy from the outset. The argumentatio following the above1 is preceded by a 
brief partitio.2 In accordance with the rules of anticategorica3 Cicero, first, puts forward 
evidence to prove Roscius junior’s innocence,4 then, he starts his attack against Capito and 
Magnus5—his aim here is to protect his defendant’s life. This is followed by the 
argumentation on Chrysogonus’s unlawful grabbing6—here, the orator is driven by the motif 
of getting the robbed paternal inheritance back. Cicero’s narrative on the murder already 
contains the presumption that the auction was from the first illegal.7 
In the part of the argumentatio, which is aimed at clearing Roscius junior, Cicero starts his 
reasoning by enumerating the so-called argumenta de vita.8 Cicero claimed that the 
representatives of the prosecution could bring up nothing against Roscius junior’s conduct of 
life. Although Erucius charged him with misappropriation of funds (peculatus),9 he was 
unable to produce evidence on the merits to certify his statement. Cicero takes the charge of 
peculatus—which nevertheless referred to some kind of greed—out of the original context 
and by referring it to the scope of other lies, he dismisses it briefly. The exploration of the so-
called argumenta e causa10 is more profound and precise than it would be required by 
Erucius’s pleadings: the orator wins the sympathy of the audience by lengthy digressions and 
introduces more scope for usual topoi (the prosecutors’ bad conscience, high appreciation of 
peasant’s way of life in Rome, etc.). Much more original is the structure of the so-called 
argumenta e facto.11 Although the prosecution asserts that Roscius, as an indirect perpetrator 
with the assistance of slaves, killed his father,12 Cicero ignores this statement and considers 
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the following opportunities one by one: Roscius did away with his father by himself, with the 
assistance of others—freemen or slaves from Ameria or Rome. As slaves are listed at the end 
of the enumeration only, the orator judges this opportunity by stating that his defendant—if he 
had been the perpetrator—would have used this tool only in a fit of despair. Yet, he refutes 
this count of the indictment with the greatest of ease, stating that Roscius junior asked that the 
slaves should be subjected to interrogation and, in the course of that, torture, Roscius Magnus 
and Chrysogonus prevented their interrogation. The so-called argumenta e tempore following 
the above prepares the attack against Capito, Magnus and Chrysogonus.1 
In the attack against the opponents, Cicero puts forward his arguments in an order following 
the chronology of the events.2 First, he takes account of the line of argumenta e causa and 
argumenta e vita anteacta with respect to Roscius Magnus presented by the orator as the 
actual perpetrator of the murder.3 The framework of argumenta e facto—more specifically 
argumenta e loco,4 e tempore,5 e tempore consequenti6—is filled primarily by expounding the 
importance of the role of the messenger of the murder, Mallius Glaucia and the news 
forwarded by him to Capito.7 It is by this that Cicero brings the other Roscius, the accomplice 
of the murder, Capito in the picture, against whom he straightaway puts forward his reasoning 
to be formulated on the basis of argumenta e causa8 and argumenta e vita,9 which he closes 
with a tirade against the two Roscii.10 Cicero does not carry through the analysis of the 
importance of the news immediately forwarded to Chrysogonus,11 however, by stressing the 
extent of grabbing he allows to presume the motif of the crime.12 Spending a long time with 
the role of the delegation sent to Volaterrae is primarily aimed at increasing the antipathy 
against Capito.13 At this point, Cicero again turns to the refusal of the opportunity of 
interrogating the slaves,14 which, albeit, supports Roscius junior’s innocence, leaves little 
surface of attack on the movers of the charge as the orator is compelled to declare that the 
present owner of the slaves, Chrysogonus is little interested in the murder itself, only by his 
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power (potentia) did he help the infamy of the infamous Capito and Magnus (audacia).1 His 
last “argument” could not have been convincing to the judges either; yet, paying regard to the 
dangerous political circumstances of the case, the orator must have thought—as a matter of 
fact, leaving it open for the judges to draw the conclusion that Sulla’s confidant must have 
had a greater part in committing the murder—that he had better declare that as far as he is 
concerned he tries to judge Chrysogonus’s acts “in good faith”: namely, that his corruptness 
does not make Chrysogonus a murderer.2 
The argumentatio against Chrysogonus hides several difficulties attributable, among others, 
to the deterioration of the text;3 however, building the reasoning reminding of tightrope 
walking between interests could not represent an easy task even to Cicero. First, he qualifies 
the sale of the victim’s property unlawful;4 then, he again emphasises that the idea of the 
lawsuit has been made up and the action is moved by nobody else than Chrysogonus, who is 
motivated solely by the intention to keep the unlawfully grabbed property thereby.5 These 
difficulties must have arisen not so much in outlining the psychological background but in 
presenting arguments in such form that the judges coming from the nobility should not feel 
injured: as a part of them enjoyed the benefits of proscriptiones, Cicero had to refrain from 
doubting the appropriateness and lawfulness of forfeitures of property and auctions for in this 
case he most probably could have been afraid of the nobles setting their rows straight against 
the orator, who attacks the proscriptio and its consequences, and his defendant.6 Accordingly, 
first, he sharply separates Chrysogonus’s deeds in the past from the procedure of others who 
benefited from auctions and proscriptiones,7 then, with overwhelming pathos he argues that if 
the judges distance themselves from the corrupt practices of this kind of parvenus—quite 
clearly he refers to the class-consciousness and human envy of the nobles—the cause of the 
nobility will shine all the more brightly and immaculately.8 
After the orator has flattered the self-respect of the nobility, he must convince the judges 
simultaneously of two, completely contradictory demands: on the one hand, he must insist on 
that Roscius junior has no other desire than sparing his life, and in return he would be pleased 
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to deliver his property voluntarily to Chrysogonus1—on the other hand, he must not forget 
about his actual goal, specifically, that simultaneously with obtaining verdict of acquittal, he 
should get the robbed paternal inheritance back for his defendant. Inspired by a brilliant idea, 
he separates the claim of the accused from his own desire (formulated as a general statement 
for the public): when he begs the judges for sparing Roscius’s life, he speaks on behalf of his 
defendant2—and when he demands reinstating of the lawful property status, he turns to the 
judges in his own voice but on behalf of public order calling for security in law.3 By doing so, 
he maintains the legal claim for paternal inheritance, but by nothing does he impair the 
passionate course of the peroratio begging for mercy, referring to eternal laws of humanity4—
and while the judges are listening to Cicero’s soul shaking periods with deep emotion, they 
can safely forget about the real subject of the lawsuit at stake for both of the parties: the six 
million sestertii.5 
It is not without any reason that Cicero himself considered this oration delivered by him at the 
age of twenty-six his masterpiece6 as he solved numerous quite conflicting tasks by brilliant 
rhetorical tactics: he built his own version on the murder, in which he unmasked and at the 
time obscured the opponent’s intentions; on behalf of his defendant he waived the paternal 
inheritance worth several millions, at the same time, on behalf of the public he maintained, 
from first to last, the claim of the accused to get it back; he set up the “hierarchy of infamy” 
where the two infamous Roscii, Magnus and Capito are placed as murderers at one pole, the 
“merely” greedy and corrupt Chrysogonus in the middle, and, compared to the murderers, a 
complete opposite is constituted by the other pole, the dictator, Sulla knowing nothing of 
abuses and foul deeds, whose name has been abused in bad faith by his subjects and 
confidants.7 
While recognising the virtues of content of the speech, Wilfried Stroh criticises its structure at 
several points. He argues that the partes orationis excessively, one might say, in a schoolish 
manner, follow the order set in the literature of rhetorical training, and they allow to infer a 
kind of superstitio praeceptorum,8 almost superstitious insistence on what has been acquired 
in training. Accordingly, Cicero too sharply separates narratio from argumentatio and does 
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not finish certain threads once started (so, for example, the references to Magnus’s 
profiteering or to the purported assassination attempt against Roscius junior), which might 
have aroused the audience’s suspicion or at least interest.1 These matters of detail and 
criticised elements would have been probably handled by greater circumspection by the 
mature Cicero, however, we should not forget that this oratio is the second speech of the 
twenty-six years old orator; yet, among cases of greater importance, his first serious and 
successful attempt.  
The formal exaggerations, the Baroque-like amplitudes of the asianism, the pathetic rattle 
sometimes almost crossing the border of good taste were cut off of Cicero’s style by practice 
and further rhetoric studies—nevertheless, the ingenuity of rhetorical disposition, the precise 
yet flexible handling of the legal facts of the case, the masterly implementation of merging 
logical and topical arguments, which later on served the basis of Cicero’s ars oratoria, we can 
see blossoming out already in Pro Roscio Amerino in full pomp. 
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II. Lawsuit of Aulus Cluentius Habitus  
 
The statement of the defence delivered in the criminal action (causa publica) of Aulus 
Cluentius Habitus—Cicero’s longest actually delivered speech left to us—is from 66, that is, 
the year when Cicero was praetor. In certain respect, it is the precious stone of Cicero’s ars 
oratoria since its narrative is vivid, full of turns like a crime story; events, scenes, planes of 
time replace one another boldly, sometimes seemingly illogically but, being subordinated to 
the effect the orator means to attain, in an exactly premeditated sequence. Cluentius was 
charged, on the one hand, with poisoning his stepfather, Statius Albius Oppianicus. The other 
part of the charge was founded on the criminal proceedings under which eight years before 
Cluentius charged Oppianicus with poisoning attempt against him, as a result of which 
Oppianicus was compelled to go into exile—in the current lawsuit, however, the prosecution 
brought it up against him that the former court of justice declared Oppianicus guilty purely 
because Cluentius had bribed the judges. Lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis of 81 served as 
basis for judging crimes that provide grounds for the charge of poisoning; however, the 
prohibition of bribing judges applied to the order of senators only, and Cluentius belonged to 
the order of knights.  
 
II. 1. Historical background of Pro Cluentio 
 
Cicero refers to the oration delivered in defence of Aulus Cluentius Habitus in 66 in Orator 
written twenty years later as an example of using the three genres of style in the same speech,1 
and quotes a truly successfully made phrase2 from it.3 Writing about the orator’s power of 
judgement Quintilian brings up Cluentiana as a textbook example of properly built rhetorical 
strategy,4 and elsewhere he expounds that Cicero threw sand (that is, dust) into the judges’ 
eyes.5 The oration is cited by Gellius too;6 Pliny considers it Cicero’s most outstanding 
rhetorical achievement,7 and from among Claudius Tryphoninus mentions it.8 Philology of the 
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modern age also devoted considerable scope to the Pro Cluentio, Theodor Mommsen refers to 
the speech as an outstanding example of antique “criminal statistics”.1 
The accused of the lawsuit, A. Cluentius Habitus was born in Larinum in north Apulia 
controlled by the Aurii, Albii, Cluentii and Magii related by manifold marriage connections 
and kinship,2 which shows the reflection of crimes growing wild in Rome3 and it cannot be 
said that at a rate of a small town.4 He lost his father, Cluentius senior when he was fifteen, in 
88;5 two years later his mother, Sassia got married again, and to the husband of her daughter, 
Cluentia, that is, her own son-in-law, A. Aurius Melinus, at that.6 That is where Cicero dates 
the bad relation between the accused and his mother from as he claims that Cluentius was so 
much shocked at Sassia’s act that he decided not to maintain any relation with his mother.7 
Aurius—purportedly as a result of the machinations of St. Abbius Oppianicus—fell victim of 
Sulla’s proscriptiones,8 and Cluentius’s mother married Oppianicus, who earlier divorced at 
least two wives, Papia (Magius’s widow) and Novia, and lost two wives, the elder Cluentia 
and Magia.9 
It is worth noting that to illustrate the hatred between Oppianicus senior and Cluentius Cicero 
does not use the opportunity that he could properly exploit as the psychological motivation of 
the assassination attempted by Oppianicus against his stepson, namely, he does not mention 
how Cluentius responded—possibly with antipathy or anger—to the fact of the marriage of 
his mother and Oppianicus.10 Magia was the mother of Oppianicus junior, who acted as 
accuser against Cluentius, that is, the son of his stepmother in 66. Oppianicus senior 
purportedly wanted to get his stepson, Cluentius poisoned and used C. Fabricius for carrying 
out his plan, who tried to win the help both of Scamander, the libertine and the slave of the 
physician who treated Cluentius for performing the murder.11 It is impossible to clarify how 
much the fact of the assassination attempt could be considered proved; however, Cluentius 
brought a charge first against Scamander, then Fabricius and finally his stepfather, Oppianicus 
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senior. The court of justice found all the accused persons guilty; however, Oppianicus was 
convicted with a little majority of the votes cast.1 The lawsuit involved several suspicious 
circumstances, for example, the judges were drawn irregularly,2 the suspicion of bribe3 
emerged with respect to several senators, e.g., C. Fidiculanius Falcula,4 M. Atilius Bulbus and 
Staienus.5  
Based on all that, suspicion extensively spread that the lawsuit was influenced by bribes and 
bribe attempts. In spite of the fact that Oppianicus was convicted, Cicero tries to present the 
case as if Oppianicus himself might have been the briber and it was thanks to this that almost 
half of the members of the court of justice voted for his innocence, in contrast with 
Scamander and Fabricius who were unanimously convicted; on the other hand, Oppianicus’s 
counsel, L. Quinctius suspected Cluentius of bribe as by his formal accusation he eventually 
won success, and used this case for agitating as a tribune before the popular assembly against 
the corruptness of the order of senators constituting the courts of justice.6 Consequently, the 
lawsuit caused political stir and served as grounds for proceedings against several senators 
who participated in the lawsuit as judges.7 Cicero, who defended Scamander in the 74 
proceedings, refers to the case as a textbook example of the bribeability of courts of justice 
just because Oppianicus was sentenced by only little majority of the votes cast, from which he 
wanted to create evidence of or at least arguments on the bribe committed by the accused.8 
Two years after he was convicted, in 72, Oppianicus senior died in exile but near Rome9—the 
prosecution claimed that Cluentius had him poisoned10—however, no factual data are 
available on the circumstances of his death. His widow, Sassia suspected her son (that is, 
Oppianicus’s stepson), Cluentius of having poisoned Oppianicus, and she tried to confirm her 
suspicion by testimonies—primarily forced from slaves—but she did not succeed in it.11 
However, after further deaths occurred, and Cluentius got involved in them under unclarified 
circumstances, in 66 Abbius Oppianicus junior—presumably twenty-one years old at the time 
of the lawsuit12—brought a charge against Cluentius, a member of the order of knights,1 based 
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on Sulla’s lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis, which contained the state of facts elements 
homicide, illegal possession of arms, making and passing on poison for the purpose of 
manslaughter, arson and certain procedural crimes, such as for example bribing the court of 
justice in order to have innocent persons sentenced—however, it extended this later scope of 
state of facts to magistrates and senators only.2 Based on that—paying regard to the letter of 
the law—Cluentius could not be declared guilty in the charge of bribe if for no other reason 
than because he did not belong to the scope of subjects of the law as he came from a family in 
the order of knights and had never held a state office.3 The office of iudex quaestionis was 
fulfilled by Q. Voconius Naso;4 the young Titus Attius, knight of Pisaurum acted on the side 
of the prosecution,5 the defence of Cluentius, who can be most probably considered guilty in 
the charges brought against him, was undertaken by Cicero, a praetor in 66, who attained that 
the accused was acquitted.6 The court of justice consisted of thirty-two jurors, made up, on the 
grounds of lex Aurelia iudiciaria of 70, of senators, knights and aerar tribunes each 
constituting one-third of the panel.7 
The defence followed a double path: it did not come to the main count of the indictment 
immediately; instead, it dealt with the issue of bribe first. In order to support his own narrative 
on bribe, to discuss the subject of bribe more extensively than the accuser: first, he details 
Oppianicus senior’s guilty past record, and deals with two former lawsuits related to the 
assassination attempt against Cluentius. In the introduction Cicero announces that in his 
statement of the defence he will follow the double path indicated by the prosecution and will 
justify why he deals with the first point more profoundly than with the second one: the charge 
of poisoning is fully unfounded, therefore, it can be get done with briefly; the bribe case has 
been generally known for eight years already, and the joint effort of the counsel for the 
defence and the judges will be required to do away with it. The first part of the statement of 
the defence consists of three subchapters, which deal with Oppianicus senior’s past record, the 
poisoning lawsuit of the year 74 and the bribe case. In the second part of the oration, which 
now covers the main count of the indictment, i.e., the issue of assassination committed by 
Cluentius against Oppianicus by poison, the orator passes over other purported acts of the 
accused and the crime of poisoning with lapidary conciseness and almost suspicious ease, and 
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he spends more time only on the testimonies enforced from slaves brought up by the 
prosecution as evidence. 
 
II. 2. Applicability of lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis in Cluentius’s lawsuit 
 
In the beginning of the speech, in the prooemium, Cicero strictly separates the charge of 
murder committed by poison and the charge of bribing the court of justice that passed 
sentence on Oppianicus senior eight years before, which was politically highly exploited by 
subscriptor Attius.1 The charge could be based (i) on assassination and mixing of poison, (ii) 
several poisoning attempts and bribing the court of justice, (iii) simply on assassination 
attempt.2 It makes it rather difficult to reconstruct the facts that Cicero both conceals facts 
unpleasant to his defendant and dispenses with elements self-evident to the audience of the 
period but no longer known to the reader of the present day. It is clear that as counsel for the 
defence Cicero’s task was to prove to the judges that his defendant had not committed the 
crime(s) he was charged with—that is, in accordance with the fundamental rhetorical 
principles he had to proceed in compliance with status coniecturalis.3 
To a lawyer’s eyes, one of the most interesting questions of Pro Cluentio is whether the 
charge brought by Oppianicus junior based on lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis against 
Cluentius applied to manslaughter committed by poison only or covered bribe of the court of 
justice too, which the accused committed, as claimed by the accuser, eight years before, in the 
lawsuit against Oppianicus senior. In clarifying the question, as a matter of fact, the problem 
of the reliability of the source base arises as Cicero’s form of presentation and his references 
to the text of the law are most probably tendentious—even if he could not have modified or 
distorted the text of the law on the merits when citing it—and the form of Sulla’s laws left to 
us is from a much later age;4 furthermore, it must be taken into account that the text effective 
at the time of the lawsuit is not necessarily identical with the text left to us.5 Although the 
later version of lex Cornelia de falsis sanctions active bribe in court of justice, it is not 
probable that the original lex Cornelia testamentaria contained provisions to such effect. In 
the attempt to determine the counts of the indictment precisely, one should not forget about 
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the circumstance that in the quaestio proceedings the accuser was allowed to present 
everything to the jurors that he could bring up against the accused since his aim was to declare 
guilt in general only and not to fix guilt that can be declared in specific counts of the 
indictment since punishment was not based on the discretion of the court of justice.1 We 
cannot know for sure if in delatio nominis it was mandatory to notify the law and if in 
addition to naming the law that provided grounds for the charge it was mandatory to specify 
its exact passage or if it was mandatory to name other counts of the indictment to be referred 
to in the scope of the charge and whether they were binding with respect to the continuation 
of the lawsuit in the event that they were determined.2 
There is a good chance of stating that in the introduction of the lawsuit it was mandatory to 
set the counts of the inducement in writing, as Cicero notes this in De inventione regarding the 
period before Sulla.3 It is worth looking at how much Cicero specifies statutory grounds of the 
charge of the given lawsuit in his speeches and to what extent he comments on the 
introductory part of the lawsuit (postulatio, delatio nominis, receptio nominis). References to 
the state of facts and charge of de pecuniis repetundis,4 de maiestate,5 de ambitu,6 peculatus,7 
inter sicarios and veneficii,8 iniuriarum,9 furti,10 de vi,11 de alea12 and de parricidio13 can be 
found item by item.14 Furthermore, in several cases he names the particular law, for example 
lex Plautia de vi,15 lex Iulia de pecuniis repetundis,16 lex Papia,17 lex Acilia18 and lex 
Scantinia.19 In several orations he refers expressis verbis to the charge being in conformity 
with the facts of the case, for example, in Pro Roscio Amerino,20 In Verrem—among others 
regarding the statues erected21—Pro Scauro,1 Pro Rabirio Postumo2 and Pro Ligario.3 
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In Pro Cluentio Cicero’s form of presentation is twofold. On the one hand, it gives the 
impression that the court of justice is competent exclusively in the case of poisoning,4 and 
article six of lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis on bribing the court of justice does not apply 
to Cluentius as the scope of persons is restricted to the order of senators;5 on the other hand, it 
deals with bribe continuously as crimen. The quaestio chaired by Q. Voconius Naso was 
undoubtedly competent primarily in cases of poisoning—which, as a matter of fact, does not 
exclude bringing up other counts of the indictment—at the same time it contained a section 
that sanctioned bribe.6 It is worth looking at the points referred to by Joachim Classen in order 
to clarify if the charge was in conformity with the facts of the case. In spite of incomplete 
source base it can be pointed out that in no other cases was a charge brought due to bribe in 
court of justice on the grounds of lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis as there were other 
opportunities for sanctioning bribe of the court of justice. Furthermore, it is not probable that 
iudex quaestionis would have sustained the charge contrary to the letter of the law, more 
specifically, that the prosecutor would extend the state of facts of Sulla’s law to the order of 
knights, beyond the order of senators. Cicero asserts that Attius often referred to aequitas, by 
which he argued for the extensive interpretation of the law, and Cicero—although he wants to 
protect Cluentius against the peril arising from the suspicion of bribe—does not refer to bribe 
even once as crimen in conformity with the charge, and quotes no testimony to refute it; 
instead, he underlines it much rather as a point brought up by the prosecution that can 
generate prejudice7 and bias.8 
 
II. 3. The “charge” of iudicium Iunianum and bribe in court of justice  
 
As the starting point of his speech Cicero chose the speech of subscriptor Attius—as the main 
accuser, Oppianicus scarcely said anything9—apparently he recognised it as a rhetorical 
achievement. In his very first sentences he tried to reflect on the opponent’s speech and 
mitigate its effect, which, however, might raise considerable suspicion as to whether he had 
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reconstructed the opponent’s argument without any distortion.1 By the appearance that he 
speaks accepting Attius’s division2 he undoubtedly made an effort to give the impression of 
sincerity, insistence on truth and lack of rhetorical tactics to the audience.3 Some paragraphs 
later the hearer or the reader will be surprised to notice that it is just deviation from the 
accuser’s system, individual arrangement of the facts, circumstances and evidence by which 
Cicero wants to convince the judges of his truth, emphasising that they will be able to form an 
opinion and make judgment on what had happened after having learned of the full scope of 
the structure set up by him.4 Cicero looks forward, with trust, to the refutation of the actual 
charge discussed by the opponent—as the orator claims5—just touching on the issue, that is, 
the charge of poisonings (more accurately three poisonings), and he contrasts it with the 
extensively discussed charge sufficiently known to the public, the charge of bribing the court 
of justice passing sentence eight years before; at the same time, he stresses that only the 
charge of poisonings falls within the competence of the court of justice set up now.6 (Based 
on Cicero’s statement of the defence the charges of poisoning brought against Cluentius might 
have been the following:7 poisoning Oppianicus senior by abetment of Strato, Micostratus and 
M. Asellius,8 poisoning C. Vibius Capax9 and assassination attempt against Oppianicus 
junior.10) At the same time he cannot fully ignore the charge of bribe—as Attius talked about 
at length—instead, he starts a counter-attack: he qualifies this charge libel arising from 
political motifs, and as such a threat that must be taken seriously and whose treatment 
requires the counsel for the defence to use a non-routine strategy and the judges to show deep 
and wise consideration.11 Thereby he manages to make the charge general enough as if it were 
aimed against the fact of bribe and corruption in court of justice only and not against the 
person of Cluentius.12 
By trying to present his defendant as a person persecuted for political reasons for years, the 
orator, as a matter of fact, tries to win the judges’ compassion, to whom he does not omit to 
stress his faith in their objectivity and sense of justice, which he underlines by recurrently 
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using the concept of aequitas.1 At the end of the introduction, Cicero sums up the plan of his 
statement of the defence, in which, however, he mentions the strategy of handling only the 
charge of bribe, which is—according to his earlier statement—legally insignificant.2 
Concerning this point he announces that the charge of bribe is far from being unfounded but 
its direction is totally different from what public opinion has been poisoned with so far: 
namely, in the case of Oppianicus senior the judges were indeed bribed, yet, not by Cluentius 
but against Cluentius.3 By the latter circumstance—which he would not have needed 
necessarily, as it would have been enough for him to clear his defendant by proving: it was 
not Cluentius who bribed the court of justice—he wanted to achieve a double goal: on the one 
hand, he connects the cases of Scamander and Fabricius with the lawsuit of Oppianicus by 
presenting the sentences passed therein as praeiudicium,4 on the other hand, he enables 
himself to deal in depth with Oppianicus’s all foul deeds deemed relevant and suitable for 
deterring the court of justice and the audience. In other words, before going into the defence 
of Cluentius he turns the positions of the fight around and launches an attack against the 
accuser, more exactly against his father.5 
In the following sentences Cicero’s intention becomes even more unambiguous. He explains 
the act taken by the young accuser by his obligations as a son,6 and his own decision to 
expound the crimes of Oppianicus senior at length by his obligations as counsel for the 
defence,7 more specifically by pointing out that if it is possible to help a living person by 
causing harm to a dead person, it must be done.8 By apologising to the judges for perhaps 
dedicating too much room to Oppianicus senior—ensuring them that once he has explored all 
the circumstances of the case, he can clarify the situation of Cluentius defended by him—he 
creates the opportunity for himself to involve all additional information directly or indirectly 
related to the case as he pleases in the scope of the oratio.9 So, in the introduction10 after 
expressing seeming acknowledgement and sympathy for the accuser and the subscriptor as 
well as regret over his defendant’s miserable situation, he resolutely separates the counts of 
the indictment: the bribe that can be perhaps better supported by facts although it is legally 
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irrelevant in the given case, yet, it is represented as dangerous for political reasons and the 
assassination attempt having great significance in terms of the proceedings, which, however, 
can be easily refuted—wasting relatively few words on both the accuser and the accused, 
driving the judges’ attention to Oppianicus senior.1 
Cicero begins to describe the events as in a report,2 in a lean style he speaks about the death of 
Cluentius senior, a venerable citizen and about the marriage concluded by Cluentia junior 
with A. Aurius Melinus.3 Soon, he comes to Cluentius’s mother, Sassia, who married her own 
son-in-law. At this point he interrupts his sentence at the word mother and emphasises that in 
spite of all her vileness he calls her mother,4 perhaps all the more because it would be difficult 
to rephrase the Greek term mētēr amētōr5 in Latin.6 On several occasions he emphatically 
calls Sassia mother so that by contrasting this naming with the foul deeds attributed to her he 
could highlight that the deeds committed by her are unnatural and guilty, and as Sassia’s 
procedure was aimed against her daughter, Cluentia and not against Cluentius, the orator can 
build the connection between the circumstances only through some skilful manoeuvres.7 
Contrary to the original announcement—that he intends to discuss Oppianicus’s lawsuit in 74 
and the bribes that took place in relation to it8—Cicero as soon as he utters Sassia’s name, as 
if guided by sudden temper, comes to her marriage concluded with her son-in-law and 
expelling of her daughter,9 and at this point he does not confine himself to enumerating the 
facts objectively; instead, he dramatizes the series of events concerning them in a fortissimo 
imbued from first to last with powerful indignation, shifting from the instrumentation of 
defence to that of prosecution.10 He makes his attack not on the person who is directly related 
with bribe or poisonings but on the person only loosely connected with the charge, by all 
that—in accordance with the basic topos of antique rhetoric—he demonstrates that the 
motivations of the acts of a given person can be explored from his conduct of life.11 It is not 
chance that Cicero tries to work up temper against Sassia since he somewhat offsets the 
aversion to and prejudice against Cluentius, and tries to present Oppianicus junior’s formal 
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accusation as an act of a child’s pietas.1 Before returning to the basic story, he again points 
out that the judges have to listen to all that to be able to understand the full scope of the 
events.2 
Regarding the questions raised by pietas—after he has mitigated the effect that the child’s 
sentiment emphasised by the prosecutor produced on the judges, which was or could have 
been suitable from the first for turning the audience against Cluentius—the orator had to 
tackle the following problems involving great difficulties. Cicero had to decide (i) if he should 
treat crimina veneficii following the prosecutor’s dispositio after iudicium Iunianum or he 
should turn the order round; (ii) if he should proceed status collectionis (that is, referring to 
the interpretation in accordance with the letter of the law) or in accordance with status 
coniecturalis (by denying and refuting the charge of bribe committed by Cluentius); (iii) how 
he should turn the judges’ sympathy aimed at Oppianicus junior towards Cluentius.3 
By this narrative the orator—without coming to the actual refutation of the charges—gave a 
palpable picture, so to say suggesting the prosecutor’s motivation, of the conduct of life of the 
accuser’s stepmother, who was most probably present at the trial.4 By characterising Sassia in 
such form Cicero sheds light on the source of Cluentius’s all troubles, of the intriguing and 
lawsuit conducted against him, thereby while outlining the facts he strives to manipulate his 
audience by powerful psychological effects at the beginning of the speech already to be able 
to rely on value judgements so formulated while building his further arguments. 
After that he again reminds his audience of Oppianicus’s crimes and conviction,5 and in order 
to stop disbelief in Oppianicus’s foul deeds he tries to present Cluentius’s earlier accusation 
against his stepfather as lawful defence and make solely Oppianicus responsible for the failed 
poisoning attempt6—while in the characterisation of Oppianicus he tendentiously speaks 
about crimina and not the single crimen the sentence is based on as if the sentence had been 
passed due to several crimes.7 By discussing Oppianicus’s penal record Cicero finds the point 
of attack, beside Sassia, in another person not directly concerned in the lawsuit, thereby 
diverting the judges’ attention from the particular case and the accused before starting to 
refute the charge on the merits at all.8 
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After that the orator dwells on the fate of Dinaea and her family as well as Magia, Oppianicus 
senior’s second (or third) wife and the accuser’s mother, depicting the murder committed 
against Magia’s stepbrother, Oppianicus’s escape and return under Sulla’s protection with 
vivid colours.1 Cicero mentions the precedents and preparation for Oppianicus’s marriage to 
be concluded with Sassia as a textbook example of Oppianicus’s audacia2 by relating the 
sudden death of his two sons—the accuser’s stepbrothers.3 The narrative might give the 
impression to the superficial spectator—more exactly listener or reader—as if murders had 
taken place or Oppianicus had been responsible for the death of his sons. Looking at the text 
closer it becomes clear that Cicero does not state any of the opportunities expressis verbis, his 
formulation makes it possible to draw any conclusions, however, his tone might have aroused 
his audience’s suspicion with good reason that Oppianicus is far from being innocent in the 
children’s death. By what tools does the orator produce this effect? First, he makes general 
statements on Oppianicus’s and Sassia’s turpitude, then he describes Sassia’s reluctance to 
propose to her new suitor without exactly specifying its cause. After having sufficiently 
excited his audience’s curiosity, as the reason for reluctance he puts the answer to Sassia’s 
mouth that she does not resolve to marry Oppianicus because he has three sons, thereby 
suggesting that Oppianicus was compelled to choose between his sons and his future wife. At 
this point the orator reminds of Oppianicus’s greed and obscurely refers to it that he realised: 
he must find remedy against delaying his wedding-feast in his own house. He does not say a 
word about killing the children by Oppianicus, he only relates that Oppianicus, departing from 
his habit, had one of his sons brought to him, and after he suddenly died, he hastily had him 
buried. Regarding the other son he notes that he was killed; yet, he says nothing about who 
the murderer could have been; then, he draws the conclusion: now nothing was in the way of 
the marriage of Oppianicus and Sassia. These paragraphs are perfectly suitable for shedding 
light on Cicero’s rhetorical tactics in Pro Cluentio. He selects and enumerates various facts 
with good sense, and by his style reflecting contempt he suggests the unspoken conclusion 
with compelling force to his audience: Oppianicus has murdered his own sons for the sake of 
Sassia.4 
It was not by chance that Cicero must have felt: he used this trick so successfully that he can 
bravely draw conclusions regarding the mood of the judges of the former lawsuit under which 
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it was not these deaths that Oppianicus was held responsible for.1 He addresses a rhetorical 
question to those listening to him if there is anybody who should consider Oppianicus 
innocent and a victim of judicature defying law.  
While turning to the next part Cicero emphasises that now he will discuss it briefly and will 
soon come to treating the issues closely related to his defendant’s case, that is, not the charges 
yet, however, to avoid the appearance of unfavourable accuser’s role he does not omit to 
stress again that getting to know all these “antecedents” is indispensable for getting better 
acquainted with Cluentius’s case.2 In what follows Cicero suggests rather than states as a 
sentence Oppianicus’s guilt in the death of certain persons, for example, his first wife, the 
elder Cluentia and her brother, C. Oppianicus,3 focusing on his two “dear” crimes arising 
from his character: murder and bribe in court of justice.4 Although the enumeration of deaths 
is highly effective and dramatic, their discussion brings the audience farther from rather than 
closer to their clarification since the orator does not save the topoi of court of justice rhetoric 
(such as for example “double murder” committed against a pregnant woman) and proper tools 
of style, among others anaphorē, antithēsis, exclamatio and correctio.5 
One could believe that the pathos of the picture cannot be enhanced anymore; yet, Cicero 
takes one step further: he reminds his audience of the kinship relation between Cluentius and 
his mother, Sassia and his stepfather, Oppianicus,6 in the light of which he can legitimise 
Cluentius’s procedure in resolving to bring a charge solely due to the direct danger 
threatening his life.7 This way he presents his defendant’s earlier formal accusation against 
Oppianicus as a step just as necessary as Oppianicus junior’s formal accusation against 
Cluentius, by which he can contrast the incompatibility of Sassia’s role in the lawsuit and 
Oppianicus senior’s assassination attempt against Cluentius with both legal and ethical norms, 
that is, pietas.8 To make direct threat to Cluentius’s life more unambiguously clear, the orator 
now speaks no longer about the fact that the poison was caught in the act9 but that the 
assassination attempt itself was caught in the act,10 and he does not omit to name its motif, the 
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greed of Oppianicus craving for his stepson’s inheritance.1 (The fact that according to Cicero 
Oppianicus hoped to become the heir of Cluentius lets one presume that Cluentius did not 
make any last will and testament so the estate devolving to Sassia might have sooner or 
later—as well through a new foul deed of Oppianicus “experienced in murder of wife”2 now 
to be committed against Sassia—devolved to his stepfather.3) 
When describing the preparations for the assassination attempt, Cicero first outlines a rather 
negative picture of Fabricius,4 which is very noteworthy because a few years before he 
defended him as the accused—which he refers to with good sense only somewhat later.5 
Accordingly, Fabricius, entrusted by Oppianicus, tried to get Diogenes, one of the slaves of 
Cleophantus, Cluentius’s physician, to commit the murder but this plan failed since the slave 
betrayed the plan to his master, who warned Cluentius and at the same time sold him the 
slave. At this point the orator relates further events rather—what is more suspiciously—
briefly: the poison was soon handed over and in a few days’ time “reliable persons” not 
specified any closer jumping out of their hiding place discovered the money with the 
Fabricii’s libertine, Scamander.6 Instead of enumerating any further possible proofs he 
stresses his indignation by rhetoric questions and discloses by efficient exclamatio that 
Oppianicus could not have been acquitted under any circumstances from the charge of 
crimes—tendentiously referred to in plural.7 No doubt, the description of the circumstances is 
far from satisfying and provides several points of attack—as the poison was not found at 
Scamander—because an attempt similarly depicted by the prosecution was torn to pieces in 
Pro Caelio by Cicero himself.8 
General references to the fact that the crimes mentioned in general, not specified any closer 
were obvious and “caught in the act” do not make Cicero’s narrative clearer.9 Reference to the 
fact that the poison was caught in the act and was captured is also rather general as the orator 
does not name the person with whom the poison was captured.10 Concerning senator 
testimony Cicero again formulates obscurely because he states that Scamander was caught in 
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the act with the poison and money.1 Prior to that he asserts that Cluentius first brought charge 
against the person whom he caught in the act with the poison in his hand,2 however, this 
statement is not valid if for no other reason because elsewhere it is not claimed that Cluentius 
has caught anybody in the act.3 The reference to the Scamander lawsuit—in which Cicero 
acted as Scamander’s counsel for the defence against Cluentius—makes the obscurity thicker 
because in connection with it the orator gives account of the pleading that Diogenes and 
Scamander agreed in handing over medicine and not poison, and recalls the question of the 
prosecution why Scamander made an appointment for a remote spot and why he went there 
alone.4 If Scamander had been indeed caught in the act with the poison, Cicero would have 
certainly worded this point more clearly with more cutting remarks. Similarly, his statement 
made later in the speech that Oppianicus was caught in the act when he wanted to poison his 
stepson can be considered powerful distortion5 because he provides no information as to who 
brought the poison there, and his answer to the question with whom the poison was found—
due to uncertainties of the texts left to us6—is not unambiguous.7 
The following facts can be established: a libertine was caught in the act with a package 
containing money, and a slave was caught in the act with poison, however, the slave later on 
was given into the ownership of the accuser, that is, Cluentius, so his confession cannot stand 
beyond any doubt,8 and the authenticity of senator Baebius’s testimony, who maintained good 
relation with Cluentius, can be questioned too. In view of the fact that—in the light of the 
above—the proofs do not seem to support Cicero’s argument and his reconstruction of the 
events, he could not be satisfied with simple description of the facts since it would not have 
produced the picture that he wanted to outline; instead, he had to, on the one hand, mitigate 
and distract the judges’ attention by bits of information and obscure suggestions carefully 
placed at clearly separable points and arouse indignation by a stream of questions, and, on the 
other hand, to kindle and grasp their attention with respect to the hypotheses suggested by him 
as necessary conclusions.9 
Cicero is able to use even the circumstance that in the Scamander’s lawsuit he acted as the 
counsel for the defence of the accused, that is, against Cluentius, to support his own 
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argument:1 in the detailed but far from accurate narrative of the facts he presents his 
procedure as proof of his intention to help and sense of obligation rather than personal 
standpoint.2 To conceal his own role, he again makes an attack on Oppianicus, however, he 
leaves no doubt that the conviction of Scamander and the conviction of Oppianicus senior as a 
praeiudicium are closely interrelated.3 The plane of narrative and the plane of argument again 
slide into each other, a fact clear to the attentive reader only—the judges listening to the 
speech certainly did not notice it. The narrative of Fabricius’s lawsuit does not supply us with 
new information, Cicero asserts that owing to his friendship with Oppianicus he is to be 
necessarily considered an abettor or at least a person initiated in the poisoning attempt.4 He 
adds the defence of Fabricius by Caepasius (an untalented advocate) as a comic element to his 
speech as it were to let the judges take a rest after the horrible acts depicted in the foregoing 
but his conclusion drawn from it is again absolutely clear: Fabricius was declared guilty by 
his own conduct, that is, his own sentence.5 Only somewhat later do we learn of the rate of the 
probably unanimous voting from Cicero,6 from which it can be inferred with good chances 
that here again the orator knowingly conceals certain facts and connections.7 
After that, following a long transition full of rhetorical questions and fictitious dialogue,8 in 
which he again underlines the significance of the earlier judgments as it were to prove 
Oppianicus’s guilt, he starts to discuss Oppianicus’s lawsuit.9 His tone gets increasingly 
heated, which enables him to skip longer demonstration and argument without attracting 
attention, and after that he comes to the first actual charge announced at the beginning of the 
speech, not falling within the competence of the court of justice though, the issue of bribing 
the judges in Oppianicus’s lawsuit in 74.10 
When determining the identity of the briber Cicero highly narrows the scope of deliberation 
as he alleges that if it was probably not Cluentius who bribed the court of justice, then it must 
have been done by nobody else than Oppianicus, and if it is proved that Oppianicus was the 
briber, then Cluentius will be freed from the charge.11 This locus was highly appreciated also 
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by Quintilian as a textbook example of refutation by remotio,1 disregarding its lack of 
conformity with facts—for in his other orations Cicero did not deny that both the accuser and 
the accused had most probably bribed the members of the court of justice, albeit, with 
different success.2 Being clear, suggesting sincerity, his wording was perfectly suitable for 
lulling the attention of the listener of the period—or the (superficial) reader of the present 
day—as he sets up his alternative by reference to statements excluding each other, and 
henceforth he continues to approach the issue of corruption from the aspect of Oppianicus: by 
proving Oppianicus’s guilt he automatically exonerates Cluentius—in other words, he sets 
himself the task of proving Oppianicus’s guilt rather than Cluentius’s innocence,3 as most 
probably the prosecution tried to support Cluentius’s guilt rather than Oppianicus’s 
innocence.4 The seemingly self-assured statement that he must present clear and unambiguous 
facts to the judges was meant to dispel possible further doubts of the audience—while 
dispensing with arguments based on probability.5 (It is not needless to say that in his oration 
Cicero does not dedicate too much room to Cluentius’s character study, for that matter, he 
gets down with it by a few commonplaces,6 and makes no effort to support his defendant’s 
irreproachableness by further arguments derived from the scope of vita anteacta.7) 
After the introduction consisting of several sentences8 Cicero starts the characterisation of 
Oppianicus’s abettor, senator Staienus.9 In the following part, narratio and argumentatio 
again merge (almost inseparably or at least indistinctively),10 combining unprejudiced 
statements of facts, assumptions placed in proper form suggesting objective information, 
characterisation of persons—undeniably one-sided yet capable of influencing the audience—
(fictitious) dialogues in a personal tone and sometimes witty, sometimes dramatic questions 
inspiring confidence.11 In the course of that by unaffected elegance Cicero disregards certain 
problems and facts; for example, he lets the process of Oppianicus’s lawsuit and the reasons 
for convicting him remain in obscurity, and he gets down with the rate of votes cast by the 
judges by a less lifelike explanation. He asserts that it was just the judges bribed by 
Oppianicus who voted for Oppianicus’s guilt because they found the amount of bribe too little 
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or were convinced that the intermediary had embezzled a major part of it;1 the judges who 
wisely deliberated the case and viewed the judgment made in the Scamander and Fabricius 
lawsuits, considered as praeiudicium or meant to be presented by Cicero as such, by keeping 
their distance abstained;2 there might have been (as the orator later obscurely suggests) at 
least ten such judges,3 while five unbribed judges took stand for the innocence of the 
accused.4 To avoid that no doubt should arise in the audience—for that matter righteously—
whether Oppianicus was indeed guilty and if the court of justice was bribed solely by 
Oppianicus, the orator, leaving no time for breath, comes to the consequences, political 
aspects of the lawsuit,5 and at the same time—for reasons of captatio benevolentiae—
formulates open praise to the judges, offering his thanks for newly obtained “security in 
law”.6 
All this he sums up as antecedents only so that he could explore, in accordance with his own 
concept, it was in the interest of whom to bribe the court of justice in the lawsuit in 74?7 He 
suggests that Oppianicus’s guilt was from the outset clear to everybody beyond any doubt; he 
contrasts the prosecutor’s self-assuredness with the desperate flurry of the accused being 
aware of his own guilt, and in the light of the outcome of the lawsuit he makes it clear that it 
must have been in the interest of only Oppianicus—as a last resort—to bribe the members of 
the court of justice.8 To make his argument more convincing, Cicero brings up Cluentius’s 
accounts, which contain no reference to any payment of such nature, as a proof;9 however, he 
does not mention Oppianicus’s accounts. Picking out some of the arguments of the opponent 
most probably as a result of subjective selection, he repeats them and by speaking about them 
he makes the appearance of refuting them.10 He considers the fact that Staienus also voted for 
Oppianicus’s guilt a trick of Staienus, who embezzled the money, to demonstrate to his 
fellow-judges that Oppianicus had deceived him.11 Concerning the six hundred and forty 
thousand sestertii handed over by Oppianicus to Staienus Cicero notes that mathematically it 
would have been sufficient for corrupting sixteen judges, however, he conceals the fact that 
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seventeen votes would have been needed for conviction1 and in this case Staienus should have 
been awarded some allowance beyond the above, which might strike the eyes of the reader of 
the oration but must have been missed by the judges listening to it.2 
Here, in theory, he could conclude his reasoning as he has thoroughly described the 
opponent’s character, procedure, the motifs of his deeds, dwelled on the significance of earlier 
lawsuits and can consider corruption of the court of justice adjudicating in 74 by Oppianicus 
proved, however, he has not responded yet at all to the opponent’s more important arguments, 
which he carefully obscured at the beginning of the oration in the partitio. So, now, after he 
has swept off the opponents’ more easily refutable arguments very efficiently, he must turn to 
discussing the arguments of the prosecution more difficult to refute and less easily handled by 
high-sounding commonplaces.3 
To start with he repeats the opponent’s allegation that several judgments were adopted which 
prove that Cluentius bribed the court of justice in the Oppianicus lawsuit, yet he immediately 
gives a comprehensive response to it suitable for distracting the judges’ attention. Masking 
defence by attack, he states that no judgment has been passed in the case of bribe Cluentius 
has purportedly committed and that the judgments referred to and applied to this scope of 
issues by the opponent have no relevance in the case, and that this is the very occasion when 
Cluentius can respond to the charge of corrupting the court of justice.4 This argumentation 
might seem to be peculiar all the more when one considers that Cicero emphasises at the 
beginning of the oratio too that the court of justice ordered to pass judgment on Cluentius is 
competent in the matter of poisonings only, in the matter of bribe it is not.5 After he has 
discussed the issue of bribe at length, by a daring stroke he tries to give the impression to his 
audience that his arguments made so far have not constituted a part of extra causam reasoning 
at all.6 He considers the earlier judgments a part of the campaign of heckling before the 
popular assembly,7 describes them partly as misfortune, partly as irrelevant and insignificant 
in Cluentius’s case, partly as having an outcome favourable to Cluentius, and he contests that 
they can be called “judgments” at all.8 It is in the light of the above that he starts discussing 
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one of the most critical consequences of earlier events, the conviction of C. Iunius, chairman 
of the bribed court of justice that adjudicated in 74.1 
First, he strives to underline that the lawsuit against Iunius—which can be considered the 
outcome of iudicium Iunianum that has become proverbial, a synonym of corrupt 
adjudication2—was tendentious, hasty and irregular; then, he turns the attention to the 
political motifs of the lawsuit; finally, he doubts that the judgment was well-founded in terms 
of content.3 He stresses that Iunius was actually convicted not due to bribe,4 and in this 
argument he generously disregards the fact that in Roman criminal action it was the facts and 
circumstances deliberated in the proceedings and not the statements set forth in the charge 
(indictment) that served as basis of the judgment—all this the orator does, as a matter of fact, 
in order to take the edge of the judgment against Iunius as a praeiudicium.5 He presents the 
proceedings against Iunius as the product of tribunes’ campaign of heckling, calling it a storm 
with devastating power rather than judgment, and contrasts the tools and goals of court 
proceedings with those of influencing public opinion at popular assemblies by strong colours 
and emphatically warns his audience of the dangers of tribunes’ populist campaigns.6 He 
tactfully keeps quiet about the fact that although the lawsuit was commenced on tribunes’ 
initiative the judgment was passed as a result of the decision of the senators’ court of justice, 
that Iunius—as he suggested earlier—was one of Cluentius’s friends,7 and that in the given 
case he himself is conducting political agitation against excesses of people’s party politics; 
instead, he makes the audience aware again and again that the conviction of Iunius is the 
consequence of a storm with ill outcome and not an action at law conducted in accordance 
with rules of procedure.8 It must not be forgotten: the court of justice could not have 
convicted Cluentius de iure in the charge of bribe, if, however, Cicero did not annul this 
charge, nothing would have prevented the judges from declaring the accused guilty in the 
charge of poisoning—primarily not because poisoning was proved but due to their being 
convinced that the bribe had taken place—since no reasons were attached to the judgment and 
the quaestio adjudicated in the issue of guilt based on the overall impression developed about 
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the case rather than provedness of the charges; in other words, it would have been possible to 
convict Cluentius due to bribe but by virtue of poisoning!1 
Again he emphasises that Iunius’s case must be strictly separated from Cluentius’s case, and 
as if he believed that too, he considers the conviction of Bulbus, who adjudicated in the 
lawsuit in 74, and further judges brought to court with other charges unworthy of any further 
discussion as insignificant accessory circumstance, paying regard to the fact that it cannot be 
proved that the conviction was based on the case of poisoning of the Oppianicus lawsuit, 
undoubtedly included in the counts of the indictment.2 Thereby Cicero makes resolute efforts 
to take the edge of usability of former judgments as praeiudicium since he is compelled to 
touch upon the Staienus lawsuit quite embarrassing to him, in which he acted as counsel for 
the defence.3 After a longer praeteritio4 he starts to build his argument, and its weak points 
are not noticed by the audience at first hearing.5 First, Cicero touches upon the prosecutor’s 
statement—whether it was made like that or Cicero replicates his opponent’s argument in a 
somewhat distorted form cannot be known—that Staienus received monies of bribe from 
Oppianicus, which seems to be supported by Staienus’s conduct of life, by using argumenta e 
vita anteacta, and he, of course, keeps quiet about the charge which could be brought up in 
the lawsuit that Staienus was possibly bribed by Cluentius too. He mentions Cluentius only 
when he draws his conclusions in a rather long sentence consciously made somewhat 
incomprehensible, repeating the logically imperfect alternative set up earlier6 which states that 
the bribe committed by Oppianicus excludes Cluentius’s guilt, and so using as a premise the 
conclusion made probable earlier and not supported fully with logical reasons that the fact of 
bribe cannot be proved regarding Cluentius he suddenly draws his conclusion: the conviction 
of Staienus—which, similarly to judgments mentioned earlier, cannot be considered the result 
of a properly conducted lawsuit much rather the outcome of a terrible blow7—is absolutely 
not against Cluentius but supports his innocence.8 
By the summary made here Cicero as it were makes the bed for the lawsuit of C. Fidiculanius 
Falcula with an outcome different from the formerly outlined cases, from which he wants to 
make an argument to support his own reasoning. The case of Falcula charged on the grounds 
                                                 
1
 Stroh 1975. 199. 
2
 Cic. Cluent. 97–98. 
3
 Cic. Cluent. 99–102. 
4
 Cic. Cluent. 99–100. 
5
 Classen 1985. 66. 
6
 Cic. Cluent. 9. 64. 
7
 Cf. Cic. Cluent. 88. 
8
 Cic. Cluent. 102. 
54 
 
of crimen repetundarum yet acquitted—who accepted money of bribe as a judge from 
Cluentius in Oppianicus’s lawsuit as the charge claimed—could be undoubtedly brought up 
by Attius. (It is worth mentioning that Cicero makes it unambiguously clear in Pro Caecina 
that Falcula—as both the public and he is convinced about it—voted for Oppianicus’s guilt 
just upon the effect of the amount of bribe received from Cluentius.1) At this point Cicero 
takes Falcula’s case out of the context outlined by Attius and includes it in the order of other 
praeiudicia meant to be considered insignificant so that he could crown his argument by the 
lawsuit concluded by acquittal to reach a favourable end asserting that the poisoning charges 
brought against the judges adjudicating over Oppianicus have nothing to do with Cluentius’s 
case.2 In his argument he emphatically underlines that tribune L. Quinctius conducted a 
campaign of political heckling against Falcula, whose first lawsuit he discusses shortly, the 
second one more profoundly,3 but he places emphasis not on Falcula’s innocence but on the 
sheer fact of his having been acquitted as it were indicating that having knowledge of the 
outcome of the lawsuits against Scamander and Fabricius was absolutely enough for the 
judges to convict Oppianicus without any external influence.4 As Oppianicus was convicted 
by a low majority,5 Cicero somehow has to place his argument on firmer bases since as an 
argumentum for guilt he could bring up only an unanimous or almost unanimous judgment 
with no scandalous consequences for the judges. Therefore, to distract the audience’s 
attention and to lull their vigilance, he starts a lengthy argument interspersed with poetic 
questions on the ways judges formed an opinion, enumerating several respected judges by 
name who voted for Oppianicus’s guilt, whose moral integrity is meant to support the 
lawfulness of the judgment6—although this digression is based on conjecture and 
assumptions, the enumeration by names gave the impression to the audience as if the orator 
had discussed this issue profoundly in conformity with facts. Accordingly, the political 
background outlined, the emphasis on fomentation and campaign setting out from L. 
Quinctius, the invective against the tribune’s excessive power support the innocence of both 
Falcula and the others,7 so the prosecutor had no other choice than accepting either that the 
                                                 
1
 Cic. Caecin. 28–30. 
2
 Classen 1985. 67. 
3
 Cic. Cluent. 103. 
4
 Cic. Cluent. 104–106. 
5
 Hoenigswals 1962. 110. 
6
 Cic. Cluent. 105–107. 
7
 Classen 1985. 68f.; Humbert 1938. 292. 
55 
 
lawsuit against Oppianicus was proper and fair or the praeiudicia were irrelevant with regard 
to Cluentius’s lawsuit.1 
In what follows Cicero again strives to annul the arguments of the prosecution and to 
demonstrate that they are insignificant instead of refuting them.2 Just as he does not accept the 
iudicium Iunianum with scandalous outcome, causing great excitement even years later3 as a 
real iudicium and as he does not recognise the iudicia of the lawsuits against Bulbus, Gutta 
and Popilius as relevant praeiudicium in terms of the Cluentius lawsuit4 because they were 
not based expressis verbis on the state of facts of bribe received as a judge, at this point he 
tries to shake the formal validity of the litis aestimatio—the “decree” declaring the 
punishment imposed in the repetundae lawsuits—adopted in P. Septimius Severus’s case.5 
Thereby he substantiates the relativity of the sanction of infamia, i.e., loss of honour imposed 
under the censor’s regimen morum,6 and the argument by which he can qualify this measure 
less significant than the judge’s decisions.7 This historical/public law digression must have 
been a refreshing digression to the audience, yet Cicero used this moment for breath to 
undermine the power of censorial moral adjudication by setting up a sophisticated 
alternative.8 According to his argument either censors’ measures have to provide grounds for 
establishing the facts or their measures should be preceded by production of evidence and 
followed by reasons: in the first case they would have tyrant’s power, in the second case they 
should marshal proofs both in favour of Cluentius’s guilt and Oppianicus’s innocence. After 
setting up the logically not fully satisfactory alternative, before the persons present could 
come to their senses, Cicero showers the list of Oppianicus’s all crimes—specified or 
suggested earlier—upon his audience.9 To increase temper, the orator suddenly goes into an 
invective like outburst, he scourges the errors, temporal restrictedness and unfoundedness of 
former censorial measures, taking his examples from his own practice and cases widely 
known to the public.10 
The fact that the censors inflicted infamia on a total of two judges enables Cicero to draw 
further conclusions: he can formulate unfounded charges cited from military practice, and by 
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underlining the political motifs of censors’ procedure and the disagreements between them he 
can further reduce the weight of their measures through which he prepares his effort to shake 
the significance of the circumstance brought up by the prosecution, the censorial reprimand 
against Cluentius.1 In addition to asserting that Cluentius’s conduct of life is irreproachable, 
he states that his defendant has not had the opportunity to refute false accusations, 
incriminations and defamation2—and he considers that Cluentius’s innocence has been 
sufficiently proved by this rather obscure sentence. Cicero gets down with Egnatius ‘s last 
will and testament, in which the father excluded his son from the inheritance who falsely 
adjudicated in the Oppianicus lawsuit upon the effect of purported bribe, briefly by setting up 
a highly sophisticated but not fully satisfactory alternative that cornered the prosecutor,3 and 
criticises the senatus consultum sanctioning the corruption of the judges4 due to its inaccurate 
wording and ineffectiveness.5 
The audience’s attention must have undoubtedly languished after this long, complicated 
argument interspersed with several intellectual manoeuvres—and Cicero’s aim might have 
been successful application of tactics of tiring out6 for once he had disputed and annulled the 
significance of praeiudicia he had to fight with his own statements made earlier.7 Elsewhere 
he tried to use the fact of Scamander’s defence to advance his own purposes,8 just as 
Fidiculanius Falcula’s case;9 he tactfully does not reflect upon his statements made in the 
oration delivered in favour of Aulus Caecina—which Attius most certainly did not omit to 
refer to—and is satisfied with using the general name iudicium Iunianum.10 Although the 
prosecutor most probably confronted him with his statements made in the Verres case on 
corruptness of senators’ adjudication, in his response Cicero remains on the plane of general 
considerations and points out that the content of his oral pleadings—since oral pleadings 
cannot be of such weight as law or court decision—are always the product of the given 
situation and age, that is, does not mirror his own conviction.11 As a parallel he refers to 
outstanding orators of the generation preceding him, M. Antonius and M. Crassus,12 which 
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be considered an effort to distract attention rather than refutation on the merits; yet, it is 
suitable for warning and urging judges to decide the case objectively free from prejudice.1 
Cicero emphasises that he has responded to all relevant charges, or at least all charges deemed 
relevant by the prosecutor, brought up by him against Cluentius with regard to bribing the 
judges in the Oppianicus lawsuit eight years before,2 however, instead of summing up the 
above he starts—in spite of his defendant’s desire3 but for reasons that become obvious later 
on—to expound what Attius most probably expected at the beginning of the statement of the 
defence: the issue of competence of the quaestio, adjudicating in the state of facts of 
assassination and mixing poison, with respect to bribe committed by knights, amounts of 
bribe given to judges since the competence of the court of justice extended to bribes 
committed by members of the order of senators only.4 By choosing defence in terms of 
content and not form he manifests self-assurance and faith in the success of Cluentius’s case 
to the audience and he can keep the judges’ attention alive, who are waiting for the part on the 
merits,5 while tiring them out without being noticed. He explains why he discusses the issue 
of bribe so long by necessity required by pubic interest,6 then he comments on Attius’s 
arguments—albeit, by short references and quotations only7 not to refresh the judges’ 
memory—by which his opponent compared the letter of the law8 (i.e., the relevant provision 
of lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis applies to the acts of the members of the order of 
senators only) with the spirit of the law,9 that is, aequitas,10 which seemed to be justified also 
by changed circumstances for while at the time of the scope of Sulla’s reforms administration 
of justice was considered the privilege of the order of senators, based on lex Aurelia enacted 
in 70 members of courts of justice were made up by senators, knights and aerar tribunes each 
constituting one-third of the panel, and so it could be considered justified that identical 
criminal law norms should apply to persons who fulfilled identical tasks but came from 
different orders.11 
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In his reasoning certain common topoi take ample room: he emphasises the importance of 
laws for the sake of maintaining the State and reminds judges of their duty, i.e., the obligation 
to serve laws.1 He analyses relevant passages of lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis in 
details,2 and proves that no charge could have been brought against Cluentius for bribe based 
on this law.3 He expounds—and tries to legitimise—the different status and evaluation of 
members of the order of senators and knights, and warns the judges against interpreting the 
provisions of the law extensively through their own judgment, that is, interpretation used by 
them in dispensation of law.4 If Cicero had from the first moment adhered to the letter of the 
law strictly and admittedly, which the prosecutor expected, he would have openly 
acknowledged Cluentius’s guilt in the charge of bribing the court of justice and he could have 
referred to no more than lack of personal scope of the law as a cause excluding culpability, 
however, by that he would have fundamentally shaken the image developed and meant to be 
maintained from first to last about his defendant’s innocence, which might have led the judges 
to infer that Cluentius would not have shrunk back from murder either.5 In the summary of his 
argumentation Cicero, first, formulates praise of judges who adjudicate by abiding by the law; 
secondly, he refers to Cluentius’s innocence, now fully proved as he claims in the charge of 
bribe; thirdly, in connection with the polemical, exaggerated and misinterpreting 
reconstruction of Attius’s train of thoughts he formulates warning as a patron and statesman 
thinking responsibly to the court of justice, cautioning the judges that by accepting the 
extensive interpretation they would shake the authority of the court of justice and thereby the 
fundaments of the State.6 
What causes could have induced Cicero to take his argument to the plane of politics? Nothing 
can be inferred from Attius’s oration since it has not been left to us,7 and the effective text of 
lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis is known from Cicero’s oration only, although he must 
have made no significant modifications therein.8 Joachim Classen raises the following three 
opportunities as possible explanation for Cicero’s tactics. First, it is possible that Attius as the 
prosecutor placed the poisoning cases in the centre of the charge and used the issue of bribe in 
the lawsuit in 74 only for influencing the climate of opinion against Cluentius so that he could 
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achieve his goal more safely in the mirror of the past of the accused: to prove the charge of 
bribe brought against Cluentius in accordance with the spirit—and not the letter—of the law. 
Secondly, it cannot be ruled out that the assassination attempt served only as a starting point 
for him to have Cluentius convicted, by making the judges accept the extensive interpretation 
of the law, due to the bribe committed in the Oppianicus lawsuit held under scandalous 
circumstances and producing not less scandalous after-effects. Thirdly, it cannot be ruled out 
either that Attius was led primarily by political purposes to introduce the extensive 
interpretation of the law implemented in dispensation of justice—at least as a later basis of 
reference to public opinion and adjudication practice.1 
The prosecutor’s primarily political motifs are contradicted by the identity of the participants 
of the lawsuit, more specifically that as a prosecutor solely Attius not having any special 
political significance supported Oppianicus junior not having any major political influence 
either and his mother, the otherwise unknown Sassia from Larinum, and that Cicero provided 
defence alone without using the assistance of one of the orators of the age having influence in 
public affairs, for example, Hortensius. Most probably it was not in the interest of the order of 
either the senators or the knights to implement the extensive interpretation of Sulla’s law to 
the extent that the order of knights should be included in the scope of persons to be sanctioned 
in the case of passive bribe in court of justice since thereby they would have extended the 
scope of persons to be sanctioned in active bribe too, which would have allowed to reveal 
several bribes so far left in obscurity where judges of senator’s rank accepted amounts of 
bribe. Consequently, in this respect concordia ordinum that Cicero desired to attain must have 
been realised indeed against the trend of populares.2 It is worth adding that the court of justice 
reform proposed by M. Porcius Cato in 61, which set the aim of sanctioning all kinds of bribe 
in court of justice, could never assume the form of law, because it would have endangered this 
special form of manifestation of concordia.3 So, there are good chances that taking the oration 
to the plane of politics is one of Cicero’s doings, which is explained partly by his selected 
lawsuit tactics—and not the path he was forced to take by the prosecutor—partly by the effort 
to emphasise his own role in public affairs.4 (Cicero is compelled to discuss the charge of 
bribing the court of justice to such an exhaustive extent, among others, because the prosecutor 
most probably prepared and confirmed the charge of poisoning falling within the competence 
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of the court of justice psychologically by expounding the events of the Oppianicus lawsuit; 
consequently, the defence necessarily had to refute or at least counteract it.1) 
 
II. 4. Handling the charge of veneficium  
 
After this reasoning Cicero makes it clear that what he still has got to say is short and can be 
summed up briefly, by which he not only refers to the length of what he has got to say but 
tries to reduce the weight of the opponent’s charges since—as he claims—these charges are 
pure fiction, and after taking the edge of the campaign against Cluentius they cannot stand 
their ground.2 He responds to the arguments aimed against Cluentius regarding the motifs of 
poisonings—Cluentius’s greed and cruelty—at a stormy speed, more exactly he sweeps them 
off by a few commonplaces,3 he devotes no more than a few sentences to any of them—
instead of refutation in conformity with facts and consistent argumentation he dedicates room 
to wittiness and invective like outbursts;4 however, from first to last he is able to give the 
impression as if he had refuted Attius’s allegations point by point for the fairly tired out 
audience must have been just as much waiting for the conclusion of the speech. At the same 
time, the orator cannot allow himself not to touch upon material elements, more specifically 
each of the poisonings because later on even the highly tired out judges would have certainly 
noticed that distraction of attention was excessively drastic and for this reason not tactical at 
all.5 
Regarding the charge of murdering C. Vibius Capax, by way of refutation Cicero confines 
himself to the testimony of L. Plaetorius as a rescue witness and emphasising the 
unimpeachable character of the witness, but he tactically keeps quiet about what specific 
points of the testimony make the charge void,6 and substitutes the exact description of the 
case by more general wordings.7 He dedicates somewhat more room to Balbutius’s death, 
which purportedly took place because he drunk up the poison cup made by Cluentius for 
Oppianicus junior at his wedding ceremony.8 In his reasoning, first, he points out the lack of 
any motif, which is based primarily on conclusions drawn from the character of the accused, 
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secondly on the allegation that Cluentius had no reason at all to fear Oppianicus junior, but he 
carefully avoids to mention other possible motivations—just those by which he tried to 
support Oppianicus’s assassination1 against Cluentius.2 From the scope of motives he picks 
only the elements that he considered easily refutable, but to make them more authentic he 
crowns his refutation by questions as if he has answered all questions.3 Yet, he does not 
content himself with taking the narrative of the prosecution to elements or with mere 
praeteritio, he refutes Attius’s allegations seemingly in details. He states that Balbutius’s 
death is not the result of murder, which he supports by the later death and purported illness of 
the deceased, which seems to be certified by the testimony of his father, Balbutius senior.4 It 
is worth observing that in his argument he does not deny that the poison was made or that 
Balbutius drank it, instead he takes the edge of the charge merely by the fact that his death 
occurred later and he was ill. So, how is his argumentation built at this point? First, he 
emphasises his defendant’s innocence; then, he doubts the order of the events reconstructed 
by the accused and that their content is true; finally, he crowns this by the testimony of a 
witness who maintains kinship relation with the victim—and is otherwise absent—thus giving 
the impression of refutation on the merits to the judges.5 
After Cicero has concluded the two former cases without but with the appearance of 
refutation on the merits, now he can come to the most essential count of the indictment, the 
issue of poisoning Oppianicus senior by Cluentius with the assistance of M. Asellius as 
abettor,6 which must have been from first to last present in the mind of the judges and the 
audience in the light of which five-sixth of the oral pleading can become understandable. As 
most probably the actual reason for the formal accusation by Oppianicus junior might have 
been his father’s murder and death, the orator is compelled to depict the victim as 
unfavourably as possible in the first part of his speech so that the formal accusation could 
appear to the judges nothing else than a campaign of revenge motivated by immense hatred 
and he could give a relatively acceptable explanation for the circumstances of Oppianicus’s 
death. In the light of that Cicero had to discuss the bribe in court of justice strictly separated—
and as remote as possible—from poisoning since the fact of the charge brought against the 
stepfather itself could have generated an image in the audience from which the crime of 
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poisoning would not have been alien either. Furthermore, this separated discussion enabled 
the orator to refer to the hypotheses set up and conjectures formulated and suggested to the 
judges in the first part of the oration as facts proved in the refutation of the second count of 
the indictment.1 
As the first point of his reasoning Cicero denies that Cluentius had any motif to murder 
Oppianicus,2 what is more—now referring to Oppianicus’s foul deeds enumerated and made 
probable as proved facts—he argues by claiming that Cluentius would have been more 
interested in his stepfather living in exile and poverty,3 however, this (high-sounding) topos 
can be considered unfounded to the extent that Oppianicus was never forced to go to exilium 
and certainly never lived in misery. After that, just as in connection with the Balbutius case, 
he starts to shake particular factual circumstances one by one;4 more specifically, he disputes 
that using M. Asellius as abettor was reasonable5 and that poison put in bread was lifelike;6 
however, with good sense (at least for the time being) he omits to touch upon the testimony of 
the witness of the prosecution, Strato; instead he starts to relate a real thriller and puts 
Cluentius’s mother, Oppianicus junior’s stepmother, that is, Oppianicus senior’s widow, 
Sassia in the centre.7 In the course of that he does not strive to prove his allegations in 
conformity with facts, he contents himself with highlighting the most repugnant moments of 
the series of events8—and there were good chances for them to duly arouse the tired out 
audience’s interest and maintain their attention—emphasising Sassia’s “well-known” cruelty,9 
and directing the suspicion of poisoning towards her too.10 
In his presentation, as a matter of fact, he does not shrink back—in order to depict a darker 
image of Sassia—even from contradicting himself hard to be noticed by the audience; for 
example, on the one hand, he speaks about Oppianicus’s highly respected friends;11 on the 
other hand, he stresses that the neighbourhood avoided and despised him.12 Later, giving up 
even the appearance of the objectivity of the narrative, he showers a torrent of exasperated 
questions and commonplaces on the audience and Sassia and, in fact, just at the strategic point 
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where he should respond to the allegations of the prosecution in conformity with facts: in 
connection with the third torture of Strabo the slave—it is worth adding: slaves’ testimony 
was considered evidence only in the event that it was taken from them in torture (tormentum, 
eculeus)1—and he declares that the slave’s testimony cannot be evaluated in view of the 
circumstances of the confession since he was not brought in court,2 without commenting on 
its content on the merits.3 Referring back to the beginning of his oration, in a praeteritio full 
of exaggerations, Cicero discusses Sassia’s foul deeds committed against her son, Cluentius,4 
and underlines the case of Fabricianum venenum from among them, i.e., the poisoning 
purportedly attempted against her son, and although he does not give account of its 
circumstances, he tries to present it as a fact decisive in terms of the outcome of the lawsuit 
and the verdict of the judges.5 Sassia’s foul deeds culminate in preparing the lawsuit against 
Cluentius,6 when she tried to kill his son by the assistance of the accuser and unlawfully 
exploiting the tools provided by law—when depicting the above Cicero several times 
efficiently contrasts the word “mother” with conduct worthy of a mother and eventually 
makes Sassia her own son’s accuser;7 then, in a powerful invective he presents a stylised 
figure of Sassia as a superhuman, subhuman monster.8 Thereby the orator manages to 
magnify the danger implied by the charge to real vis maior since whereas he classifies 
Oppianicus junior’s acts as procedure guided by a (step)son’s pietas, he presents the mother’s 
motivations as an inhuman campaign of revenge.9 In the peroratio10 Cicero, on the one hand, 
addresses begging to the judges, on the other hand, he crowns his outbursts against Sassia.11 
The dispositio applied with respect to the subject, the alternation of detailed reasoning and 
briefly made declarations and the system of arguments and hypotheses confirming each other 
create the construction by which Cicero made Cluentius’s case—not promising much success 
prima facie—successful.12 Undoubtedly, it was a significant achievement that he was able to 
revive the events and after-effects of the Oppianicus lawsuit having taken place years before, 
which became generally known as scandalous moments, and in accordance with his own 
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concept, at that.1 Likewise, by masterly tactics he separated arguments, facts and 
circumstances belonging to each other and connected completely separate arguments, facts 
and circumstances, by interweaving the planes of narratio and argumentatio almost 
impossible to unravel.2 
 
II. 5. Rhetorical tactics and double handling of the facts of the case in Pro Cluentio 
 
Discussion of crimina veneficii, that is, actual, legally relevant counts of the indictment in the 
first place could give the impression to the judges that Cicero tries to evade the less 
considerable but highly effective part of the charge, iudicium Iunianum, for this reason, he 
admittedly—in fact only apparently since he starts discussing the Oppianicus lawsuit on the 
merits much later only3—follows the system set up by Attius. Regarding the forced choice 
between status collectionis and status coniecturalis Cicero resolves to perform a stunt, a 
highly break-neck one, at that, which he, however, already used successfully in Pro Roscio 
Amerino4: he separates his own intentions and his defendant’s interests and claims by stating 
that for him as counsel for the defence it would have been absolutely sufficient to refer to the 
law itself,5 but at the request of Cluentius, who wanted not only to win the lawsuit but to 
restore his reputation6 he has chosen the more difficult way, specifically he wants to prove the 
innocence of the accused not only formally but also substantively.7 By that he can absolutely 
give the impression as if each of the two statuses represented proper weight for him to make a 
success of his case.8 
The double argument technique, at the same time, fits in with the “needs” of the members of 
the court of justice with brilliant accuracy since by applying status collectionis he defends the 
interests of the order of knights adhering to the words of the law, which take them out of the 
scope of culpability;9 at the same time, he arouses fear in them that in the event that the 
extensive interpretation gains ground, charge can be brought at will in the future due to bribe 
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against knights too;1 on the other hand, he does not have to be afraid of drawing the anger of 
judges who come from the order of senators because having used status coniecturalis he can 
be sure of their sympathy since by proving bribe committed by Oppianicus and not by 
Cluentius and by having explored that only a few judges were bribed in the Oppianicus 
lawsuit and only Staienus was actually given money,2 through a kind of “washing the Moor 
white”—so kind to senators so much damaged by the events of the lawsuit in 74—he restores 
the honour of the judges in the present case by providing them with a scapegoat.3 With respect 
to the application of two status, in the dispositio of Pro Cluentio, together with Wilfried Stroh 
we can create the following system:4 in the discussion of iudicium Iunianum,5 status 
coniecturalis (i.e., it was not Cluentius who committed bribe) was addressed to senators6 and 
status collectionis (i.e., Cluentius could not be punished pursuant to section six of lex 
Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis) to knights,7 and it is followed by the discussion of crimina 
veneficii.8 
To counteract the sympathy shown towards Oppianicus junior, Cicero chooses a masterly 
tool: he enters in the picture Cluentius’s mother (that is, the widow of Oppianicus senior and 
stepmother of Oppianicus junior), Sassia, who is fired by hostile odium and crudelitas against 
her son, and in whose hands—for she is moving the threads of the charge—Oppianicus junior 
guided by a child’s pietas is merely a tool for accomplishing her revenge.9 It is worth 
examining closer at what points and in what context Cicero mentions Sassia.10  
Directly after exordium/prooemium he names Sassia as a mother guided by cruelty and hatred 
and as the source of the charge.11 The question whether Sassia (as Joachim Classen argues) 
was personally present at the trial12 or (as Wilfried Stroh and Jules Humbert asserts) was 
absent13 cannot be settled, as Cicero does not address her directly at any point and it is not 
known if she testified or not, and perhaps it is not exceptionally relevant. He emphatically 
alludes to Sassia’s significance in terms of the lawsuit,14 and states that for the sake of saving 
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Cluentius he cannot show consideration for her,1 however, it is much later, in the discussion 
of crimina veneficii that we learn what this significance is.2 The minutes of the interrogation 
of the slave was read (caused to be read) by Attius before the court of justice,3 but it is 
doubtful if Sassia’s name occurred in it;4 however, the most probably rather subjective 
reconstruction of the events imbued with rhetorical exaggerations enabled Cicero to make an 
attack against Cluentius’s mother.5 The orator keeps the promise made earlier6 only after that, 
and he presents a stylised image of the mother as monstrum to the judges who probably had 
not known anything about the relation between mother and son before the trial. Accordingly, 
she was already part of the assassination attempt against Cluentius,7 she made her stepson her 
son-in-law in order to enter him as an accuser acting resolutely against her son;8 then, after 
brief summary of the interrogation of the slave9 the orator creates the image of Sassia who 
manipulates witnesses, arrives to Rome to hasten her son’s ruin, holds the threads in her hands 
in the background but hides from public.10 
As the prosecutor most probably did not mention Sassia, instead, tried to strengthen the “pius 
Oppianicus—impius Cluentius” opposition in the judges, Cicero, with good sense, using the 
tool of retorsio criminis let the characterisation set up by the prosecution fall back—if not on 
Oppianicus junior, of whom the orator could not speak much ill for he was young and gave a 
good impression to the judges—on Sassia purportedly manipulating the charge, who seemed 
to be suitable for this role all the more because the fact of her marriage entered into with her 
son-in-law11 around 86 offered the defence the opportunity to expound the topos of a female 
violating the order of nature and for this reason undoubtedly not shrinking back from other 
foul deeds either.12 Cicero achieves all that by brilliant regrouping of the events since it is just 
this ordo artificiosus that allows him to build the narratio divided into two into the 
argumentatio and to get from here straight to the peroratio that fulfils the function of 
invective against Sassia, in which the attention and effort of the judges should be aimed no 
longer at deliberating if Oppianicus junior was right or wrong in taking vengeance for the 
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conviction and death of his stepfather but at saving the son from the revenge of the mother, 
who is treading under foot the laws of nature and wants to use administration of justice to 
achieve this goal.1 
In the part on iudicium Iunianum2 Cicero handles the tools of narratio and argumentatio, 
traditionally and theoretically clearly separable and to be separated, with brilliant and 
deceptive ease. Although after the propostio3 and the interposed narrative on Sassia4 he starts 
the narratio that culminates later in confirmatio,5 its given parts,6 for example, the paragraphs 
on Oppianicus’s foul deeds7 and those relating praeiudicia8 actually fulfil the function of 
probabile e causa working towards the purpose to be proved9 because they are meant to 
support that it was not Cluentius but Oppianicus who might have had and did have a reason 
for bribing the court of justice.10 Similarly, the argument on the amount of bribe as probabile 
facto partly precedes,11 partly follows,12 that is, surrounds the narratio on this topic;13 in other 
words, the argumentatio discussing these events, outlining an approximate chronology is of a 
narrative kind.14 
This complicated procedure is indispensably necessary for Cicero to make the—lesser 
lifelike—train of thoughts believable to the judges which states that in the lawsuit in 74 it was 
not the winner Cluentius but Oppianicus declared guilty that bribed the court of justice and in 
such fashion, in fact, that the hired intermediary, Staienus promised to hand over the bribe to 
the judges but later he alleged that the accused was not willing to pay, thereby he turned the 
judges against him and made sure that Oppianicus would be convicted, and all that he did in 
order to keep the whole amount for himself. Cicero, however, did not shower this narrative on 
the audience without any preparation, therefore, he was compelled to give reasons for the 
reconstructive narratio by a preceding argumentatio claiming that Oppianicus—being aware 
of his numerous foul deeds and praeiudicia negatively influencing his case—must have had a 
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serious motif to bribe the court of justice.1 Cicero, as a matter of fact, gets into conflict with 
his promise that in his speech he intends to follow the order set up by the opponent;2 yet, he 
more or less keeps his promise during the actual narratio, although prior to it he speaks about 
the points not touched upon by the prosecutor. And in long preparatory passages he assures 
the judges several times that he wants to make it short what he has got to say,3 which he can 
do because right at the beginning of the oratio he states that he does not intend to conceal 
anything of the facts of the case and is willing to deal with every circumstance mentioned by 
Attius.4 
Breaking strict chronology can be clearly observed especially in discussing praeiudicia that 
are against Cluentius’s case and the list of Oppianicus’s crimes. The chairman of the 
Oppianicus lawsuit (iudex quaestionis), C. Iunius was convicted in 74, and in the same year 
the senate issued a resolution that made it possible to hold judges affected by iudicium 
Iunianum responsible for bribe.5 In 73, C. Fidiculanius Falcula was acquitted in two lawsuits;6 
in 72, P. Septimius Scaevola was convicted for crimen repetundarum, between 73 and 70 M. 
Atilius Bulbus was convicted for crimen maiestatis; in 70, on the occasion of census M. 
Aquilius, Ti. Gutta and P. Popilius—just as Cluentius himself—were reprimanded by the 
censors; in the following years Popilius and Gutta were convicted due to ambitus, Staienus 
was convicted on the grounds of other charges.7 The prosecutor presents each of these 
lawsuits and judgments as it were—independently of the nature of the particular charge—as 
the outcome of iudicium Iunianum;8 whereas Cicero, contrary to natural chronology, sets up 
an artificial chronology that suits his intentions as counsel for the defence, in which 
judgments appear as the consequence of the invidia stirred up by tribune Quinctius,9 
furthermore, by anticlimactic editing, from cases with greater weight10 through Septimius 
Severus’s listis aestimatio,11 censorial measures considered weightless,12 Egnatius’s last will 
and testament13 and the senatus consultum14 he gets to his own opinion formulated in Verrine 
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orations,1 thereby—by striking a tone ranging from pathetic to irony—he gives the 
impression of decrescendo of the invidia to the audience.2 
Similarly, with respect to Oppianicus’s murders and foul deeds—real ones and those 
attributed to him3—a relative chronology suitable for rhetoric tactics set up by Cicero can be 
clearly observed. The first murder: Oppianicus poisons his wife, Cluentia, Cluentius’s aunt 
with his own hands.4 The second and third murders: Oppianicus poisons the pregnant wife of 
his brother, C. Oppianicus and then his brother to get his inheritance.5 After that, following 
the death of his brother-in-law, Cn. Magius, who named Oppianicus junior as his inheritor, 
Oppianicus senior induces Magius’s pregnant widow to abort the embryo, then marries her.6 
The fourth murder and counterfeiting of the last will and testament: by the assistance of a 
travelling pharmacist/poison mixer Oppianicus poisons his former mother-in-law, Dinaea, 
who had named him as her inheritor in her last will and testament, then, he has the last will 
and testament, from which he had already deleted bequest orders, drafted again and has it 
sealed by a forged seal.7 The fifth murder: Oppianicus gives order to find and murder M. 
Aurius, Dinaea’s son, of whom he learns—he bribes the messenger to provide false 
information for the relatives—that he was taken prisoner of war and lives in Gallia as a slave, 
and to whom his mother left four hundred thousand sestertii.8 The sixth, seventh, eighth and 
ninth murders: by creating the appearance of proscriptio Oppianicus has A. Aurius killed, 
who threatened to sue him due to the assassination of M. Aurius, and has three other citizens 
of Larinum killed under the pretext of the same legal title.9 The tenth and eleventh murders: 
Oppianicus wants to marry A. Aurius’s widow, Sassia, but she does not want to be the 
stepmother of three male children, therefore, Oppianicus kills two of his sons and leaves only 
Oppianicus junior alive.10 Counterfeiting of the last will and testament and the twelfth 
to indicate himself as inheritor Oppianicus forges the last will and testament of Asuvius from 
Larinum, then has Asuvius killed, and pays off Q. Manlius, triumvir capitalis who starts 
investigations in the case.11 
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Changing this chronology Cicero gives account of Oppianicus’s crimes in the following 
chronology: assassination of M. Aurius,1 A. Aurius and three citizens from Larinum,2 the two 
male children,3 Cluentia,4 the sister-in-law and the brother, C. Oppianicus,5 instigation for 
abortion,6 counterfeiting of the last will and testament and assassination of Asuvius,7 
assassination of Dinaea and forging her last will and testament.8 Why was Cicero 
“compelled” to act like that?9 As the narratio is not directly linked to the Cluentius case, the 
orator cannot dwell on specific cases by supporting them by documentary evidence or 
testimonies, instead, he must content himself with flashing the appearance of demonstration 
from time to time.10 Furthermore, possible demonstration would be made difficult by the fact 
that the crime story like narrative is not lifelike because it would be hard to explain: why a 
Richard III like serial murderer Oppianicus, who gets his victims from his own family, who 
settles in their estate, who marries his victim’s widow, was called to account for his deeds 
only one and a half decades after his first assassination; why he was named as their inheritor 
in their last will and testament by several persons during the times although they must have 
known that thereby they hastened their own death; why his brother, C. Oppianicus should 
have made the murderer of his wife his inheritor; why he killed his two sons only and left the 
third one alive; and why he had M. Aurius killed although earlier, when forging Dinaea’s last 
will and testament he had already deleted the bequest ordered to be given to the son.11 
The orator does not even try to refute the counter-arguments listed above; much rather he 
makes efforts to avoid that they should occur to the audience at all, that is, to achieve his goal, 
instead of obvious lies, by delicately dislocating and concealing facts and arbitrarily 
determining the dramaturgical order of the cases—and that in doing so he meets success is 
proved by the sheer fact that the authors of later comments did not form a suspicion either, 
and only Wilfried Stroh made an attempt at reconstructing the actual order of events. 
Placing the assassination of M. Aurius first in the order proved to be a masterly trick since as 
“evidence” it was possible to bring up the idle talk about the case and the open threat by A. 
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Aurius,1 and as the cause of failure to commence any trial it was possible to bring up the use 
of Sulla’s proscriptiones, that is, the assassination of A. Aurius by political machinations,2 
which supported failure to call Oppianicus to account for his deeds regarding other cases by 
his political influence.3 Cicero eliminates questions that might arise regarding Dinaea’s death 
and last will and testament by similar ingenuity. When Dinaea is mentioned for the first time, 
only her illness and death and the existence of her last will and testament is referred to but 
counterfeiting of the last will and testament is not,4 and only much later—once he has 
showered the stream of Oppianicus’s crimes on the audience, which as it were makes the new 
and umpteenth murder logical—does the orator bring up the fact of the assassination of 
Dinaea and forging of her last will and testament.5 Cicero explains the momentum that 
Oppianicus was willing to murder also his own sons not from the character of Oppianicus but 
of Sassia, who agreed to marry him only under this condition, and the dark portrait depicted 
of Sassia who married the murderer of her husband6 does not rule out but definitely makes the 
double assassination probable.7 Lack of evidence does not prevent Cicero in his narrative at 
all, he turns necessity into a virtue and reminds the judges of the point that their indignation 
must be dwarfed by the indignation of the court of justice eight years before that examined 
proofs and heard witnesses in details.8 
Referring to shortage of time, Cicero gets down briefly with the assassination of the one-time 
wife, Cluentia and the sister-in-law and brother, C. Oppianicus, however, there are good 
chances that reference to Sassia after the former wife, Cluentia—of whom he does not state 
expressis verbis that she remained Oppianicus’s wife until his death—might make the 
audience believe that Cluentia was Oppianicus’s wife later, after Sassia; and suspicion that the 
orator speaks about events that occurred before 82 does not even arise. Undoubtedly: Cicero’s 
aim must have been just to confuse the chronology and thereby the audience completely since 
he could not prove, only complain of the assassinations listed here.9 The gifts given by 
Oppianicus to the widow of his brother-in-law, Magius by themselves would make only the 
intention to marry probable, however, connecting them not with the marriage but with the 
abortion carried out by Magia upon Oppianicus’s instigation presents them as merces 
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abortionis.1 To make the assassination of Dinaea and especially counterfeiting of her last will 
and testament2 lifelike, Cicero inserts the assassination of Asuvius after the above—in whose 
last will and testament Oppianicus was indicated in the first place as inheritor—which is 
supported by the testimony of Oppianicus’s accomplice, Avillius, and thereby inheriting 
through assassination is made the outstanding motivation of Oppianicus’s deeds,3 and so 
poisoning of Dinaea and forging of her last will and testament are now nothing else than 
enhancement of the motives of the Asuvius case.4 
Cicero’s narratio in Pro Cluentio is a beautiful example of the appearance of ordo 
artificialis—and mos Homericus5—in which perspicuitas considered a virtue is replaced by 
the strategy justified by utilitas causae, based on which in the representation of both the chain 
and the internal structure of events elements that are more believable and better supported by 
proofs precede elements that can be proved with difficulties—or cannot be proved at all—as it 
were creating credit and basis for having them accepted too.6 
To give a technical summary of the rhetorical virtuosity of Pro Cluentio: by discussing the 
charge of bribe and the charge of poisoning separately Cicero doubles narratio and 
argumentatio; he inserts propositio, which usually follows narratio, directly after prooemium; 
argumentatio in connection with both the first and second count of the indictment unnoticably 
and almost inseparably flows together with narratio; peroratio is a logical outcome of 
narratio inserted as conclusion; the narratives inserted extra causam, free handling of 
chronology and joint application of status collectionis and status coniecturalis built on each 
other strengthen the positions of the defence. This rhetorical tactics becomes astonishing just 
by the fact that the listener or the reader never feels that he is the victim of Cicero’s knowing 
misleading, what is more, the links of the narrative are intertwined without spectacular jumps, 
seemingly integrated in a logical order, which is supported also by the fact that, except for 
Wilfried Stroh, modern commentators of the text mostly set out from the order of the events 
outlined by Cicero in order to reconstruct the historical facts of the case.7 
As exemplum of the exemplary combination of the three genres of style of rhetoric Cicero 
himself also referred to Pro Cluentio,8 in which extended introduction, soberly brief 
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descriptions, precise argumentation, colourful narrative, reasons full of emotions, pathos and 
irony, linguistic humour and keywords hammered with passion, apposite characterisations, 
polemical statements not free from exaggerations, questions formulated with tormenting 
temper and invective like insertions are combined into a harmony not seen anywhere else.1 
Thanks to Cicero, Cluentius was acquitted; however, as we can learn it from Quintilian’s 
account, the orator himself admitted that he had achieved that by cleverly manipulating the 
judges.2 Perhaps for this reason, Cicero considered Pro Cluentio one of the maximum outputs 
outputs of his orator’s career,3 which both Quintilian4 and Pliny, who praised this oratio as 
Cicero’s most excellent speech, agreed with.5 The oration can be indeed considered 
exemplary: the orator masterly changes elements of style; combines pathos, simple 
description and humour; represents situations and characters appropriate for a crime story 
with apt preciseness; palpably connects arguments and planes of time, except when he intends 
to make obscurity denser, without distorting lucid arrangement of facts. From first to last 
engaging the attention of the audience—since later he himself admitted that he had to throw 
dust in the judges’ eyes during his speech6—and leading the judges qualified to decide the 
case, as a matter of fact, towards the direction he wanted to. 
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III. Lawsuit of Titus Annius Milo  
 
On 18 January 52, in Bovillae two emblematic figures of the optimates and the populares, 
Milo and Clodius clashed, and members of Milo’s followers killed Clodius. Milo’s defence 
was undertaken by Cicero; the final hearing was held on 8 April, which was perhaps the 
weakest performance in Cicero’s career: both Clodiana multitudo and Pompey’s soldiers 
embarrassed him, clamour and shouting in stopped him short, made him irresolute, what is 
more, frightened him; he could not deliver the prepared speech with the planned constantia, 
he spoke flustered unable to collect his thoughts. His delivered speech was taken down in 
shorthand as usual; and Pedianus Asconius, who gives us a highly accurate account of the 
events, could still read the minutes that contained the speech and shouting in; it is, therefore, 
an indisputable fact that Pro Milone published later—as a matter of fact, apart from certain 
overlapping thoughts—is not identical with the oratio made on 8 April 52. 
 
III. 1. Historical background of Pro Milone 
 
Milo was born as a member of gens Papia in Lanuvium; then, he was adopted by his maternal 
grandfather, T. Annius—who as the inhabitant of the same municipium maintained relation 
with Oppianicus and his wife, Sassia, depicted by Cicero in Pro Cluentio by rather dark 
colours—and from then on he bore the name T. Annius Milo, however, he inherited rich 
estate from his father too.1 (Cicero’s several friends, senator C. Velleius and senator L. 
Thorius Balbus, Q. Roscius the actor and grammarian L. Aelius Stilo came from Lanuvium.2 
In 49, Cicero himself wanted to buy an estate there; however, it could be carried out most 
probably only in 45.3) Nothing is known of Milo’s political career before he was elected a 
tribune in 57; however, historical records reveal that he took action as one of the eight 
tribunes who—led by tribune Q. Fabricius—drafted a petition for the sake of calling Cicero 
home.4 When on 23 January 57 at the concilium plebis they would have voted on the motion, 
Clodius’s gang—including several gladiators borrowed from his brother praetor Appius 
Claudius Pulcher—disturbed the assembly by violence and prevented voting.5 Milo detained 
                                                 
1
 Cic. Cluent. 78. 182; Mil. 64. Cf. Wiseman 1971. 195. 
2
 Lintott 1974. 62. 
3
 Cic. Att. 9, 9, 4; 13, 6; 12, 41, 1. 
4
 Cic. Sest. 72. 
5
 Cic. Sest. 75ff.; 85. 
75 
 
the gladiators; later, however, Serranus released them.1 After that, Milo tried to bring a charge 
against Clodius before the quaestio de vi, however, the edicts suspending administration of 
justice prevented him from doing so.2 After their attempts at settling the crisis by lawful 
means had failed one after another, Milo and Sestius also set up a private army from 
gladiators and professional boxers,3 however, it cannot be known whether it was this fact or 
the pressure exercised by Pompey that removed the obstacles of the final voting on 4 August 
at the comitia centuriata on the bill on calling Cicero home.4 Pompey, on the one hand, 
managed to bring down rising grain prices, which highly furthered improvement of public 
feeling, and, on the other hand, he lined up a considerable number of voters from municipia at 
the popular assembly.5 It must be made clear, however, that in 57 Milo did not undertake any 
part in personal defence of Cicero who returned home in 57 because Clodius’s horde was able 
to disturb the reconstruction of the house of Cicero and his brother without any trouble, and 
when Cicero was attacked on Via Sacra, he was defended by his own guard.6 Several people 
suspected that Cicero was in the background that Milo prevented Clodius from being elected 
aedil, however, there are good chances that this was part of Milo’s personal revenge, and 
Cicero could only hope in silence that the conflict would end with Clodius’s death,7 which did 
not happen for the time being.8 
In the second half of December 57, aediles for the next year were elected, including Clodius, 
who used his position to bring a charge before the popular assembly against Milo—so, it was 
at that time when Cicero defended Milo as an orator first.9 The atmosphere must have been 
similar to that in 52; the orator had to speak in the midst of continuous murmur, shouting in 
and disturbance.10 After the trials held on 2, 7 and 17 February 56, final voting was set for 7 
March; however, it is not known whether it took place at all.11 By then, the force of Milo’s 
private army had reached and exceeded that of Clodius, and Cicero, who had formerly been 
rigidly against use of violence in public life, this time gave his now tacit, now expressis verbis 
consent to armed fight as long as it served the goals that he also wanted to achieve.12 Milo 
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already gave resolute help to Cicero when in April 56 Clodius’s gang attacked him again,1 
and the relation between Cicero and Milo was hammered into a personal friendship and close 
political alliance.2 
Milo’s praetorship can be most probably dated to 55, i.e., to the third year before his 
consulship as in accordance with the provisions of lex annalis at least two years shall have 
been passed between holding two magistrates. In the fight for praetorship he was resolutely 
supported by Pompey.3 Milo soon married Fausta, Sulla’s cousin, who divorced C. Memmius 
before that,4 which was a serious step towards his consulate resolutely supported by Cicero 
too. In 54, four persons applied for the consul’s offices of the year 53: C. Memmius, 
supported by Caesar and originally by Pompey too, Cn. Domitius Calvinus, M. Valerius 
Messala and M. Aemilius Scaurus.5 Scaurus—as half-brother of Fausta and Faustus Sulla, that 
is, now as Milo’s borther-in-law—hoped to have the support of his former brother-in-law, 
Pompey, whose divorced wife, Mucia Tertia he married. Furthermore, he believed that 
through Faustus Sulla’s wife, Pompeia (Pompey’s daughter) he could also strengthen their 
relation, however, in August and September 54 in the lawsuit due to crimen repetundarum, in 
which he was defended by Cicero, Pompey did not side with him, and later completely backed 
out from behind him.6  
The election campaign involved not only bribe but violent and armed competition. Milo also 
hoped that his marriage would make his relation with Pompey closer; actually, it meant 
danger to him. Milo resolutely sided with Scaurus in the hope that as consul he would provide 
him with efficient help to fulfil the consulate of the year 52.7 Cicero supported Messala,8 
however, he was worried about the tension between Milo and Pompey, which became 
increasingly apparent since Pompey tried to turn Caesar too against Milo.9 In the meantime, 
referring to ill omen the election was postponed, and Scaurus tried to catch his rivals in the act 
of bribe; and some people was hoping that the elections could be held later on under the 
supervision of an interrex or dictator, specifically Pompey.10 Milo was pondering over 
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intervening in the course of the event by arms,1 Cicero, putting his moral concerns aside, 
would have supported him in theory; yet, he was alarmed by the danger of open conflict with 
Pompey as it was just that for which he had not undertaken formal accusation against 
Gabinius either. Undoubtedly, Cicero hoped that the efforts to increase Milo’s influence and 
support his plans for consulship would restore his own weight in public life.2 
Imperfect information is available on the events of the year 53, yet, it is a fact that the election 
of the magistratus curules had not happened before the summer,3 and Pompey used all his 
forces to have dictator’s authorisation voted for himself;4 however, the senate gave him 
authorisation only for ensuring orderly and lawful conduct of the election as proconsul.5 
During the campaign of the election of magistrates in 52, violence definitely grew: Clodius’s 
gang attacked consuls Messala and Domitius Calvinus, according to Cicero’s narrative M. 
Antonius wanted to have Clodius assassinated,6 and Clodius, who wanted to become praetor 
originally in 53, postponed his plan to the following year, due to holding the elections late, 
and so he inevitably conflicted both with Milo and the two candidates for consul, Hypsaeus 
and Metellus Scipio, supported by Pompey.7 
In the meantime, Cicero vehemently tried to win Curio, who had returned from Asia, over to 
ensuring Milo’s campaign,8 he expounded that all his thoughts were filled with Milo’s 
consulate since that is what both officium and pietas demanded from him. He invited Curio to 
take over management of the campaign, and briefly summed up everything for him that 
Quintus had summed up for him in 64 in Commentariolum petitionis. It is not probable that 
Curio undertook the task because later on no reference to this sort of activity or to gratitude 
felt by Cicero towards him for that can be found in any of the letters. Also, interesting light is 
shed on Cicero’s efforts by Gabinius’s defence in the lawsuit due to crimen repetundarum, 
which is quite difficult to date as the only reliable source in this respect is Pro Rabirio 
Postumo.9 Rabirius Postumus was also charged of crimen repetundarum, and, for that matter, 
due to the amount given to him by Gabinius, arising from blackmail and abuse of authority, 
and Cicero, overcoming his personal aversion, undertook defence of the accused (accused 
parties) so that he should not get confronted with Pompey. Several valid arguments against 
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dating Gabinius’s lawsuit to the end of 541 are formulated by Andrew Lintott.2 Gabinius 
returned to Rome on 27 September 54 where he was charged of crimen maiestatis;3 on 11 
October a debate was in progress on who should bring a charge of repetundae against him; on 
21 October a charge of ambitus was brought against him too. On 24 October, at a rate of 
thirty-eight/thirty-two he was acquitted of the charge of maiestas.4 
Regarding the issue whether the lawsuit could be commenced and conducted in the rest of the 
year, it is necessary to take the order of holidays of the following months unsuitable for legal 
proceedings into consideration too: from 26 October to 1 November Ludi victoriae Sullae, 
between 4 and 17 November Ludi plebei were arranged, and in the remaining period there 
were several other festivities, which made it almost impossible to conduct a longer lawsuit. 
Furthermore, lack of magistrates made it difficult to conclude a lawsuit commenced at the end 
of 54 in the beginning of 53 as praetor’s offices were not filled, so, the function of iudex 
quaestionis (quaesitor) could have been fulfilled maximum by the interrex.5 It is also hard to 
imagine that the lawsuit due to crimen repetundaum had been concluded by the end of 54 if 
we take into account the duration allowed for the accuser to search for evidence (inquisitio) in 
this sort of cases—in this respect it is enough to think of the lawsuit against Verres: with 
respect to Sardinia Cicero was allowed thirty days, in the case of Sicily he had to be satisfied 
with fifty days, although originally he asked for one hundred and ten days as the side 
competing for formal accusation, acting in collusion with Verres won one hundred and eight 
days for Achaia.6 Paying regard to all that, even cautious estimates would claim that at least 
one hundred and fifty days must have been required for collecting evidence of Egypt and 
Syria, in other words, the lawsuit could scarcely commence before March 53, which seems to 
be supported by the fact that no reference to the lawsuit against Gabinius can be found in 
Cicero’s correspondence in 54.7 At the same time, Cicero—although his conviction would 
have demanded and several of his friends urged him to—did not join the charge of maiestas 
lest he should incur the hatred of Pompey, and he excused Quintus by claiming that the charge 
was weakly founded and poorly built from the first, so it would have been a fault to lend his 
name to it.8 
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So, Cicero, putting his personal antipathy aside, and to ensure Pompey’s support to Milo, 
undertook the defence of both Gabinius and Rabirius Postumus against the charge of 
repetundae; yet, even by that he did not achieve his desired goal. In 53, no election was held 
for the magistratus curules of the year 52, and Pompey prevented tribune T. Munatius 
Plancus from appointing an interrex for conducting the election of consuls because he was 
afraid that the election of his future father-in-law, Metellus Scipio would be unfavourable to 
him. Milo, however, supported by Cicero, was not willing to surrender to Pompey’s plans, 
and electing Milo consul was a great threat to Clodius too for as the consul of the year 52 he 
would have supervised the nomination, campaign and election of the praetors to be elected for 
the year 51.1 
 
III. 2. Lawsuit of Milo – Cicero’s narrative and Asconius’s description  
 
Below it is worth surveying the chronology of the Milo lawsuit and its precedents in short—
primarily on the basis of Asconius, who had (when he wrote the history of the lawsuit 
approximately one hundred years later) several sources of the period, Cicero’s delivered 
speech and the Acta of the given period available to him. When setting up the chronology, as 
a matter of fact, supplementary sources can be and should be taken into consideration, such 
as, for example, Cicero’s letters, Plutarch’s and Dio Cassius’s accounts, although the latter 
state facts as appropriate in a condensed form in several cases, and sometimes merge events 
for the sake of dramatic effect. Asconius very rarely contradicts himself, so, in the rarest cases 
and with the greatest caution can it be alleged that his narrative is inaccurate, tendentious or 
intentionally fictitious.2 Relevant dates always reflect the condition prior to Caesar’s calendar 
reform, in this respect it is necessary to pay regard to the fact that the year 52 contained an 
Intercalarius; accordingly, the order of months was as follows: January consisted of twenty-
nine, February twenty-four, Intercalarius twenty-seven, March thirty-one and April twenty-
nine days.3 
On 18 January 52, Q. Pompeius Rufus and C. Sallustius Crispus delivered a hostile speech 
against Milo at the contio plebis,4 even before the conclusion of the contio Milo left for 
Lanuvium on Via Appia, namely, as dictator of the settlement he had to inaugurate the flamen 
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of the local cult into his priestly office—according to Cicero the same day,1 according to 
Asconius the following day.2 Already on the previous day, Clodius had gone to one of the 
stations of his election campaign, Aricia, and on 18, on the way home he stopped at a small 
village in Alba, Bovillae, and most probably visited Pompey’s villa in Alba too.3 Milo 
interrupted his journey in Bovillae at around the ninth hour (three in the afternoon), that is, 
three hours before dusk.4 Later on—according to Asconius in the ninth, according to Cicero in 
the eleventh hour (i.e., five in the afternoon)5—Milo, who travelled on carriage with his wife 
and followers, armed slaves and gladiators (presumably three hundred of them), rode 
northward with three of his followers and about thirty armed slaves.6 The clash took place in 
front of the Bona Dea sanctuary, near Clodius’s estate;7 according to Asconius’s narrative, the 
last member of Milo’s followers had words with Clodius’s followers, Clodius, hearing the 
clamour, turned back and in response to his threatening gestures one of Milo’s men threw his 
spear, which hit Clodius in the shoulder. Clodius was taken to a nearby inn, however, Milo’s 
men attacked the inn and killed Clodius.8 They threw Clodius’s corpse to the road, which was 
found and taken to Rome by senator Sextus Teidius.9 As a result of the clash, eleven of 
Codius’s slaves were killed, two of Milo’s slaves were wounded, and his coachman was most 
probably killed.10 
Here, it is necessary to highlight a few points that make the authenticity of Cicero’s narrative 
somewhat improbable, especially with regard to the character and time of the clash. The clash 
probably began not in the eleventh hour of the day, i.e., around five in the afternoon since—as 
Bovillae was located thirteen miles from Rome—then the senator could have scarcely arrived 
in Rome with Clodius’s corpse in the first hour of the night, and if Milo had to inaugurate the 
flamen on that day indeed, then it is not probable either that he arrived at Bovillae so late. In 
the presentation of the clash Cicero strives to give the impression as if Milo had been attacked 
by Clodius’s men both from the side and from behind, and that numerous of Milo’s slaves 
were killed, and he tries to make Clodius’s gang appear as big as possible.11 Asconius did not 
say a word about the death of Milo’s men, and the fact that Clodius was taken not to his villa 
                                                 
1
 Cic. Mil. 27f. 
2
 Asc. 3. 
3
 Cic. Mil. 51. 54. 
4
 Quint. inst. 6, 3, 49. 
5
 Cic. Mil. 29; Asc. 4. 
6
 Cic. Mil. 28f.; Asc. 4. 12. 
7
 Cic. Mil. 53. 86; Asc. 4. 
8
 Asc. 5–6. 
9
 Asc. 6. 
10
 Cic. Mil. 29; Asc. 7. 
11
 Cic. Mil. 29. 53f. 
81 
 
but an inn allows to make it probable that Milo’s troop cut off connection between the scene 
of the clash and the villa. Asconius’s account, which was written on the basis of delivered 
pleadings, evidence and the account of Acta Diurna, allows it to suggest that the accidentally 
occurring clash was concluded by the intentional assassination of the wounded Clodius.1 
At the murdered Clodius’s house on the Palatine, the mob of the city gathered in huge 
numbers; the same evening, Clodius’s wife, Fulvia exhibited Clodius’s corpse in public.2 The 
next day, on tribune Titus Munatius Plancus’s proposal the corpse was taken down to the 
Forum and was placed on rostra.3 Plancus and Pompey, who strove to prevent Milo from 
being elected consul, began to heckle the crowd against Milo; the mob took the corpse to the 
Curia to burn it, however, in the course of that the Curia and the Basilica Porcia caught fire 
and burned down.4 In the meantime, the patricians held an assembly on the Palatine where M. 
Aemilius Lepidus was elected interrex, who was demanded by the adherents of Scipio and 
Hypsaeus supported by Pompey to hold the elections immediately, which he refused as a 
completely unlawful step. The crowd at once attacked both the house of the interrex and the 
house of Milo, who was away, however, they were driven back; thereupon, with torches 
robbed from the grove of Libitina they marched to the house of Scipio and Hypsaeus and the 
gardens of Pompey,5 whom they proclaimed now consul, now dictator.6 
Marcus Caelius, Cicero’s one-time disciple and defendant, as a tribune convened a popular 
assembly where Milo and Cicero could expound that Clodius set a trap for Milo, who used the 
tool of lawful defence only when he killed Clodius.7 As no elections could be held due to 
armed disturbances of peace, senatus consultum ultimum was adopted with the content that 
the interrex, the tribunes and Pompey as proconsul should make arrangements to ensure the 
safety of the State and Pompey should recruit an army from Italy to restore public order.8 
Approximately thirty days after Clodius’s death, Q. Metellus Scipio lodged a complaint with 
the senate claiming that reference to situation of defence was unlawful and untrue, and 
demanded to conduct investigation and proceedings.9 In the meantime, although a part of the 
people demanded that Pompey should be appointed dictator, on the grounds of the resolution 
of the senate Pompey was granted the office of consul sine collega—hard to define in terms of 
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public law.1 Now Cicero could not see good chances for the election of Milo, who got 
between two fires due to the raging of Clodius’s adherents and the fact of holding out the 
prospect of and later on ordering investigation. Undoubtedly, Clodius’s assassination did not 
appear to be a politically wise step by Milo; however, it probably imbued Cicero with the 
feeling of personal satisfaction.2 He considered Milo’s act, who had now turned from a 
political ally into a friend, morally fully approvable, and placed him in one row with Servilius 
Ahala and Scipio Nasica, who were compelled to commit homicide in order to save the State.3 
Clodius’s two cousins started to demand that Milo’s and Fausta’s slaves who had taken part in 
the clash at Bovillae should be interrogated, and by actio ad exhibendum claimed extradition 
of the slaves,4 Hortensius, however, argued that—in view of the fact that Milo had already 
liberated the slaves who protected the life of their master—as freemen they could not be 
extradited for interrogation.5 In the case, the most influential and venerable representatives of 
the optimates, Cicero, Hortensius, Cato, Faustus Sulla and Marcus Marcellus resolutely sided 
with Milo.6 At the same time, Pompey behaved with Milo by preserving the appearance of 
fairness; so, for example, when he received the message that Milo’s slaves wanted to murder 
him, he investigated the matter under consilium amicorum, and invited Cicero too to be a 
member of it,7 and when Milo sent him the message that he was ready to withdraw from 
applying for the consul’s office, he replied that he did not want to directly intervene in filling 
offices in such fashion, so, he did not desire to persuade anybody to apply or dissuade 
anybody from applying.8 Presumably, the reason for that might have been that Pompey was 
sure of the success of the candidates supported by him, and did not want that an election 
without opposing candidates should make the legitimacy of the elected consuls questionable.9 
At the same time, Pompey tried to give the impression that he was really afraid of an 
assassination purportedly threatening him from the side of Milo and his adherents;10 however, 
the issue of the assassination attempts cannot be clarified, and it cannot be decided whether 
Milo’s men were preparing for such an act indeed or the news spread about it served nothing 
else than increasing antipathy against Milo. 
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On 22 January, Milo asked Pompey to grant him an audience and offered him to waive his 
application for the consul’s office, Pompey, however, declared that he did not want to 
intervene in such fashion in public affairs—yet, he refused to give Milo the opportunity to 
meet him personally.1 On 23 January, Q. Pompeius Rufus accused Milo before the contio of 
preparing for an assassination against Pompey.2 Around 27 January, tribune M. Caelius Rufus 
and Milo stepped before the contio with the argument that Clodius had prepared for 
assassination against Milo. 
It might have been in early February, between 3 and 10 that they issued the resolution of the 
senate that authorised Pompey to hold conscription all over Italy and recruit an army;3 it 
might have been at the same time that they adopted the senatus consultum ultimum that 
ordered “state of emergency”.4 Although Dio Cassius dates the senatus consultum ultimum to 
the days immediately following Clodius’s death5 and conscription by Pompey to a time 
somewhat later;6 yet, even at this point no weighty arguments support that Asconius’s precise 
description and the chronology based on it should be questioned.7 Around 18 February, in the 
senate Q. Metellus Scipio heavily attacked Milo’s defence referring to self-defence8 and 
declared that Milo’s arguing was unfounded due to all the circumstances of the case, the 
number of the slaves as well as the number of injuries and deaths suffered on the sides of the 
opposing parties. At the end of February, Pompey returned to Rome, however, he set up his 
accommodation in his villa outside the pomerium, claiming that there he felt more secure of 
Milo.9 
At the end of February or at the beginning of Intercalarius, Clodius’s two cousins, with the 
support of Valeius Nepos and Valerius Leo, put forth the claim under actio ad exhibendum 
that Milo and his wife, Fausta should extradite their slaves so that they could be interrogated 
in Pompey’s presence; for the same purpose Herennius Balbus announced their claim for 
Clodius’s slaves, and Caelius Rufus demanded extradition of Quintus Pompeius’s and 
Hypsaeus’s slaves. Hortensius argued that Milo’s slaves could not be extradited as now they 
were freemen since their master had liberated them for saving his life. At that time, the six 
most important and most venerable representatives of the optimates, Quintus Hortensius, 
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Cicero, Marcus Marcellus, Marcus Calidius, Fautus Sulla and Marcus Porcius Cato clearly 
stood up for Milo already.1 Simultaneously, rumours started to spread about electing Pompey2 
or Caesar dictator.3 The office of the thirteenth interrex after Clodius’s death, Servius 
Sulpicius Rufus, which commenced on the twenty-first day of Intercalarius, was interrupted 
on the 24 by electing Pompey—rather doubtfully in terms of public law—consul sine collega, 
that is, his one-person consulship,4 which took place (with quite a propaganda value) one day 
after the Regifugium, i.e., the holiday celebrating the chasing away of kings.5 The senate 
granted Pompey the right to choose a collega beside him, however, only after two months 
later.6 
On the twenty-sixth day of Intercalarius, Pompey—with express reference to the events at 
Bovillae and setting the Curia on fire—put forward a proposal to the senate to make the 
sanction of vis and ambitus stricter and to reform the order of procedure of both crimes in 
such form that, first, hearing of the witnesses would be implemented, then, the prosecution 
would have two and the defence three hours to plead their arguments.7 Milo and his adherents, 
as a matter of fact, felt the danger implied by setting up the quaestio extraordinaria, and on 
the following days made an attempt at thwarting the enactment of the law, so, for example, 
tribune Caelius Rufus was compelled to back out only upon being threatened by Pompey by 
armed forces.8 On the twenty-seventh day of Intercalarius, Q. Hortensius, supported by 
Cicero, put forward a proposal that Clodius’s assassination, setting the Curia on fire and 
attacking Aemilius Lepidus’s house should be qualified contra rem publicam acts9 so that 
thereby he could take the edge of Pompey’s laws directed against Milo and his act could be 
judged under quaestio ordinaria.10 Q. Fufius Calenus demanded that Clodius’s death should 
treated separately from other events,11 however, this proposal was vetoed by T. Mutatius 
Plancius and C. Sallustius Crispus.12 On 1 March, Pompey’s laws were enacted,13 their 
ratification must have taken place after 26 March, once the popular assembly had accepted 
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them. In the meantime, Cicero went to Ravenna to try to persuade Caesar—in order to 
counterbalance Pompey’s political overweight—to apply in absentia for consulate.1 
On 15 March, Pompey postponed the session of the senate claiming that he was afraid of 
Milo’s armed attack.2 At the next session, P. Cornifius charged Milo of having come to the 
senate with arms; thereupon, Milo lifted his tunica so that they could see that he had come 
without arms. In response, Cicero declared that all charges against Milo were fabrications.3 At 
a contio, T. Mutatius Planus summoned one of Marcus Lepidus‘s libertines, M. Aemilius 
Philemon, who alleged that as he witnessed Clodius’s assassination Milo took him captive 
and kept him in custody for two months. According to Asconius, this allegation—whether it 
was true or not—seemed to be suitable for turning public feeling against Milo.4 Plancus and 
Q. Pompeius Rufus also summoned a triumvir capitalis, and questioned him if he had 
detained Galata, one of Milo’s slaves, who took part in killing Clodius. The triumvir capitalis 
said only that the slave was caught as fugitivus at a taberna, and that the tribunes did not let 
him taken back to Milo. The next day, M. Caelius Rufus and another tribune took the slave 
back to Milo.5 Cicero was under increasing pressure to leave Milo to his fate; yet, he 
resolutely stood by him.6 
On 26 March, the popular assembly passed the two leges Pompeiae—this interval was 
necessary because lex Caecilia Didia of 98 stipulated that between rogatio and promulgatio a 
trium nundinum should elapse, which expired by then.7 L. Domitius Ahenobarbus was elected 
quaesitor of the court of justice set up on the grounds of Pompey’s laws.8 Clodius’s two 
cousins, who had earlier brought a charge of de vi against Milo, brought a charge of ambitus 
now based on the new laws against Milo, the prosecution was joined by C. Ateius and L. 
Cornificius; P. Fulvius Neratus brought a charge of de socaliciis against Milo.9 
Between 27 March and 3 April, A. Manlius Torquatus held divinatio to choose from among 
the four applicants who wanted to represent the charge of ambitus, and Appius Claudius 
senior, one of Clodius’s cousins, who brought a charge of vis too, was chosen; P. Valerius 
Leo and Cn. Domitius acted as co-prosecutors.10 On 4 April, Milo’s representatives appeared 
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before the court of justice chaired by M. Marcellus and attained that the lawsuit due to 
ambitus would be postponed to a date after the proceedings to be conducted due to vis.1 
Appius Claudius demanded extradition of Milo’s fifty-four slaves for interrogation, 
whereupon Milo replied that they were no longer under his control; Domitius as quaesitor 
ordered that Claudius should select the slaves to be interrogated.2 C. Causinius Schola 
testified that he was present when Clodius was assassinated, M. Marcellus wanted to put 
questions to him but the Clodiani made so much clamour and disturbance that Marcellus 
Domitius was compelled to seek protection on the judge’s pulpit. All this induced Pompey to 
promise to safeguard the trials thereafter with arms.3 
Pompey managed to bring Clodius’s adherents under control to a certain extent for the time of 
hearing the witnesses. In the course of that the attack against the inn, killing the innkeeper and 
throwing Clodius’s corpse on the road were revealed.4 M. Porcius Cato confessed that M. 
Favonius had said to him: Clodius declared on 15 January that Milo would be dead in three 
days.5 On 6 April, Clodius’s mother-in-law, Sempronia and his wife, Fulvia testified, which 
considerably made the public feeling side with them.6 After that, T. Munatius Plancus held a 
contio where he fired the crowd up so that they should not let Milo escape.7 
Perhaps the weakest performance in Cicero’s career took place in this lawsuit: both the 
Clodiana multitudo and Pompey’s soldiers embarrassed him, clamours and shouting in 
stopped him short, made him irresolute, what is more, frightened him; he could not deliver the 
prepared speech with the planned constantia, he spoke flustered unable to collect his 
thoughts.8 His delivered speech was taken down in shorthand as usual; and Asconius could 
still read the minutes that contained the speech and shouting in; it is, therefore, an indisputable 
fact that Pro Milone published later—as a matter of fact, apart from certain overlapping 
thoughts—is not fully identical with the oratio made on 8 April 52.9 Afterwards, Cicero 
recalled this unsuccessful performance with indifference—whether pretended or real 
indifference it cannot be decided.10 According to Dio Cassius’s narrative, it was on this day 
that Milo tried to persuade Cicero to get out of his lectica only after the court of justice had 
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appeared so that the soldiers and the heckled crowd should not increase his tension since he 
usually struggled with strong stage fright when he started his speeches as it is generally 
known.1 
Shops were closed on the day of the trial, the Forum was secured by Pompey’s army; first, the 
accusers, Appius Claudius, M. Antonius and P. Valerius Nepos spoke, then, as the only 
defender, Cicero. Milo was convicted at a rate of thirty-eight/thirteen.2 On 8 or 9 April, Milo 
was convicted due to ambitus too in his absence.3 On 11 or 12 April, Milo was again 
convicted due to vis based on lex Plautia in his absence.4 After 12 April, M. Saufeius, who 
took part in the clash at Bovillae and against whom a charge of vis was brought and was 
defended by Cicero and Caelius Rufus, was acquitted by one vote.5 Approximately on 13 
April, Milo went into exile to Massilia.6 After 18 April, a charge was brought again against 
Saufeius on the grounds of lex Plautia—he was defended, beside M. Terentius Varro Gibba, 
by Cicero again—but he was acquitted at a rate of thirty-two/nineteen.7 Against Sextus 
Cloelius, who had Clodius’s corpse taken to the Curia and was thereby indirectly considered 
instigator of setting the Curia on fire, a charge was brought after 22 April, and he was 
convicted with a huge majority of the votes cast as public feeling turned against the Clodian 
mob again.8 
 
III. 3. Handling of the facts of the case in Pro Milone 
 
M. Iunius Brutus—one of Caesar’s later assassins, addressee of Cicero’s history of eloquence 
entitled Brutus—voicing the conviction of several people, represented the view in his 
fictitious speech written in defence of Milo and published later that the assassination of 
Clodius constituted huge gain for the State.9 According to Asconius, in his delivered speech 
Cicero took up the position that though a person might be convicted for the sake of the public 
but in the absence of lawful judgment or other statutory authorisation nobody should be killed 
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by referring to the interest of the state1—so, it is unambiguously clear that it was only the 
version of the speech left to us, i.e., the not only extensively re-edited but re-written version 
representing a completely new argument at certain points (which was published for 
legitimisation purposes and was in circulation as a political pamphlet), into which Cicero built 
the train of thoughts that acknowledgement rather than punishment would be due to Milo for 
killing Clodius as thereby he had done immense service to res publica.2 At the same time, it is 
possible to accept Andrew Lintott’s view that, compared to Asconius’s account, the rest of the 
arguments of the published speech and the delivered oration might have mostly overlapped.3 
Obviously, Cicero could not argue differently—as it was an undeniable fact that Milo’s slaves 
had killed Clodius—than by claiming that they acted in a situation of lawful defence as decent 
slaves ought to, that is, they protected their master.4 As a key legal argument he uses the “vim 
vi” and “arma armis repellere cuique licet” principle.5 Right at the beginning of his speech 
he makes it clear that he would base his argument on it as follows. The end of the 
prooemium/exordium contains the description of the legal question of the case (stasis, status, 
quaestio, constitutio). The possible forms of handling the case in accordance with Antique 
rhetorical theory are as follows: in the case of status coniecturalis it had to be clarified 
whether the suspect had committed the act, i.e., the question is aimed at the person of the 
perpetrator; status definitivus applied to the legal classification of the admitted act; in the case 
of status generalis or qualitativus they investigated if the committed act was subject to the 
scope of the given punitive statute; and in the case of status translativus they examined which 
law was to be applied and which court of justice was competent in the case. Status generalis 
can be taken more or less as the equivalent of the present-day reasons for excluding 
unlawfulness—for example, lawful defence, state of emergency, etc. Others argued that the 
case should be judged in terms of status generalis; more specifically, that killing of Clodius 
was not a crime because it served the interest of the state, thus, it occurred completely rightly. 
Cicero did not choose this path since he did not want to use either the tool of deprecatio (by 
which the accused admits his guilt and asks for pardon referring to his earlier merits) or the 
opportunity of comparatio, which presents the act as a deed performed for the sake of the 
state. In his argument he used the tool of relatio criminis6 and wanted to prove that Clodius 
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had intended to murder Milo, and Milo had acted in self-defence only. At the same time, it 
can be established that setting out from the stable legal and political grounds of reference to 
the situation of lawful defence he does not lay smaller emphasis on emotional impact and uses 
the tool of comparatio, that is, he presents Milo’s act committed in self-defence as a deed 
beneficial to the State—the latter assessment was most probably not voiced in the delivered 
speech and was inserted in the published version only.1 
The argument of the prosecution somewhat helped Cicero as the Appii Claudii argued that 
Milo set a trap for Clodius with premeditated malice to be able to murder him, which Cicero 
could easily refute.2 The primary aim of the court of justice set up by Pompey must have been 
to punish the abettors—in this case Milo, who did not kill Clodius with his own hands—rather 
than the slaves and freemen belonging to the people of the house of Milo and Clodius who 
clashed on Via Appia. In accordance with that, the phrase “dolo malo” well-known from the 
praetor’s edict3 was in several cases adopted in the usage of quaestiones de vi too.4 On the 
other hand, to distinguish voluntary homicide from involuntary homicide, the phrase “dolo” 
was used already in the par(r)icida definition attributed to King Numa.5 Lex Cornelia de 
sicariis et veneficis ordered to punish bearing of arms suitable for manslaughter and bearing 
of arms with intent to kill.6 Taking all this into consideration, there are good chances for 
presuming that lex Pompeia de vi providing grounds for the proceedings against Milo also 
contained the phrase “dolo (malo)” and, accordingly, the accusers might have also wanted to 
prove that the act had been premeditated, prepared, which Cicero could easily refute.7 
Accordingly, Cicero, responding to the usage of the prosecution, uses the phrases “insidiae” 
and “insidiator” several times;8 however, he strives to refute that the point would have been 
that both Milo and Clodius had planned in advance to kill the other, and emphasises that the 
plan of the murder was formulated and became determination unilaterally in Clodius.9 He 
convincingly refers to the opportunity provided by ius naturale that killing of the aggressor 
insidiator does not qualify an unlawful act.10 Cicero endeavours to turn it to his and his 
defendant’s advantage that the senate qualified the events taken place on Via Appia treason 
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when he tries to prove regarding the clash that it was seemingly condemned but practically 
approved by the senate.1 In the narratio the orator touches on lawful defence as well as 
stresses that the slaves killed Clodius not upon Milos’s instructions.2 Presentation of the 
situation of lawful defence bears a clear resemblance to the relevant locus in Pro Sestio where 
the orator describes Sestius’s act as the only possible form of defence against Clodius.3 
Cicero, at least in the version of the speech left to us, elegantly disregards the point of the case 
most critical to Milo: the attacking of the inn, that is, the circumstance that even the most 
brilliant orator could not have presented as direct outcome or manifestation of lawful defence. 
After the speeches had been delivered, both the prosecution and the defence repudiated and 
demanded expulsion of five senators, five knights and five aerar tribunes from the members of 
the quaestio;4 so, a total of fifty-one jurors voted. According to Asconius, twelve senators, 
thirteen knights and thirteen aerar tribunes voted for Milo’s guilt, and six senators, four 
knights and three aerar tribunes voted for his innocence; furthermore, Asconius describes that 
according to certain people Marcus Porcius Cato most certainly took a stand for acquitting the 
accused as he declared several times that Clodius’s death was a great relief to res publica.5 
During the following days Milo went into voluntary exile to Massilia. 
Milo’s property was sold by auction for the twenty-fourth of the real value, which either 
meant the real ratio or was indicated merely in the sense of a very low amount,6 but in this 
respect it is not possible to answer the question with full certainty whether this took place as 
second punishment of the judgment, i.e., through state sectores, or merely due to accumulated 
debts under usual bankruptcy proceedings on creditors’ initiative paying regard to the fact that 
the debtor went into exilium.7 Yet, the following arguments are in favour of the above. 
Publicatio bonorum was connected with traditional exile as punishment (aquae et igni 
interdictio) in accordance with Sulla’s laws, and this state most probably existed until 
Caesar’s legislation, which increased punishment for homicide by forfeiture of property as 
second punishment.8 In this respect perduellio was considered an exception because in most 
of the cases forfeiture of full property was imposed as second punishment.9 Lex Plautia de vi 
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held out the prospect of exile,1 however, lex Pompeia de vi, which provided grounds for the 
proceedings against Milo, framed a not specifically known but stricter sanction, which might 
have meant forfeiture of property too, and the circumstances of the case and Cicero’s 
correspondence2 allow to make it possible that the sale of Milo’s property by auction did not 
serve satisfaction of private law claims but was implemented as second punishment of exile.3 
 
III. 4. The published version of Pro Milone – reasons for publication  
 
It is worth paying some attention to the question why Cicero published Pro Milone in a re-
written and re-edited version. It is all the more noteworthy because Cicero usually did not 
publish his speeches delivered in lost lawsuits.4 Perhaps it is not needless to survey the series 
of the most important, winning defence speeches left to us: on the basis of Pro Roscio 
Amerino (in 80), Pro Cluentio (in 66), Pro Murena (in 63), Pro Sulla (in 62), Pro Archia 
poeta (in 62), Pro Flacco (in 59), Pro Sestio (in 56), Pro Caelio (in 56), Pro Balbo (in 56), 
Pro Plancio (in 54), Pro Scauro (in 54), Pro Rabirio Postumo (in 53) and Pro Ligario (in 46), 
to the best of our knowledge, Cicero’s defendants were acquitted. The outcome of Pro Roscio 
comoedo (presumably in 76), Pro Fonteio (in 69) is not known; the trial of Pro Rabirio 
perduellionis (in 63) was interrupted.5 In this respect, Pro Milone is an exception: the accused 
was convicted, Cicero, however, published the revised version of the speech. From among 
defeated oral pleadings, in addition to Pro Milone, Pro Valero, delivered between 80 and 70 
and lost in the meantime, was published; Cicero did not publish the unsuccessful speeches 
delivered in defence of Scamander (in 74), Antonius (in 59), Cispius (in 56), L. Caninius 
Gallus (in 55), Gabinius (in 54) and Scaurus (in 52); accordingly, they have not been left to 
us. The speech delivered in defence of Manilius in 65, with an outcome not known to us, has 
not been left to us either. During the ten years preceding the Milo lawsuit, Cicero managed 
winning cases only, in this respect and with regard to the fact of publishing, Pro Milone 
constitutes an exception.6 
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Wilfried Stroh explains the publication of Pro Milone by pedagogical reasons, that is, 
Cicero’s intention was to set an exemplum to young orators.1 On the other hand, there must 
have been not much sense in Cicero setting the speech of a lost lawsuit as an example to 
students; at most it can be conceived on the basis of the explanation that he might have 
wanted to demonstrate by the revised version what speech he should have delivered in order 
to win the lawsuit. However, even the revised Pro Milone—which might have satisfied the 
orator-artist Cicero’s demands in vain—would have demonstrated the politician Cicero’s 
defeat to the general public. Taking all this into consideration, just as in the case of the second 
Philippic, there must have been primarily political reasons for publishing Pro Milone.2 
 
III. 5. The motif of killing the tyrant as further development of lawful defence  
 
Below it is worth investigating how the motif of killing the tyrant appears in the speech 
delivered in defence of Milo, more precisely, in the published speech left to us, and how it is 
reflected and more elaborately worked out in Cicero’s later philosophical works. As a starting 
point it must be made clear that harmonisation of the defence of dignitas and legitimised 
application of vis—i.e., killing the tyrant as a category of public law/philosophy of the state—
was integrated in Cicero’s philosophy only after Milo’s unsuccessful defence and publication 
of the re-written/re-edited version of the speech.3 
There is a completely striking connection between the portrait of the tyrant in De re publica4 
and the formulation of the demand to eliminate the tyrant from public life5 and the image of 
“Milo as tyrannoktonos”.6 Accordingly, tyranny is created not through filling some office, 
position or dignity; the tyrant carries the core of tyranny in his personality, being, which is 
aimed at a single goal: dominatio over his fellow-citizens, and, eventually, at seizing regnum.7 
Thus, the civis who frees the State from the plague of tyranny is nothing else than tutor et 
procurator rei publicae, that is, healer of the community. In Pro Milone the contrast becomes 
sharp and clear: Clodius appears as tyrannus,8 his death as killing the tyrant,9 Milo as 
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conservator populi, and through killing Clodius as tutor et procurator rei publicae.1 As a 
historical example for tyrant Cicero very often mentions Tarquinius Superbus, Sp. Maelius 
and Ti. Gracchus,2 and refers to Verres from the recent past.3 Cicero himself was several 
times called tyrant by his political opponents and enemies.4 
Cicero’s theory of killing the tyrant is primarily based on stoic philosophy;5 at the same time, 
it is important to underline that this theory is not a direct philosophical transformation of the 
“vim vi repellere licet” principle that serves the legal postulate of defence in Pro Sestio and 
Pro Milone.6 The stoic element of the motif of killing the tyrant can be demonstrated most 
clearly, what is more, in a form uttered by Cicero, in the third book of De officiis written in 
44.7 He declares that the element of killing the tyrant8 is fully in harmony with stoic 
philosophy,9 which also complies with naturalis ratio,10 i.e., it is the ultimate conclusion of 
ethical consideration.11 In view of the fact that the tyrant ruins human community and places 
himself outside the rules of coexistence,12 accordingly, these rules are not binding him 
Cicero extends this principle to a wider scope, more specifically, he harmonises it with the 
norms of ius naturale, ius gentium, ius divinum and ius humanum.14 The stoic sage acts in 
harmony with the laws of nature when he eliminates the tyrant from society, imitates the 
efforts of Hercules made for the sake of mankind.15 
Cicero transforms the thesis of stoic moral philosophy into the legal thinking and concepts of 
the Romans.16 His reasoning culminates in turning the right of killing the tyrant into the 
ethical/legal command of killing the tyrant: making common cause with the tyrant is 
excluded, he must be barred and removed from human community since he is nothing else 
than a beast having assumed human form.17 Phalaris’s case is Cicero’s most favourite 
and by that he demonstrates that assassination is not only ethically fair but it is definitely a 
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moral obligation (honestum necare), elimination of the tyrant from the community (feritas et 
immanitas beluae segreganda est). This again is in line with the identification of the tyrannus 
with belua also present in stoic philosophy, which is clearly formulated in De re publica too1 
in such form that the tyrant is the most harmful species of animals, which is the most hateful 
subhuman being both to gods and humans, that is, it lives merely in figura hominis.2 Thus, the 
key attributes of the tyrant can be described by the following concepts: nulla societas, belua, 
genus pestiferum, exul, contra leges, contra naturam; i.e., a being close to a subhuman form 
of existence, whose assassination cannot constitute moral offence just as killing any harmful 
beast.3 
In Pro Milone this train of thoughts and images can be clearly followed. Cicero devotes two 
paragraphs to Clodius’s sexual debaucheries,4 three to his religious offences,5 and underlines 
his crimes committed against natural law and positive law.6 All this properly substantiates the 
image depicted of Clodius’s beastly nature: the net of laws, which served to catch Clodius, the 
beast, who wants to seize regnum,7 and of which he slipped out several times, and the 
representation of the wild beast hiding in darkness creates the image of beastly existence.8 
The wild animal topos occurs several times in Cicero’s corpus in the characterisation of both 
Clodius9 and Antonius.10 So, Clodius was nothing else than a belua upsetting the order of 
Roman societas, terrorising decent citizens, among others Cicero and Pompey,11 who tried to 
carry through the seizing of dominatio by undermining laws (legibus Clodianis) too, as it is an 
immanent feature of every tyrant,12 and in 58 Cicero himself almost fell victim to this 
legislation crushing the law, more precisely lex Clodia de capite civium. 
When Cicero refers to the circumstance of the situation of lawful defence excluding 
unlawfulness with regard to Milo’s defence,13 on the one hand, he supports his argument by 
the terminology of the relevant passage of lex Cornelia de sicariis,14 on the other hand, he 
not refer to written law but to man’s innate right derived from nature in order to prove Milo’s 
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act, for if an assassin, aggressor, robber or enemy attacks somebody by arms, then he can use 
every means to protect his life.1 Consequently, in killing the insidiator, that is, Clodius, Milo 
followed the law of nature as the force of positive law does not prevail in such cases, for in 
war law is silent, and the assassin can be killed rightly.2 With the aid of the basic principles of 
stoic philosophy, among others, Cicero extends the scope of lawful defence to a wide domain: 
educated persons were allowed by common sense, barbaric tribes by necessity, peoples by 
unwritten law and wild beasts by nature to drive back every attack of violence every time by 
every means.3 
The orator, however, does not confine himself to prove lawfulness of Milo’s act: it is not 
punishment at all but praise that he would deserve for killing Clodius since he did a great 
service to State so to say unselfishly because all of his acts were motivated—as Cicero 
asserts—by his commitment to public good.4 It is in this spirit that he makes Milo speak: he 
makes him wish citizens and the State tranquil and undisturbed life even at the expense of his 
own exile.5 He raises this train of thoughts and greatness of Milo’s act to a divine-cosmic 
sphere and strikes a tone that he uses later in Somnium Scipionis when praising the merits of 
men who work for the public.6 By that he opens a new dimension for the interpretation of the 
“vim vi repellere” principle as he distinguishes between two kinds of vis: baleful violence 
used by Clodius and the force that guarantees survival of Rome by which providence, i.e., 
providentia itself intervened as saviour through Milo in the fate of the State.7 Therefore, in 
this sense, his defendant is no longer an independent doer but an agent who fulfils the 
prediction made by Cicero in 57 that Milo would kill Clodius,8 that is, a means of providentia 
because divine providence, destiny had let Clodius stay alive so that it could fulfil his 
punishment at a given place, given time and under given circumstances by Milo’s hands.9 
All this is unambiguously reverberated in the relevant paragraphs of De officiis. Providentia, 
which is the form of appearance of stoic fatum,10 that is, heimarmenē, is manifested through 
the sapiens, who is, on the basis of naturae ratio, not only entitled but obliged to kill the 
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tyrannus that annihilates coniunctio civium.1 So, in this respect, Milo is nothing else than a 
manifestation of the archetype of stoic sapiens, who, having realised naturae ratio, fulfilled 
the order of heimarmenē and freed the State from the contagion poisoning the community. 
Law and statutes, i.e., state authority was not and would not have been able to bring the peril 
embodied by Clodius under control,2 law and order of the State could not put proper tools into 
Milo’s hands to act as avenger.3 
It is known from Asconius that there are significant differences between the speech delivered 
in defence of Milo and the speech published, and before delivering the speech Cicero had 
rejected Brutus’s proposal to refer to lawfulness of killing the tyrant in Milo’s defence.4 The 
fact that he did not achieve his goal, that is, he did not attain Milo’s acquittal most probably 
made the orator change his tactics of argument in the re-written Pro Milone disseminated also 
as a political pamphlet.5 Presumably, before making the speech, it was not for theoretical 
reasons that Cicero refused to accept Brutus’s argument as in 63 he himself had several 
conspirators executed without judgment and undertook the defence of Rabirius charged with 
perduellio—the difference between these cases and Milo’s case was that the latter was not 
backed by senatus consultum ultimum.6 In 57, Cicero cherished hopes regarding Clodius’s 
assassination by recalling the example of Scipio Nasica who killed Ti. Gracchus as tyrant, but 
at that time he had not placed himself beyond the limits of positive law yet.7 In the speech 
delivered he endeavoured to use the system of argument of positive law and was reluctant to 
resort to the tools of legitimisation of stoic philosophy—his efforts were not crowned by 
success. Afterwards, in the published version he used the system of argument of stoic 
philosophy, which he later on shaped into a structure of profound thoughts with respect to the 
idea of killing the tyrant in De re publica, De finibus bonorum et malorum, Tusculanae 
disputationes—in which he defined the time of the dialogue as the period of Milo’s lawsuit—
and in De officiis. He might have meant the oral pleadings, stylised into a paper on the 
philosophy of the state, which highlights Milo’s unselfishness and self-sacrifice and which 
sets Milo as an example of the stoic sage, to provide consolatio for Milo.8  
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In what follows it is worth following Aislinn Melchior’s train of thoughts that convincingly 
proves that in the version of Pro Milone left to us Cicero consequently enforces the tendency 
in Milo’s representation that he compares his defendant and his acts performed for the sake of 
res publica to his own merits obtained during suppression of Catilina’s plot and identifies him 
with himself. All this might have primarily served a given political goal: as his own fate 
exemplifies the opportunity of returning/being called back from unlawful exile, he is hoping 
that Milo will be called back too, and that is what he wanted to advance by publishing the 
oratio.1 
The key points of identifying the two persons, Cicero and Milo are as follows: both did noble 
service to the State as they freed the community of the tyrant, however, the ungrateful crowd 
forced both of them into exile. These similarities should bring along the following as logical 
consequences: if Cicero was able to return home from exile triumphantly, then Milo should 
return home too. The enemies of Cicero and Milo embody an identical principium: in the 
identification Cicero represents Clodius as second Catilina, however, it is not Pro Milone 
where this image occurs for the first time—this identification emerges several times after his 
return from exile; for example, in De domo sua Clodius appears as felix Catilina.2 In Pro 
Milone, identification of Clodius with Catilina is carried out by applying certain appositions 
rather than by name. In this respect it is worth comparing the usage of Pro Milone with that of 
the speeches against Catilina. The key characteristics of both Catilina and the conspirators are 
furor3 and audacia;4 they appear as latro,5 insidiator6 and parricida.7 Clodius and his 
adherents are also characterised by furor8 and audacia9 just as by the classifications latro,10 
insidiator11 and parricida.12 The identification of Catilina with Clodius develops most clearly 
the point where the orator speaks about the causes of his own exile,13 and in relation to it 
characterises Clodius as it were as the “legal successor” of Catilina who undermined the State. 
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Accordingly, Cicero identifies Milo’s role with his own, representing both of them as 
archetypal manifestations of real patriotism, who qualified the State for this role by 
undertaking the sublime task of killing the tyrant, that is, Clodius—in the case of Milo—and 
chasing away Catilina and having the conspirators executed—in the case of Cicero; just as the 
great and the good of past times, C. Servilius Ahala who killed Spurius Maelius, Publius 
Scipio Nasica who did away with Tiberius Gracchus, Lucius Opimius who used the 
opportunities provided by senatus consultum ultimum and did away with Caius Gracchus, and 
Caius Marius who rendered L. Saturninus harmless.1 In the first speech against Catilina the 
orator calls the example of exactly the same men to his audience’s mind when he urges that 
Catilina should be rendered harmless.2 In view of the fact that at the time of publishing Pro 
Milone the speeches against Catilina constituted exempla of Roman rhetorical training to be 
learned by heart, Cicero could certainly expect the readers of the oral pleadings to recognise 
the reminiscences implied by the enumeration without doubt and draw necessary conclusions 
from them with respect to the parallels between the roles of Milo and Cicero.3 
The characters of Spurius Maelius and Tiberius Gracchus return in the second sermocinatio of 
Pro Milone, i.e., in the passage where the orator calls Milo as it were as a fictitious speaker,4 
which can be considered as a kind of reminiscence of the given locus of the fourth 
Catilinarian oration again where Cicero expounds that Catilina represents a danger to the 
State greater than any of the former subversive elements, the Gracchuses and L. Saturninus.5 
Thereby the orator clearly demonstrates that Clodius, rendered harmless by Milo, also carried 
danger to State greater than former subversive elements, measurable only to the peril caused 
by Catilina. Just as Cicero mentions himself as conservator civium, Milo also becomes 
conservator populi.6 When he puts the statement into Milo’s mouth that he fended off 
Clodius’s dagger that he drove at citizens’ throat,7 it is a clear allusion to the passage of the 
third Catilinarian oration where Cicero tells the same about himself regarding Catilina’s 
weapons.8 It appears also as a parallel between Cicero and Milo that both of them saved the 
State and peace of citizens at the expense of risking their own life and safety.9 (At the same 
time, the orator makes use of the identification properly in other respects too: he opposes 
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Milo’s courage to his own fear,1 and Milo’s face and glance turned rigid as marble to his own 
tears.2) 
The identification of Milo with himself has further tempting opportunities in store: in the 
person of Milo who kills Clodius he can triumph over the dead primordial enemy.3 In spite of 
the fact that no direct evidence is available to us that by publishing the speech Cicero wanted 
to attain that Milo should be called home from exile, all these parallels and identifications 
give us a good chance of presuming it.4 
When Cicero forwarded a copy of the published speech—which is one of the masterpieces of 
both rhetoric and political pamphlets indeed—to Milo too, allegedly he made the only remark 
that if earlier Cicero had spoken before court like that too, then now he could not eat the 
superb fish that can be caught solely in Massilia.5 Cicero was not wrong—this statement 
makes us discern: in a certain sense Milo was a stoic sage indeed. 
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IV. Lawsuit of Quintus Ligarius  
 
After the battle of Thapsus that took place on 6 April 46 Caesar kept delaying his return to 
Rome for a long while, until 25 July—he stopped to stay on Sardinia—and this cannot be 
attributed fully to implementing measures and actions necessary in Africa since they could 
have been carried out by his new proconsul, C. Sallustius Crispus too. The triumph held 
owing to the victory in Africa—in which they carried around representations of the death of 
M. Petreius, M. Porcius Cato and Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica—must have 
further grated on the nerves of the aristocracy of Rome, because it was meant to symbolise 
Caesar’s victory both over Iuba and the senate. It was after that that Cicero broke his silence 
and delivered Pro Marcello1 in the senate, which was both oratio suasoria and gratiarum 
actio for the pardon granted to Marcellus, by which Caesar wanted to assure the senate of his 
benevolence and wanted to show off his power by his autocratic gesture. Pro Ligario 
delivered in 46 has been considered a classical example of deprecatio by both the antique and 
modern literature, and in historical terms it is not a less noteworthy work since from the 
period following the civil war Pro Marcello, having been delivered in early autumn of 46 in 
the senate, is Cicero’s first oration made on the Forum, that is, before the general public, in 
which praising Caesar’s clementia he seemingly legitimised dictatorship.2 
 
IV. 1. Historical background of Pro Ligario  
 
Quintus Ligarius—who was born as the offspring of an insignificant Sabine gens, his brother, 
Titus fulfilled the office of quaestor urbanus around 54, his other brother, Quintus obtained 
quaestorship sometimes in the 50’s3—filled the office of legate in 50 beside Considius 
Longus propraetor in the Africa province.4 After Considius went to Rome at the end of 50 to 
run as candidate for consulate, the administration of the province was left to Ligarius, who—
as Cicero asserts—was not pleased to undertake it.5 Immediately before the outbreak of the 
civil war, in 49 the senate appointed Q. Aelius Tubero, Cicero’s remote relative, propraetor of 
Africa, who waited before taking over the province—we do not know whether his illness 
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prevented him from travelling or he wanted to wait and see what direction high politics would 
take. In Africa Ligarius also took a wait-and-see attitude. That is how it happened that not 
long after the outbreak of the civil war—after the defeat by Caesar at Auximum—before the 
propraetor designated by the senate, P. Attius Varus, Pompey’s adherent, Africa’s one-time 
governor arrived in Utica,1 who arbitrarily took over the governance of the province on behalf 
of the republican side and ordered to set up two legions.2 Ligarius was compelled to 
subordinate himself to Varus’s supremacy;3 however, both Cicero and Caesar disputed its 
validity as Varus’s procedure lacked lawful grounds.4 
Soon, in the spring of 49—the exact date is not known, it might have taken place after Cato’s 
withdrawal from Sicily, i.e., 23 April—Africa’s legitimate governor, Q. Aelius Tubero, 
together with his son appeared at Utica.5 Tubero was prohibited by Varus and Ligarius, 
exercising administration along the coast of Africa, to land and take over the province 
assigned to him by the senate as well as to take water and get his ill son to enter the province.6 
In the plea of defence Cicero shifted the responsibility for the above onto Varus.7 Regarding 
these events Caesar did not mention Ligarius’s name either, only Varus’s.8 The exact cause of 
the hostile conduct engaged by Varus and Ligarius are not known, their distrust was most 
probably due to the fact that Tubero kept delaying his journey to Africa and they suspected 
him of belonging to Caesar’s adherents. After that, Tubero joined Pompey in Greece, and took 
part in the battle at Pharsalus on his side; then, we was granted pardon by Caesar.9 
In the meantime, Caesar’s commander, Curio commanded troops to Africa in August 49, and 
after the victories over Varus and Ligarius he died in the battle against the ruler of Numida, 
Iuba. Only a few of Curio’s army, including Asinius Pollio, were able to escape to Sicily. Iuba 
considered himself absolute winner and had a part of the Roman soldiers who surrendered to 
Varus executed. Although Varus did not approve this step, he was not in the situation to 
oppose it.10 As Iuba appeared to be the republican forces’ most significant support in Africa, 
the Pompeian senate awarded him the title of king and hospitality, while the Caesarian senate 
declared him enemy (hostis populi Romani). After the battle at Pharsalus Pompey’s adherents 
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gathered in Africa to continue the fight against Caesar; the office of the commander-in-chief 
was given on the grounds of Cato’s decision to Pompey’s father-in-law, the consul of the year 
52, Q. Metellus Scipio. Attius Varus, Labienus and Cato submitted themselves to Metellus 
Scipio, however, internal hostility mostly worn out the force of opposition and, to a 
considerable extent, facilitated Caesar’s victory in Africa in 46. Cato proudly took his own 
life and deprived Caesar from the opportunity of exercising power—punishment or pardon—
over him, Attius Varus and Labienus moved to Hispania, and continued the fight there up to 
45.1 
After the battle at Thapsus Ligarius was taken as captive in Hadrimentum, however, Caesar 
gave him pardon just as to Considius’s son.2 From the fact of captivity in Hadrimentum it is 
possible to draw the conclusion that Ligarius stayed there during the entire term of the war in 
Africa and did not assume any part in war actions; yet, he could not have been a really 
significant person since the author of Bellum Africanum does not mention him by name. 
Caesar’s pardon was not rare at all as the dictator gave amnesty to everybody who 
surrendered without fight in the war in Africa; only a few even of the chiefs were killed, e.g. 
Afranius and Faustus Sulla captivated during fight—whether it was done on the direct orders 
of Caesar3 or without his knowledge is disputed.4 This is fully supported by Cicero’s 
statement when he speaks about a victory where only armed persons were killed.5 However, a 
granted pardon did not give permit to return to Italy.  
Ligarius’s relatives turned to Cicero as early as in the summer of 46 asking him to use his 
influence with Caesar to allow Ligarius to return to Italy, and in letters with highly official 
tone dated in August and September 46 respectively—which does not certify that they 
maintained any friendly relation6—the orator assured Ligarius of his help.7 It is not known 
what kind of relationship Cicero maintained with the otherwise not too significant Ligarii 
known only for their hostile emotions towards Caesar and what role Cicero’s ceaseless 
financial difficulties played in undertaking the case. It is possible that it was Brutus’s 
mediation that made Cicero undertake the case.8 On the other hand, for a long while Cicero 
did not have any direct contact with the dictator, only with his environment, e.g., with Pansa, 
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Hirtius and Postumus.1 In Ligarius’s matter, together with Ligarius’s brothers he made efforts 
to get close to Caesar through mediators and disclose the matter to him.2 This was not an easy 
task because, among others, Caesar took a dislike to those who were involved in the war in 
Africa and wanted to keep them in uncertainty by delaying their return;3 Cicero encouraged 
Ligarius by asserting that his troubles would be soon solved for Caesar’s anger lessened from 
day to day.4 His next letter more resolutely voiced the hope in the opportunity of returning 
home soon5 as having undertaken the somewhat humiliating situation to ask for audience as a 
senator consularis from Caesar four years younger than him, not being above him at all in the 
hierarchy of the Republic,6 Cicero was granted personal hearing by Caesar where he appeared 
together with Ligarius’s brothers, who threw themselves to the ground at the dictator’s feet, 
and Cicero delivered a speech.7 To all that Caesar responded generously, which made giving 
amnesty unquestionable in Cicero’s eyes, however, it could not be considered a completed 
fact.8 
So, Ligarius’s case was in a fair way to get solved to satisfy everybody when in the last days 
of September 46 the son of Lucius Tubero, the former governor, Q. Aelius Tubero9 brought a 
charge against Ligarius, which he wanted to support primarily by asserting that Ligarius—and 
Varus—had not let him land in Africa, in the province assigned to them by the senate. 
Perhaps the charges included the relation maintained with Iuba as enemy and high treason 
implemented thereby. At the same time, it should be mentioned at the outset that in Pro 
Ligario delivered in October on the Forum Cicero did not touch on the legally relevant 
charges, however, by his speech—his speech made before the general public for the first time 
in the period following the civil war—he seemingly legitimised Caesar’s dictatorship.10 
The defence was provided by C. Vibius Pansa, one of Caesar’s closest men—governor of 
Bithynia and Pontus in 47 and 46, governor of Gallia Cisalpina in 45, then, on Caesar’s 
proposal, consul designatus of the year 43, together with A. Hirtius—and by Cicero. 
Regarding the progress of the case it is worth mentioning Plutarch’s account.11 Thus, Plutarch 
presumed that the outcome of the proceedings had been determined right from the outset, 
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namely, it was a decided fact for Caesar that Ligarius was guilty and would be convicted and 
it was only the power of Cicero’s eloquence that turned the flow of events. Caesar’s pardon 
produced its effect: in March 44 Ligarius was one of Caesar’s assassins,1 then he and his 
family became the victim of the proscriptiones ordered by Antonius and Octavianus.2 
It is a fact that Caesar pardoned Ligarius and let him return to Italy, however, the following 
doubts arise with regard to Plutarch’s version.3 If Caesar—as Cicero’s letter asserts—did not 
entertain hostile emotions against Ligarius, why did he allow the proceedings to take place? 
There might have been two reasons for that: he either wanted to inflict punishment on Tubero 
or wanted to provide powerful propaganda for his own clementia by forgiveness. The 
intention to convict Ligarius is highly improbable since Cicero did not put forward any new 
charges that would not have been known to him at the time of writing his letter dated late 
November, describing Caesar’s intentions.4 Furthermore, Pansa, being the dictator’s 
confidant, would not have undertaken the defence of Ligarius, if it had been decided from the 
outset that he was guilty, and Caesar would not have assigned defence to Pansa, if he had not 
wanted to give pardon to Ligarius.5 Caesar was very much aware that Ligarius did not have 
great influence among Pompey’s adherents and that the events in Africa were controlled by 
Varus, Cato, Matellus and Labieus. By that Caesar wanted to send a message to Attius Varus 
and Labienus fighting in Hispania: they had not lost all of their chances for settling the 
conflict with as little blood sacrifice as possible.6 
It seems to be more probable that Caesar decided to acquit Ligarius in order to prove his by 
then proverbial generosity again. Yet, it was just the appearance of this intention that had to 
be avoided by all means: as Caesar had no other purpose by the proceedings than have his 
clementia celebrated through acquitting Ligarius, for this reason, he put on the mask of the 
angry judge having been already convinced of Ligarius’s depravity who could be moved by 
Cicero’s eloquence only.7 Caesar as a master of political propaganda must have gladly 
grasped the opportunity offered for playing the role that his clementia was brought to the 
surface and shaped Ligarius’s fate favourably owing to the efficient oration of the counsel for 
the defence only.8 It cannot be ruled out that for Caesar—using Cicero’s role taking for his 
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own goals1—the Ligarius case might have also served to enable him to convince those of his 
adherents who considered the scope of pardon granted by him excessive that both his more 
moderate and forgiving adherents and his defeated opponents agreed with the main line of his 
politics.2 
Regarding this view Wilhelm Drumann does not qualify Cicero’s role specifically, yet, 
knowing his damning judgement on the orator-statesman he could not have formed a positive 
picture of it since elsewhere—very much in bad faith—he presents Cicero as an extremely 
vain figure who overestimates himself, is heated by the desire to be in the public eye, lacks 
clear political vision, and overtly humbles to potentes.3 The question can be estimated with 
greater subtlety from the works of Matthias Gelzer and Justinus Klass if we presume that 
Cicero, using Caesar’s propaganda, tried to realise his own program: the more supporters of 
Pompey were granted pardon, the more chances he could see for strengthening the situation of 
the optimates, which in the long run could make (could have made) it possible to restore the 
order of the state of the Republic. To this end, it was indispensable to force Caesar somehow 
to implement his announced fundamental principles.4 Handling the situation required great 
sense of tactics, seeming subordination, internal resoluteness and external flexibility from 
Cicero. Caesar’s later acts, the battle at Munda and Ides of March 44 proved that both Cicero 
and Caesar had wrongly surveyed the efforts of the other party and the political party.5 
Clementia showed towards Ligarius was addressed not only to Pompey’s adherents fighting 
against Caesar in Africa but also to those preparing for another war in Hispania, and Cicero’s 
participation in the proceedings provided sufficient publicity for the case as well as the 
appearance of objectivity manifested by Caesar.6 At the same time, Pro Ligario made it 
possible for Cicero—although it might have seemed to be shameless flattery in the eye of the 
adherents of the Republic7—to enforce his own political goals, i.e., to try to make the dictator 
committed to follow his conciliatory policy, and to find as many causes for exculpation for 
the supporters of Pompey as possible.8 Cicero, however, presumably—contrary to Gerold 
Walser’s view, who interprets the Ligarius case as demonstration of Cicero’s vanity and 
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overestimation of his own role1—took part in the play directed by Caesar not because he was 
driven by political blindness and hybris, as it were believing that by his orator’s ingenuity he 
could deceit and enchant the dictator’s clear political vision. Much rather his concerns 
formulated in the letter written to Servius Sulpicius Rufus were realised:2 again he was 
compelled to take a position and as it were became extortable—if we take his promises made 
to his friends who lost favour, e.g., Ligarius seriously.3 On the other hand, if he did not want 
to get again into open hostility with Caesar, he could not refuse to legitimise his peace policy 
by taking position, which policy most probably had some attraction for Cicero too since it was 
the only thing that could bring some kind of remedy for the empire having been exhausted in 
the civil war.4 Cicero was also as much of a political realist to size up that it was impossible to 
to avoid public life turning into sheer anarchy without some kind of compromise between the 
parties. Yet, he did not let Caesar use his talent as unprincipled tool: in Pro Ligario he 
ceaselessly makes an effort to certify excusable errors of Pompey’s adherents and does not 
omit to criticise the dictator’s status and the general conditions of Rome.5 
Regarding the procedure followed by Caesar, there are certain similarities with his conduct 
engaged when granting pardon to Marcellus. Caesar himself was also interested in calling 
Marcellus back from exile; on the one hand, he wanted to demonstrate his generosity again; 
and, on the other hand, he wanted to advance legitimisation of dictatorship by the fact that a 
firm adherent of the republic such as Marcellus also returned home and acquiesced in the 
changes in political conditions, and by accepting the pardon granted to him as it were 
acknowledged it. In spite of the fact that Marcellus’s homecoming was a previously resolved 
fact, the dictator’s propaganda was meant to create the impression that Caesar bowed to the 
senate’s request only when he called the republican Marcellus back from exile. Caesar’s 
father-in-law, Piso mentioned Marcellus’s name seemingly accidentally in his speech 
delivered in the senate,6 upon which Marcellus’s cousin with identical name7 threw himself 
on the ground at Caesar’s feet to beg for pardon for his kin, then the senators also rose from 
their seat and asked Caesar to exercise mercy. The dictator, after having complained at length 
about Marcellus’s faults, seemingly utterly unexpectedly declared that he would not be averse 
to the wish of the senate. This was followed by noisy applause of the senate and Cicero’s 
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speech, in which Cicero praised his human eminence. Presumably, a similar choreography can 
be observed in Ligarius’s case too. If Caesar had let Ligarius return home without special 
proceedings, he would have missed an important occasion to propagate his policy advocating 
conciliation. As a matter of fact, it is not possible to give an answer to the question whether 
Tubero had acted against Ligarius upon Caesar’s instruction or the dictator merely made use 
of the occasion being offered. 
 
IV. 2. Procedural issues of the lawsuit  
 
Pro Ligario raises several questions that can be answered with difficulties. Why did Cicero 
not use the obvious argument in his statement of the defence that Ligarius’s independent 
power of decision was highly restricted in Africa since governance was in the hands of Varus 
and Cato, so it was not Ligarius on whom the alliance entered into with Iuba turned? Why did 
Cicero did not strive to refute the charges made by Tubero? Why did Cicero undertake the 
case although he otherwise maintained good relations with the Tuberos and almost none with 
the Ligarii?1 Regarding the Ligarius case further questions arises: does the case under review 
constitute actual court proceedings, consequently, a real speech in court; did Caesar pass a 
judgment on Ligarius as a judge or not? Giving answer to these questions can possibly make 
further questions unimportant or no longer have a cause. 
The communis opinio gives the answer yes; and there are actually certain arguments to 
support these presumptions. Cicero calls Tubero prosecutor and Ligarius the accused, and in 
both cases he uses the proper technical term: specifically that Ligarius is an accused who 
admits his guilt, that is, an accused that each prosecutor would want,2 and that Tubero accuses 
a man who makes a confession or a man whose case—i.e. political record—is better than or at 
least the same as his.3 The charge is determined by Bauman as maiestas imminuta or as 
crimen maiestatis imminutae. The facts of the case that can be deduced from the described 
historical situation would have later belonged under lex Iulia maiestatis,4 and as this statute of 
Augustus repeats the elements of earlier legislation,5 it can be made probable that we can 
qualify Ligarius’s act treason. On the other hand, it is important to add that the term maiestas 
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does not occur at all in the entire Pro Ligario, and Cicero does not determine the legal nature 
of the charges either.1 
Also, it is against the concept of regular criminal action that the proceedings were conducted 
in the absence of the accused, i.e., Ligarius. Although Roman legal practice did not exclude 
conviction in absentia, however, the accused had to be called to appear before the law before 
commencement of the lawsuit.2 Ligarius did not get such summons, what is more, it is a 
cardinal point of his case that Caesar prohibited him to enter the territory of Italy. 
Furthermore, the lawsuit conducted due to maiestas imminuta would have belonged before the 
quaestio perpetua de maiestate set up by Sulla since Sulla’s court of justice reforms were not 
abrogated by Caesar, he changed only the lists that formed the basis of the scope of jurors and 
the scope of identity of jurors;3 this measure presumably constituted part of the reforms of the 
year 46. The proceedings, however, were conducted not before the quaestio de maiestate as it 
could be expected but before Caesar personally as judicial forum, in whose hands Ligarius’s 
fate was placed.4 
Similarly, it is against the validity of crimen maiestatis as a charge that the alliance entered 
into with Iuba, King of Numidia against Caesar would have been its implementation in 
practice.5 However, the fact of the alliance with Iuba was known to Caesar already at the time 
of granting pardon to Ligarius, after the battle at Thapsus, so a charge based thereon would 
not have brought anything new to the knowledge of the dictator.6 
The interpretation provided by Theodor Mommsen offers a possible solution for these 
difficulties; he asserts that the imperium of magistrates contains the right of the judge to pass 
a judgement in criminal proceedings too.7 Although the power of administration of justice of 
the magistrate was restricted by the legal institution of provocatio ad populum, this did not 
apply to extraordinary imperia, that is, the decemvirate of the 5th century, the second 
triumvirate and the dictatura rei publicae constituendae (he ranks both Sulla’s and Caesar’s 
dictatorship under the latter).8 This view is fundamentally shaken by Jochen Bleicken9 and 
Wolfgang Kunkel10 by stating that provocatio protected the Roman citizen from the unlawful 
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coercitio (disciplinary power) of the magistrate, however, produced no influence at all on 
iudicatio (administration of criminal justice) activity. Caesar’s dictatorship does not mean 
extraordinary imperium in the sense interpreted by Theodor Mommsen since he never took 
the title dictator rei publicae constituendae (legibus scribundis).1 
Even Theodor Mommsen refers to a single example of the application of this extraordinary 
punitive power only: Ligarius’s case.2 He supports his statement by the lines of Pro Ligario 
which assert that the purpose of the prosecution is not to convict but to execute Q. Ligarius,3 
and that this could not have been carried out by anybody in this form even under Sulla, who 
sentenced to death everybody whom he hated: since there the dictator himself gave orders to 
kill the person without anybody demanding it.4 To this Theodor Mommsen ties the following 
interpretation: the locus clearly proves that as a dictator Caesar passed a judgement over 
Ligarius as a judge and his competence was identical with that of Sulla.5 It is just the punctum 
saliens, however, that the locus does not make clear, i.e., that in a criminal case Caesar 
exercised administration of justice as a magistrate; as Cicero’s reference applies to the 
proscriptiones carried out by Sulla and does not mean to state that Sulla would have had his 
enemies executed after lawful investigation and declaring their guilt. It is public knowledge 
that Sulla was empowered by lex Valeria to have Roman citizens executed arbitrarily, without 
lawful sentence.6 So, if Caesar’s powers, by which he decided the fate of Ligarius, was 
identical with that of Sulla, then we must draw the conclusion that he obtained unlimited 
power over the losers of civil war—this seems to be supported also by the comment made by 
Cassius Dio.7  
Let us again examine the sentence of Pro Ligario considered to be of key importance by 
Theodor Mommsen, by which he wants to prove that the Ligarius case was actually court 
proceedings, specifically that the purpose of the prosecution was not to convict but to execute 
Q. Ligarius.8 It is a fact that the purpose of each formal accusation is to convict the accused, 
in the present case, however, the opponent does not claim this, much rather to kill, execute 
Ligarius without any sentence. So, just as Sulla, Caesar can proceed against his enemies as he 
pleases, he is, however, characterised not by cruelty but by clementia, and it is just exercising 
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this that Tubero wants to prevent him from. The outcome of the case was probably 
determined on the grounds of a scenario worked out in advance by Caesar, showing some 
similarities with the Marcellus case, specifically—in spite of the description provided by 
Plutarch—in favour of Ligarius. Regarding Plutarch’s description it is worth quoting William 
C. McDermott’s witty formulation word for word: “Thus, a sad picture of the orator emerges, 
no longer king of the courts, but courting a king”.1 As it is made clear by the events of the 
coming years: Cicero must have felt the same and did not forgive. The proceedings learned of 
from Pro Ligario cannot be considered a real criminal action because the decision was not in 
the hands of the quaestio de maiestate but in the hands of the dictator Caesar, who did not 
have any exceptional imperium that would have entitled him to pass a judgment on criminal 
cases affecting Roman citizens as a magistrate. 
 
IV. 3. Pro Ligario as deprecatio 
 
The above is also supported by the form of the speech; Pro Ligario is a so-called deprecatio,2 
which is a tool of influencing arbitrary decisions of persons exercising power rather than a 
tool of the defence in court of justice as it is also noted by the author of Auctor ad 
Herennium.3 So, if Cicero chose a form for his speech that could not be used in court 
proceedings,4 then this also makes it probable that in Ligarius’s case the dictator adopted 
decision not as a magistrate acting as a judge. The orator himself declares that he turns to 
Caesar not as a judge.5 Right at the beginning of the oration he emphasises that he considers 
his task is to raise Caesar’s compassion rather than refute the charges6 as most probably Pansa 
had already dealt with possible forms of refuting the charges.7 The purpose of deprecatio is 
not defensio facti, i.e., the defence of a given act but ignoscendi postulatio, i.e., praying for 
remission of punishment to be imposed due to a committed act or error.8 At the same time, it 
should be noted that Pro Ligario is not purely deprecatio but also a statement of the defence, 
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as Cicero presents several fact-based arguments to defend Ligarius.1 The usual elements of 
deprecatio are commonplaces (loci communes) meant to evoke misericordia,2 so, for 
example, the audience’s sympathy can be aroused by referring to humanitas,3 fortuna, 
misericordia and rerum commutatio.4 Accordingly, deprecatio is not a genre of the court of 
justice, its scope of application is the senate and consilium—i.e., it must have been clear to the 
audience of the period that Cicero saw through the play of passing a judgment directed by 
Caesar and used it for his own benefit.5 
The logically and psychologically proper arrangement of arguments, as a matter of fact, 
constitutes a tense structure in Pro Ligario too,6 and, accordingly, the misericordia-topoi 
filled with temper, meant to affect Caesar’s clementia, were placed in the speech 
consciously.7 Already in the prooemium the orator makes it clear that he builds on Caesar’s 
misericordia,8 thus, he makes his audience aware of the fact that his purpose regarding 
Ligarius is not liberatio culpae since in his opinion his defendant has not committed crime by 
joining Pompey9 but errati venia, i.e., obtaining forgiveness for taking erroneous position.10 
accordance with that, the orator leads the thread of Tubero being a committed adherent of 
Pompey along the speech in order to reveal the real motivation of the accusation thereby. 
The narratio, which is emphatically meant to outline the facts without emotions,11 is followed 
by the argumantatio12 that—contrary to the orator’s promise—nevertheless serves the defence 
of Ligarius: especially the paragraphs contrasting the crudelitas of the Tuberos intending to 
restrict Caesar in exercising pardon with Ligarius’s begging and tears as well as with Caesar’s 
clementia, humanitas, misericordia and lenitas.13 By that he turns Caesar’s brightly gleaming 
clementia away from the prosecutors and as it were urges him to side with his defendant,14 
turns crudelitas that the Tuberos reproach Ligarius with around, and lets it fall back on the 
prosecutors.15 He deprives Ligarius’s case of its individuality, and contrasts the general 
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miseria of the civil war with misericordia showed by Caesar, general luctus with his lenitas, 
general crudelitas with the dictator’s clementia.1 The virtue of humanitas especially comes to 
the front for misericordia and clementia are its most beautiful forms of manifestation—since 
as Quintilianus expounds, it is just this that deprecatio intends to turn the attention of the 
target audience and the addressee of the speech to.2 By underlining Caesar’s well-known 
humanitas Cicero as it were obliges the dictator to adhere to enforcing this virtue,3 and 
reminds the Tuberos of studia humanitatis, which was once not alien to them either.4 By that 
he again sets Caesar and the wing of his party urging for conciliation against the Tuberos 
desiring petty-minded revenge.5 
He makes it as it were obligatory for Caesar to keep to his principles formulated in his own 
propaganda since misericordia and lenitas are virtues frequently voiced during the civil war 
too; his humanitas can be certified by his adherents and his clementia by the whole empire. 
By all that Cicero uses the key features of Caesar’s self image as a tool for strengthening 
deprecatio.6 The following passages shed light on the purpose of these paragraphs heavily 
charged with emotions.7 Here he tries to clear Ligarius of the scelus that even after Pompey’s 
death he continued to fight against Caesar in alliance with the ruler of Numidia, Iuba, who 
was officially declared enemy by the senate by then having sided with the dictator.8 It was just 
this difference, i.e., remaining loyal to Pompey even after his death, that the prosecutors 
wanted to emphasise and thereby to take the most important argument, i.e., that the Tuberos 
also fought on the side of Pompey, away from the defence.9 In other words, the function of 
this part of the argumentatio highly charged with emotions is to win the dictator’s sympathy 
for the benefit of Ligarius and at the same time to help the orator to get over the pitfalls of his 
argumentation expounded regarding the desperate Pompeian position of the accused, while 
driving the attention of the audience and Caesar away from its logical pitfalls.10 
The heightening of emotions and temper reaches its climax in peroratio: Caesar can have no 
other choice than exercise the virtue of clementia.11 He repeats that his speech had no other 
goal than to produce effect on the dictator’s humanitas, clementia and misericordia, however 
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within the frameworks of praeteritio he does not omit to mention that he tried to refute the 
charges against Ligarius by fact-based arguments too.1 The task of peroratio is commovere, 
the effect produced on the decision-maker’s emotions,2 and in the case of deprecatio this 
aspect is reinforced because the orator underlines several elements from Ligarius’s personality 
and deeds that were to move Caesar’s emotions. So, for example, he stresses that his deeds 
were moved not by hatred against Caesar,3 that he badly tolerates being far away from his 
brothers,4 that he stayed in Africa not upon his own resolution but by being prevented by the 
storms of danger-fraught times of the civil war,5 and that Ligarius’s family had obtained 
several merits with regard to Caesar.6 He points out that many people from all over Italy 
appeared in mourning to beg for Ligarius.7 He refers to the pardon granted earlier by the 
dictator to others,8 Caesar’s clementia,9 misericordia,10 humanitas,11 liberalitas,12 bonitas,13 
crowns all that by the praise that mortals having mercy on their fellow beings become similar 
to gods.14 So, the orator used all the available tools of deprecatio, not omitting, beside 
ignoscendi postulatio, defensio facti either—thereby, albeit, accepting the choreography set 
up by Caesar, using his clementia- and misericordia-propaganda for the benefit of his 
defendant.15 
 
IV. 4. Clementia Caesaris  
 
In Pro Ligario both the term clementia16 and misericordia17 occur six times, and so rise to the 
most important form of conduct, feature demanded from and attributed in advance to Caesar. 
Here clementia means forgiving for error,18 which Caesar is required to do in his capacity as 
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father1—stressing father’s characteristic is perhaps reference to the parens patriae title.2 So, 
the conduct arising from clementia is ignoscere,3 that is, contrary to Pro Marcello, here 
clementia is shifted from the concept of temperantia animi towards the meaning mercy.4 At 
the same time, ignoscere is suitable for expressing humanitas,5 misericordia6 and clementia7 
and thereby the border between these concepts and virtues fades away, and misericordia and 
clementia become the form of manifestation of humanitas Caesaris.8 To achieve this goal, 
i.e., the pardon to be obtained for Ligarius, the orator, acknowledging the dictator’s 
superiority, praises Caesar’s clementia and in his view he deserves praise primarily because 
after his victory he did not keep this virtue out of the reach of his enemies either,9 which is a 
sufficient cause for his former enemies evaluating and experiencing his victory as benefit 
too.10 
By praising Caesar’s clementia he introduces the part in which he speaks about his own 
former hostile emotions towards Caesar11 in order to make capital of it for his defendant: 
Ligarius is more worthy of Caesar’s clementia than the orator himself because the former has 
never been hostile to Caesar, his unpleasant situation can be traced back to the unfortunate 
interplay of circumstances rather than to his own conviction. By that Cicero dresses his own 
Pompey supporter past in the cloak of praise of Caesar to overcome the dictator’s antipathy. 
At the same time he expresses his conviction that if the leaders of the opposition in Hispania 
accept the opportunity of peace offered by Caesar, they will not become disloyal to their 
ideas, instead, they follow the command of common sense—it is, of course, a question 
whether Cicero’s argument, to be more precise, his personality seemed to be authentic in their 
eyes since they could have possibly considered the orator a traitor.12 
As a matter of fact, it is undecided how much the praise of Caesar’s clementia came from 
Cicero’s heart as—in spite of the fact that this time to serve the peace of the community he let 
himself be used as the tool of Caesar’s propaganda—internal reservations and questioning of 
the superiority of the one-time equal rival could not have vanished without any traces from 
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Cicero’s soul. Reference to Caesar as father1 and denial of the effect his own orator’s 
performance produced on Caesar’s decision2 perhaps did not lack ironic overtones.3 Cicero 
was not likely to have acknowledged the legitimacy of the situation deep inside as he did not 
give up his ideal of the republican state,4 yet, he did not openly give voice to his bitterness 
and criticism, he dressed his conviction in an ambiguous form.5 If Caesar wanted to disguise 
the trial of Ligarius as official court proceedings, then it can be considered delicate irony 
masked as flattery on Cicero’s side to refer to the dictator as pater thereby depriving him of 
his capacity as judge.6 He must have chosen deprecatio as the genre of his speech for similar 
reasons, which is obviously not a genre of court of justice, and, accordingly, neither aequitas, 
nor iustitia are mentioned in the speech. On the other hand, in spite of slight criticism and 
irony by which he addresses Caesar’s public law position, to obtain clementia and 
misericordia he uses the dictator’s propagandistic concepts for his own purposes.7 
The concept of sapientia occurs only once in the entire speech and—just as in Pro 
Marcello—is used as the synonym of political consideration and common sense.8 The concept 
of consilium also occurs only once in Pro Ligario and refers both to Caesar and Pompey, and 
in a negative sense, specifically, with respect to upsetting public order.9 It is due to the 
different objectives of the two orations that sapientia as the central concept of Pro Marcello is 
thrust into the background. An oratio every time serves utile: the primary objective of Pro 
Marcello is to outline the future of the public under the rule of Caesar as primus inter pares, 
the function of Pro Ligario is to acquit his defendant and to obtain pardon for him. While in 
Pro Marcello—as its theme covers general political issues—clementia Caesaris is thrust into 
the background, Pro Ligario deals with the fate of a single person, for this reason the virtue of 
clementia comes to the front.10 At the same time—as Pro Ligario serves to break the 
opposition in Hispania and to support Caesar’s propaganda aimed at conciliation to be made 
with his enemies fighting there—for this objective the image of Caesar clemens is more 
suitable than the image of Caesar sapiens, who is willing to let bygones be bygones and 
forgive. Compared to Marcellus, Ligarius’s political weight is rather low—which cannot be 
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necessarily said of Marcellus—so it is not specially humiliating for Cicero to ask for pardon 
for an enemy who has been much below Caesar from the outset. The oration made in favour 
of Marcellus was delivered in the senate; consequently, it was also a warning addressed to the 
senators of the need of reconciliation for the sake of common good—so, sapientia was the 
key concept that connected the audience, i.e., Caesar and the senators. On the contrary, Pro 
Ligario was delivered on the Forum and the audience was the populus Romanus—so, Cicero 
thought it was more expedient to put this key word of people’s party politics in the centre.1 
Between the orations the political climate in Rome had significantly changed as a result of 
Caesar’s conduct, which left its mark on Cicero’s frame of mind sensitive of delicate 
vibrations.2 At the same time, Pro Ligario lacks the cautious optimism of Pro Marcello—in 
the meantime Caesar’s triumph had taken place—as if Cicero had given up hope that Caesar 
sapiens would restore res publica, and trustful tone is replaced by irony.3 
 
IV. 5. The issue of legitimacy of Caesar’s power in the mirror of Pro Ligario 
 
William C. McDermott—just as Cicero himself—does not consider Pro Ligario a first-rate 
masterpiece of the orator; yet, he points out that in using irony it has an outstanding place in 
the orator’s lifework.4 It is not by chance that it is quoted by Quintilian, who based his 
textbook on rhetoric mostly on Cicero whom he enthusiastically respected,5 and from among 
Cicero’s fifty-two orations quoted by him, he refers most frequently, after Pro Cluentio 
(sixty-seven quotations) and Pro Milone (sixty-seven quotations), to Pro Ligario (fifty-three 
quotations), which is highly noteworthy as contrary to the two hundred and two paragraphs of 
Pro Cluentio and one hundred and five paragraphs of Pro Milone, Pro Ligario consists of 
merely thirty-eight paragraphs. They are followed in order of reference by Pro Murena 
(twenty-five quotations), Pro Caelio (twenty-two quotations), the second Philippica (twenty 
quotations) and the first speech against Catilina (fourteen quotations). In contrast, the fourth 
speech against Catilina, Pro rege Deiotaro, De imperio Cnaei Pompei, the ninth Philippic, 
Pro Sestio and the first Verrine oration are quoted only once in each case by Quintilian, and 
he does not refer to Pro Sulla, De provinciis consularibus and the first Philippica at all. 
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Regarding Pro Ligario Quintilian calls the attention to masterly handling of the facts of the 
case and exemplary use of irony.1 Thus, Quintilian considered Pro Ligario, unique of its kind, 
a work of outstanding significance in training rhetoric.2 
In the peroratio of Pro Ligario, with huge pathos Cicero enumerates the notables of the order 
of knighthood who appeared in mourning clothes before Caesar, the people of the house of 
the Brocchi, L. Marcius, C. Caesetius and L. Corfidius.3 The latter, for that matter, could not 
be present when the speech was delivered as by then he was dead4—this error also proves that 
Cicero could not be directly acquainted with Ligarius and his family: most probably he had 
never seen the person mentioned by him but, as he was unknown, his absence could not be 
noticed by many people. This pathetic enumeration of the “notables” constitutes powerful 
contrast with Caesar, L. Tubero and Pansa, and it becomes clear that Ligarius himself was the 
least important in the lawsuit. The use of pathos in this form, without cause and therefore 
turning into the opposite must have made Caesar—and deep inside certainly Cicero himself—
smile.5 
Certain sentences of the oration had a clear meaning to the audience, for example, the point 
where Cicero describes that all of them threw themselves to the ground at Caesar’s feet 
begging for pardon—including the orator himself.6 In the account written to Ligarius Cicero 
depicted that the brothers and relatives of the accused threw themselves to the ground at 
Caesar’s feet and that he spoke in accordance with the case and Ligarius’s situation.7 The 
audience might have taken Cicero’s words literally; the dictator, however, could remember 
well that Cicero had not thrown himself to the ground at his feet—to what extent Caesar 
might have taken this phrase as irony cannot be known. Calling the four years younger Caesar 
pater has again certain troublesome overtones.8 According to Dio Cassius, Caesar was 
granted the title parens patriae in 44,9 and albeit it took place two years after Pro Ligario was 
delivered, the intitulatio must have become public knowledge earlier.10 To address Caesar 
pater could not be easy for Cicero as it was him who was given the title pater patriae in 63 by 
the senate, on the initiation of Q. Lutatius Catulus, for exposing and suppressing Catilina’s 
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plot; also, it is undecided how much this address sounded authentic or ironic from Cicero’s 
mouth to the ear of either the audience or Caesar.1 
Two paragraphs of the oration with clearly demonstrable ironic references and overtones 
deserve more profound analysis. In the seventh paragraph Cicero relates that after the war had 
begun and had been mostly fought, he, free from any restraint, upon his own decision, joined 
the army that took up arms against Caesar. He admits that he is saying all that before the man 
who, although being aware of this, returned him to the state before they ever met; who sent 
him a letter from Egypt telling him to stay who he was; who, although being the Roman 
people’s only imperator in the whole empire, let him be the other one (and news on that was 
brought by Pansa); who allowed him to keep the bundle of sticks decorated with laurel as long 
as he wanted; and who believed that he would save the orator indeed if he did all that without 
depriving him of any of his titles.2 At first hearing or reading, Cicero’s words seem flattering 
effusions, which Caesar was not in want of these days; yet, even if nobody else did, the 
dictator certainly discovered the irony hidden between the lines. It is worth comparing the 
content exposed here with Cicero’s letters written in the relevant period between November 
48 and August 47, primarily to Atticus. 
The first sentence of the paragraph seems to be true, however, the five elements following it 
need to be analysed more profoundly. The statement on pardon granted by Caesar is true as on 
17 December 48 Caesar gave instructions to Dolabella to write a letter to Cicero: he may 
return to Italy. This permit had significance because M. Antonius as magister equitum banned 
Cicero by name from Italy.3 When in August 47 Cicero received Caesar’s letter, he was 
unable to decide how much he could rely on what was written in it and how secure returning 
would be.4 Only the meeting at the end of September 47 convinced Cicero that he could leave 
Brundisium and return home. In other words, only after the meeting did Caesar gave him back 
to the state. In those days Cicero wrote several letters to Caesar’s influential men, so, among 
others, to Balbus and Oppius5 and Caesar himself, and in this letter he tried to find excuses for 
his brother, Quintus for joining Pompey.6 Although on 12th August 47 Cicero received a 
highly generous letter (litterae satis liberales) from Caesar, he gave an account of this to 
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Terentia, yet—as it has been already mentioned—this did not dispel his fears.1 It is not 
probable that this writing referred to in a somewhat cold tone is identical with the letter 
written from Egypt that was mentioned in the letter. Thus, there is a good chance of 
presuming that the letter from Egypt is mere fiction and Caesar could be very much aware of 
that too.2 The bundle of sticks decorated with laurel as badges of power and the person of 
Pansa are referred to only once but not at the same place in the correspondence from this 
period,3 however, without the additional information provided in Pro Ligario. Most probably 
it was Caesar and Pansa who were surprised the most at the news purportedly brought by 
Pansa—and disclosed by Cicero.4 
The statement that Caesar offered Cicero imperator’s office was probably based on the 
presumption that even at their meeting in September 47 Caesar made an attempt at winning 
Cicero over to supporting his politics, Cicero, however, refused to take part actively in public 
matters.5 It was always Caesar’s more or less confessed yet never actually realised desire to 
win the support and acknowledgement of older senators in higher ranks—and Cicero had a 
special place among those whose sympathy he tried to obtain.6 In 60, by the mediation of 
Balbus, Caesar offered Cicero the opportunity of joining the first triumvirate,7 and in July 59 
he urged him to accept the office of legate in Gallia offered by him,8 which Cicero again 
refused.9 In March 49 Caesar as imperator sent a letter to Cicero, whom he addressed also by 
the title of imperator, in order to win his support but he did not succeed.10 All this clearly 
proves that Caesar judged Cicero’s influence in public matters and the moral weight of his 
political standpoint both more favourably and more realistically than several modern 
historians.11 
Taking all the above into consideration, we can presume that Caesar had the meeting with 
Cicero in Brundisium organised for a definite cause,12 and for such a cause that he did not 
want to disclose in a letter. With good sense William C. McDermott makes it probable that he 
wanted to entrust Cicero as magister equitum to administer Italy for the period of time while 
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he was busy with the campaign in Africa; he probably offered him, owing to his activity in 
Cilicia, the opportunity to retain the triumph that Cicero had longed for,1 likewise the status of 
patrician, which he later granted to several people,2 for example, to Octavianus too,3 and, in 
his absence, the rank of princeps/primus rogatus in the senate, which Cicero most probably 
enjoyed as senator consularis in 62 and 60. If Cicero had accepted this invitation, beside the 
unus imperator he would have been alter imperator indeed.4 
Modern historiography has often tried to doubt Cicero’s practical skills in public 
administration/politics, in spite of his successful activity as proquaestor, consul in Sicily and 
proconsul in Cilicia. That Caesar had much better opinion of Cicero’s qualities is proved by 
his offers repeated several times. In 47 the opportunities offered by Caesar would have raised 
Cicero again to the forefront of politics, on the one hand, and, would have posed him a worthy 
challenge that he would have been able to meet properly, on the other—however, he was far 
from being so uninhibited, opportunist, thirsty of power and glory as his Antique and modern 
critics would like to present him. Probably listening to his inner conviction, Cicero refused the 
offered post—which he gave no account of either to Atticus or anybody else—and told his 
friends no more than Caesar had provided him with the opportunity of returning home.5 
Although in a negative context, Dio Cassius brings up that Cicero had not become magister 
equitum.6 Also, Dio Cassius puts the statement into Q. Fufius Calenus’s mouth that Cicero, 
after having been granted pardon and patrician’s rank by Caesar—the latter statement is 
obviously not true—he ungratefully assassinated him; not himself but by instigating others to 
commit the assassination.7 These two loci clearly supports that Caesar might have made an 
offer with this kind of content to Cicero in order to win his support, and, nevertheless, news 
about this must have somehow leaked out from their meeting in Brundisium.8 Thus, we have 
to declare that a part of the statements made by Cicero in the seventh paragraph is no more 
than pure fiction—but the reference to the opportunity that Caesar offered him the office of 
alter imperator can be possibly true. 
In summary it is worth paying some attention to the beginning of the peroratio of Pro 
Ligario, in which, albeit in hidden form, Cicero throws light upon the illegitimateness of 
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Caesar’s power and clementia.1 In the thirty-third paragraph Cicero relates that Caesar 
declared: the opposing party—that is, Pompey’s adherents—considered everybody who was 
not with them enemy, however, he considers everybody who is not against him his own 
adherent.2 This clearly reveals the contrast between the characters of Caesar and Pompey of 
which Cicero already spoke about in Pro Marcello too, specifically that in case of Pompey’s 
victory even his own adherents were afraid of the blood bath that Pompey had announced in 
advance.3 Caesar (just because of his often praised clementia) wanted to implement quite the 
contrary: as Cicero notes after the dictator’s death, he hamstrung/obliged his enemies by the 
appearance of mercy/temperance.4 Yet, from this passage of Pro Ligario, even if nobody else 
did, Caesar could hear irony: Pompey could allow himself to make this statement because 
with proper legitimisation, on the grounds of the authorisation of the senate he fought for 
maintaining the lawful order of the state whereas Caesar, who set the aim of overthrowing the 
order of the state, that is, as an illegitimate imperator was compelled to give evidence of 
clementia. 
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V. Lawsuit of King Diotarus 
 
In November 45, Cicero delivered his statement of the defence before Julius Caesar in favour 
of King Deiotarus (Pro rege Deiotaro), who, just as Q. Ligarius, sided with Pompey in the 
civil war. By then, in November 45, Caesar had defeated Pompey’s sons in the battle at 
Munda; then, he held a triumphal march over them. The triumph caused huge dissatisfaction1 
as triumphal marches were meant to legitimise victories over external enemies and not 
compatriots.2 His grandson, Castor and the one-time royal physician hired by him, Phidippus 
the slave acted as prosecutors of King Deiotarus; they charged the king with capital offence,3 
assassination attempt against Caesar dated by them to 474 and conspiracy,5 that is,6 the charge 
can be described in brief by the facts of the case of perduellio, and crimen imminutae 
maiestatis.7 Cicero, who had maintained good relations with the King since he was proconsul 
in Cilicia, undertook the defence.8 
 
V. 1. Historical background and procedural law awkwardnesses of Pro rege Deiotaro  
 
Deiotarus’s situation vis-à-vis Caesar became rather unpleasant after the battle at Pharsalus, 
which the prosecutors did not omit to exploit for their own benefit, because in 48 he visited 
Pompey in his camp. Caesar, who had the integrity of Deiotarus’s royal title and empire 
enforced in the senate as consul, interpreted this gesture as an act of ungratefulness.9 
Although in 47 Deiotarus asked for the opportunity to meet Caesar to exculpate himself for 
his conduct that Caesar found injurious, Caesar refused the favour of a meeting, bringing it to 
the King’s knowledge that in 48 already he was the repository of legitimacy, therefore, purely 
on the grounds of Roman public law Deiotarus would have been obliged to be loyal to him.10 
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After Pharsalus, Deiotarus sided with Caesar and supported his campaign in Alexandria,1 yet, 
Caesar decided that although Deiotarus could retain his royal dignity, he should give up a 
significant part of his empire.2 This dismemberment, which took place after the battle at Zela 
in Nikaia,3 meant the following: a part of Deiotarus’s empire in Armenia was granted to 
Arzobarzanes, ruler of Cappadocia, and a Galatian territory was allocated to Mithridates, ruler 
of Pergamum.4 For a while Deiotarus hoped for the victory of Pompey’s adherents in Africa, 
however, after their defeat he definitely distanced himself from them.5 After Mithridates’s 
death not much later, Deiotarus attempted to get Caesar to return him the rule over the 
Galatian tetrarchia, which, however, Castor Saocondarus, tetrarcha and Deiotarus’s son-in-
law wanted to prevent by all means.6 
After the battle at Munda that took place in March 45, Caesar received Deiotarus’s delegation 
in Taracco, and in a letter addressed to the King he held out the prospect of adjudging the case 
favourably.7 Anticipating the adoption of this decision, Castor Saocondarus’s son, Castor, 
Deiotarus’s grandson brought a double charge against his grandfather, founding it on the 
testimony of the escaped slave, Phidippus, the King’s former physician, claiming that he had 
prepared assassination attempt against Caesar—on the occasion of the visit he paid to Galatia 
in 47—and together with C. Caesilius Bassus he secretly plotted against Caesar.8 The 
prosecutors most probably founded their claim on Caesar’s aversion to and bias against 
Deiotarus.9 
By this turn the case constructed an until then unprecedented political and legal situation, 
namely, prior to that it had never occurred that a rex iussus was summoned before a Roman 
court for being charged with capital offence, to say nothing of the fact that no foedus iniquum 
whatsoever entered into with Deiotarus submitted the King to the jurisdiction of Rome. The 
charge against Deiotarus was based on the testimony of his slave, Phidippus, which, in 
addition to being morally displeasing, created an impossible legal situation since in Rome a 
slave was not allowed to testify against his master in a criminal action. Furthermore, it added 
to these awkwardnesses that in those days Deiotarus did not stay in Rome, and in accordance 
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with the order of Roman criminal procedure no proceedings could be conducted against the 
accused in his absence.1 The case was made more delicate by the fact that the charge due to 
the assassination planned and attempted against Caesar was brought before the dictator 
himself, who in accordance with the principle “nemo iudex in propria causa”2 would have by 
no means had the right to act as judge in the proceedings – not even in the case if he had been 
just as Sulla entitled to the title of dictator rei publicae constituendae (legibus scribundis), 
which in theory vested him with unrestricted punitive power.3 Yet, easily rising above all 
these reservations Caesar himself desired to proceed in King Deiotarus’s case as a judge. 
Cicero,4 as a matter of fact, did not omit to bring up these awkwardnesses,5 but being 
compelled to present these legal abuses as Caesar’s merits,6 he made capital of this need, 
declaring that the dictator would guarantee that he should not be afraid of any inequity in the 
case.7 Cicero’s words also reveal that Caesar did not take the principle of passing judgment in 
consilium8 into account either, and the orator, while emphasising the dictator’s clementia, was 
compelled to make the absurd charges inauthentic by weighty counter-arguments.9 Although 
the biography written by Suetonius on Caesar asserts that in his administration of justice he 
proceeded very strictly and justly,10 we can by no means take this statement to refer to 
Deiotarus’s case, at most to the judgments passed by Caesar during the term of his 
proconsulate, on the one hand, and to those passed in the disputes arising from the ager 
publicus allocated to his veterans after the civil war,11 on the other.12 Consequently, the 
proceedings against King Deiotarus can be in no circumstances considered a criminal action; 
on the contrary, it provides a glaring example of Caesar’s arrogance disregarding law and 
order of the Republic and defiantly showing off his personal power. 
The outcome of the lawsuit is not known, Caesar presumably adjourned decision.13 There are 
good chances of excluding the opportunity of acquittal since later Cicero noted that Caesar 
adjudged no issue whatsoever regarding Deiotarus justly.14 Nor can it be ascertained that 
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Deiotarus was sentenced as Cicero would have probably used the fact of death sentence as an 
argument against Antonius, who wanted to have a law from Caesar’s purported legacy, which 
could be reinstated to Deiotarus’s earlier reign, adopted as authentic.1 Irrespective of the result 
of the lawsuit, immediately after Caesar’s death, Deiotarus took possession of the territories 
that the dictator had disannexed from him,2 and this annexation was acknowledged as lawful 
by a regulation made public by Antonius—presumably in return for significant valuable 
consideration.3 
 
V. 2. Shaping Caesar’s image as rhetorical tactics in Deiotariana 
 
Cicero begins the prooemium of his speech with an enumeration disguised as captatio 
benevolentiae, listing the circumstances in the proceedings that make him uneasy. The 
accused whose life is at stake is a King, what is more, a highly recognised friend of Rome. 
The prosecutors are two good-for-nothings—Deiotarus’s cruel grandson and Deiotarus’s 
bribed slave, who voluntarily testifies against his master although in Rome even during the 
tortures compulsory in the interrogation of slaves it was prohibited to put questions to them to 
which they could have made a confession incriminating their master.4 The accused is not 
present, Caesar acts as judge in his own case; the trial takes place not before the public of the 
Forum but in Caesar’s palace.5 They key words of prooemium/exordium are metus, timor and 
perturbatio, however, he expresses his concerns not only due to the specific case but the 
general danger threatening security in law.6 He draws conclusions regarding the entirety of 
the community from the Deiotarus case just as he did concerning the Marcellus and Ligarius 
case. Yet, he tries to make the impression as if sapientia, praestans singularisque natura 
shown by Caesar,7 his favourable countenance,8 aequitas and audiendi diligentia reassured 
him9—probably in order to influence his defendant’s case towards a favourable direction 
(insinuatio).10 However, success of Caesar’s natura and sapientia might be overshadowed by 
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public opinion.1 He expects Caesar to arrive at a just outcome with regard to the proceedings, 
this, however, does not change his conviction that the lawsuit is a priori iniquum and a kind 
of attack against the fundaments of law and order.2 
The concept of clementia comes up first at the beginning of the argumentatio, and appears 
together with the concept of fides and constantia.3 By bringing up that Deiotarus stood by 
Pompey, the orator tries to take the sting out of Caesar’s anger as well as reminds the dictator 
of his promise made to the King, specifically, that he would adopt a forgiving attitude to him.4 
Again, the metus theme of the prooemium emerges, and in such form that Caesar, through the 
political amnesty already granted and having acknowledged his title of King and guest-friend, 
has brought an end to Deiotarus’s desperate fear, re-ranking him from the group of enemies to 
the category of friends who have forgotten about their obligation.5 In order to explain why 
Deiotarus took the position to side with Pompey by “erroneously” sizing up the situation of 
internal politics in Rome6 he extends the arguments to cover all of the adherents of Pompey, 
and tries to interpret it as loyalty to legitimate institutions, and, first touching on the King’s 
case solely in terms of public law/politics and not criminal law, he draws general conclusions 
regarding the community.7 It was clementia showed by Caesar earlier that brought an end to 
the community’s metus and timor, and in the future this virtue is no longer formulated as the 
consequence of personal mood or decision but as a requirement with binding force that the 
dictator should meet.8 The motif of fear is carried through the whole speech as it were as a 
Leitmotiv: if Caesar did not feel that his given word was binding upon him, then he would 
become a tyrant, who excites fear and dread around him.9 In Pro Ligario10 and Pro 
Marcello11—contrary to Pro rege Deiotaro—it is just lack of fear that the orator stresses; i.e., 
that he need not be terrified of speaking honestly before Caesar. 
Accordingly, the content of the meaning of clementia is modified: the emphasis is shifted 
from Caesar’s personal generosity expressed in Pro Marcello and from the inclination to 
forgive for error underlined in Pro Ligario to the requirement of the steadiness of political 
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clementia practised earlier.1 Fides and constantia to be adopted in exercising clementia come 
to the front, and Cicero—after brief refutation of the assassination attempt, transferring the 
matter from criminal law to the plane of politics—addresses Caesar not as a judge but as a 
dictator. So, if Caesar wants to avoid to be looked at as a tyrant, he must consistently keep to 
his earlier principles. Refuting the arguments of the prosecution, he quotes a letter of 
Blesamius, a subject of Deiotarus, in which—presenting these statements as gossip in bad 
faith—he voices his view that Caesar is already considered a tyrant because he had his statue 
erected beside the statues of kings.2 The orator himself neither confirms, nor refutes the 
charge of tyranny,3 instead, he points out that contrary to Deiotarus’s subjects he and his 
fellow-citizens were born as free men in a free Roman state—which implies a bitter contrast 
with the present, Caesar’s dictatorship,4 especially because Cicero does not conceal the rage 
and anger manifested by Caesar either.5 
Reference to Caesar’s clementia sometimes does not lack ironic overtones since Cicero relates 
that in 47, owing to Caesar, Deiotarus, having been deprived of the major part of his 
territories by the resolution adopted in Nicaea, could contemplate with a philosopher’s 
quietude in the evening of his life for he had been relieved of the burdens of ruling.6 
Antiochus paid the same price for furor as Deiotarus for an excusable error7—all that highly 
questions the value of Caesar’s clementia. Albeit, in the form of a rhetorical question he 
denies that Deiotarus can suffer any further loss and damage through grave iniuria8—but 
reference to this opportunity in the form of denial indicates the opportunity of grave inuiria as 
real danger: the King being sentenced by Caesar. It is just this iniuria that is the most 
important characteristics of tyranny, and if Caesar withdrew the pardon granted earlier, he 
would inevitably draw the charge of tyranny against him.9  
So, Cicero formulates a kind of “warning” to Caesar. If Caesar sentenced his one-time guest-
friend, Deiotarus, this would remind the people of the bloodshed of Sulla; the erection of his 
own statue—with the inscription “Deo Invicto” in the Quirinus temple10—is yet accepted by 
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the people of Rome but if Caesar should go beyond that, this would amount to tyranny.1 Thus, 
reference to tyranny is actually made, even if only from the mouth of Deiotarus’s delegates 
and grandson.2 This raises a question difficult to answer: whether Cicero wants to make a 
success of his case before Caesar merely in accordance with the situation of the present 
moment (as Ulrike Riemer assumes3) or (following the proposition of Helga Botermann and 
Sabine Rochlitz) the warning formulated by the orator is also a threat, which is going to be 
fulfilled by the Ides of March 44.4 
At this point Cicero presents a stylised figure of Deiotarus as a kind of philosopher king, 
which does not correspond with the historical Deiotarus image known to us—since he did not 
even shrink back in fear of murder committed against his own family members5 and so much 
disagreed with Caesar’s territorial regulations that immediately after Caesar’s death he 
marched into his earlier provinces.6 In Cicero’s presentation, however, Deiotarus becomes a 
King who rises above changes of fortuna and lives fully aware of his internal values, which 
are not only good but are sufficient for a happy life—virtus, magnitudo animi, gravitas and 
constantia.7 The pair of opposites of the “bonus rex Deiotarus” and the “Caesar tyrannus” 
becomes a ruler’s mirror, similar to Pro Marcello, albeit, it makes Pro rege Deiotaro a 
negative ruler’s mirror. Here the orator, instead of modelling the ideal ruler after Caesar, 
confronts the dictator with the requirements that he is to meet as reality appearing in the 
person of Deiotarus. Although the topos of the ruler appreciating internal values more than 
anything else is in line with the theme of Pro Marcello,8 in the orator’s presentation, however, 
Deiotarus has already realised and achieved all that Cicero set as a goal to Caesar in Pro 
Marcello.9 The idealised and, as a matter of fact, unhistorical Deiotarus is in possession of 
generosity and consistency10 that Cicero deems doubtful in the case of Caesar.11 
Cicero prepares the stylised Deiotarus image of the peroratio well in advance. As refutation 
of the assassination attempt against Caesar, first of all he brings up Deiotarus’s personality, 
who is characterised and guided, in addition to prudentia and virtus, by fides, religio, 
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probitas, constantia, integritas and gravitas1—as it were as the opposite of Caesar, whose 
fides and constantia can be righteously doubted by the public. To refute that after the battle at 
Pharsalus the King was only waiting for Caesar being defeated in the war in Africa, Cicero 
endows Deiotarus with several virtues that belong to the scope of temperance—mansuetudo,2 
frugalitas, modestia, temperantia,3 pudor, pudicitia4. It is especially interesting that reference 
is made to the virtue that is missing from the catalogue of ruler’s virtues—fortitudo, iustitia, 
severitas, gravitas, magnitudo animi, largitio, beneficentia, liberalitas5—the ancient Roman 
frugalitas, which is an asset possessed by optimus pater familias and diligentissimus agricola 
et pecuarius.6 Thus, this virtue characterises private persons rather than kings;7 yet, it is one 
of the most valuable traits beside temperantia, moderatio and modestia as a synonym of the 
Greek sophrosynē.8 It is by stressing just this virtue that he criticises Caesar who behaves 
more and more as a rex in Rome and has gone beyond human measure in his power 
ambitions.9 
In the peroratio he as it were compels Caesar to make his choice: if he allows his iracundia to 
govern, he will be just as cruel, i.e., a tyrant, as the prosecutors; but if he lets his clementia 
and misericordia prevail, then he must give pardon to Deiotarus.10 Thereby he drives the 
dictator’s attention to the point that very little—the exercise of fides and clementia—separates 
him from the form of ruling his power is now referred to in Rome: tyranny. Here, most of the 
virtues attributed to Caesar in Pro Marcello and Pro Ligario appear as features of Deiotarus 
only and Caesar’s sapientia and aequitas are presented in much paler and more relative 
colour. Clementia Caesaris—in the meantime celebrated by official cult, which must have 
been rather displeasing to Cicero—emerges at more emphatic loci than in Pro Marcello, 
however, with strong critical and ironic overtones. 
Although later on Cicero himself commented upon Pro rege Deiotaro with not much 
appreciation and called it oratiuncula with some disdain, the fact, however, that he edited and 
sent it to his friends, for example, Dolabella, as a modest gift woven by rough thread11 implies 
that he attributed significance to it that pointed beyond the circumstances of the specific 
                                                 
1
 Cic. Deiot. 16. 20. 
2
 Cic. Deiot. 25. 
3
 Cic. Deiot. 26. 
4
 Cic. Deiot. 28. 
5
 Rochlitz 1993. 139. See also Kloft 1970. passim 
6
 Cic. Deiot. 26. 
7
 Seel 1967. 229. 
8
 Cic. Tusc. 3, 16f.; 4, 36. 
9
 Rochlitz 1993. 140. 
10
 Cic. Deiot. 40. 43. 
11
 Cic. fam. 9, 12, 2. 
130 
 
lawsuit, and wanted to provide publicity for it, primarily for the criticism formulated in the 
speech against Caesar’s autocracy.1 Caesar, returning in the first days of October 45 from the 
war in Hispania2 to Rome by triumph, started to behave more and more like a rex.3 The cult 
his personality was celebrated by assumed increasingly exaggerating forms—although, as 
tradition has it, Cicero was the first to make proposals on acknowledgements to be granted to 
Caesar, while doing so he did not miss to keep sensible measure in view.4 It happened in those 
days that—motivated by fear,5 out of overzealousness, provocation or on Caesar’s 
initiative6—Caesar’s statue with the inscription “Deo invicto” was erected in the Quirinus 
temple,7 and the senate adopted a resolution on erecting the temple of Clementia Caesaris. 
Much to the delight of Cicero, who saw it as a mockery of the ideal state of the Republic, the 
Caesar statue carried around on the occasion of Ludi Caesaris was not greeted by much 
jubilation by the people.8 It came out that Caesar wanted to restore the name of the state of 
form of the Republic only and not its core and actual aspect,9 he did not live up the hopes 
attached to him in Pro Marcello, and Cicero was compelled to be disappointed with him;10 
he could not fully back out of the impact produced by Caesar’s personality.11 
Caesar required the political notabilities of the age of the Republic to give evidence of 
passivity, silent and disciplined “adapting”, “adjustment”;12 politics were controlled by Caesar 
and his camarilla;13 the integrity of common sapientia appeared to be vain hope.14 Cicero was 
forced to remain silent on public affairs,15 he devoted himself to his philosophical works—
which resulted in 45 in Hortensius, Academici libri, De finius bonorum et malorum and 
Tusculanae disputationes—in which he resolutely criticised the general conditions of his age 
and Caesar’s autocratic ambitions.16 In the light of that, the assessment of Pro rege Deiotaro 
divided the literature on the subject. Hugo Willrich, for example, evaluated it as the sign of 
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good relations between Cicero and Caesar and as the document of Cicero’s opportunism.1 
Otto Seel—in addition to clearly identifiable criticism of Caesar and the general conditions—
discovered in it the picture of demoralisation by power, specifically, demoralisation of both 
the person who exercises power and the person who bows to power, which created a 
humiliating, undeserved situation for both Caesar and Cicero.2 Matthias Gelzer, however, 
claims that the oration clearly shows how far Cicero could go even in Caesar’s presence in 
discussing political issues and that he openly gave evidence of his values supporting the 
republic.3 In Pro rege Deiotaro Eckart Olshausen unambiguously discovers the reflection of 
Cicero using his defendant’s case as a tool to enable him to reveal his thoughts before Caesar 
on political issues and expound his opinion on the conditions of the age.4 Helga Botermann 
considers this oration ultimate settlement of accounts with Caesar and his state, in which 
Cicero makes Caesar’s state as tyranny the subject of criticism.5 
In the mirror of all that it can be declared that Cicero was deeply disappointed in his hopes 
attached to Caesar;6 the gap between them became irreconcilable, and in the speech it is 
possible to reveal masked condemnation of Caesar and idealisation of his opponents.7 That in 
those days Cicero might have already thought of assassinating Caesar is revealed by a letter 
written to Atticus,8 in which the orator referred to Caesar’s purchase of a house in Quirinal: 
the house stood near to the Salus and Quirinus temple, and Cicero remarked that he would 
like to see Caesar close to Quirinus and Quirinus’s fate rather than to balanced welfare 
(salus), by which he clearly lets his younger brother infer identification of Romulus, 
assassinated according to certain traditions, with Quirinus.9  
As Suetonius left it to us, in a letter Cicero purportedly writes about Caesar: when he was 
aedil he was already thinking about royal power, striving for royal authority.10 It is worth 
paying some attention to the loci where Cicero refers to Caesar as rex. The letter addressed to 
Atticus—which mentions Caesar with ironic overtones11—was written on 14 August 45,12 and 
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the one to Matius at the end of August 44.1 On the other hand, it cannot be concealed that it 
was not only Caesar whom Cicero called rex, earlier he called Pompey the same, however, 
stressing his positive traits.2 Cicero was addressed by the title rex, and, for that matter, 
peregrinus rex, among others, in 62 regarding the execution of the plotters—and not in 
flattery.3 Consequently, the concepts of rex and tyrannus belonged to the generally accepted 
phrases of rhetoric in Roman public affairs in naming men who were striving for autocracy or 
at least prime power positions, dominatio.4 In the letter mentioned earlier, written to Atticus 
on 17 May 45, regarding purchase of property by Caesar, Cicero makes a statement which is 
open for interpretatio multiplex, that he would like to see Caesar close to Quirinus rather than 
to Salus.5 The background of the text is provided by the fact that the villa purchased by 
Caesar was located near to the Salus and Quirinus temple, and Cicero wished Caesar the fate 
of Quirinus rather than salus, that is, welfare and health.6 Quirinus as a Roman god was quite 
often identified with Romulus, who founded Rome but was later assassinated since he ruled as 
a tyrant—so Cicero wished a similarly bloody end for Caesar too.7 
The political rhetoric of the period used the name of Romulus as the synonym of tyrant—so, 
for example, the invective attributed to Sallust called Cicero Romulus Arpinas,8 and in 67 
Pompey, entrusted to wage war against pirates, wanted to have himself vested with a too wide 
scope of power by lex Sabina, whereupon C. Calpurnius Piso warned him not to strive for 
Romulus’s laurels if he does not want to come to the same end as Romulus.9 Although Cicero 
did not mention Romulus’s name in a negative context—what is more, he comments on the 
founder of the city in expressly praising context and in acknowledgement,10 his positive 
“Romulus propaganda” did not evoke much response.11 Livius discloses two versions on 
Romulus’s death. According to more widely known tradition, Romulus was enveloped by a 
cloud during a huge storm and ascended to heaven;12 according to the legend less kept in 
evidence, and understandably less popular, in his old age he became a tyrant and was torn to 
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pieces by the senators with their bare hands.1 Later on, religious faith identified the last 
member of the ancient Jupiter—Mars—Quirinus triad2 with the first King—that is how the 
legend on the King having become a god, on the one hand, and on the assassinated tyrant, on 
the other hand, was created.3 Caesar took firm steps to introduce the Romulus—Quirinus cult, 
and in his last years he placed great emphasis on his own legitimisation as “second Romulus”. 
In view of the fact that the apotheosis of statesmen after their death was alien to Roman 
thinking—the act of deification could take place solely temporarily during the triumph 
through cultic identification with Iuppiter on the Capitol firmly supported by several 
preventing rites4—in order to build his own later cult, Caesar resolutely propagated the 
respect of Romulus Quirinus.5 It was not by chance that the senate had a statue erected for 
him with the inscription “Deo Invicto” in the Quirinus temple—probably upon suggestion 
from “above”, which Caesar did accept.6 Cicero mentions the opportunity of this cultic 
identification a few times, mostly, however, he handles this identification rather cautiously.7  
At this point it seems to be justified to sum up or repeat what was expounded regarding the 
motif of killing the tyrant in Pro Milone. Cicero openly calls Caesar tyrannus after his death;8 
the stoic element of the motif of killing the tyrant can be demonstrated most clearly in the 
third book of De officiis written in 44.9 He declares that the element of killing the tyrant10 is in 
harmony with stoic philosophy to the greatest extent,11 which also suits naturalis ratio,12 i.e., 
is the ultimate conclusion of ethical consideration.13 In view of the fact that the tyrant ruins 
human community and places himself outside the rules of coexistence,14 accordingly, these 
rules are not binding him either.15 His reasoning culminates in turning the right of killing the 
tyrant into the ethical/legal command of killing the tyrant: making common cause with the 
tyrant is excluded, he must be barred and removed from human community since he is 
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nothing else than a beast having assumed human form.1 Phalaris’s case is Cicero’s most 
favourite example, and by that he demonstrates that assassination is not only ethically fair but 
it is definitely a moral obligation (honestum necare), elimination of the tyrant from the 
community (feritas et immanitas beluae segreganda est). This again is in line with the 
identification of the tyrannus with belua also present in stoic philosophy, which is clearly 
formulated in De re publica too2 in such form that the tyrannus is the most harmful species of 
of animals, which is the most hateful subhuman being both to gods and humans, that is, it 
lives merely in figura hominis.3 Thus, the key attributes of the tyrant can be described by the 
following concepts: nulla societas, belua, genus pestiferum, exul, contra leges, contra 
naturam; i.e., a being close to a subhuman form of existence, whose assassination cannot 
constitute moral offence just as killing any harmful beast.4 
In the proceedings against Deiotarus no sentence was passed. After Caesar’s death, in De 
divinatione Cicero puts the statement into Deiotarus’s mouth that he did not regret that instead 
of Caesar, who had deprived him of his kingdom, he sided with Pompey because by doing so 
he protected the authority of the senate (senatus auctoritatem), the freedom of the people of 
Rome (populi Romani libertatem) and the dignity of the empire (imperii dignitatem).5 This 
statement (no matter if together with Hermann Strasburger we accept it as authentic6 or not) 
from the mouth of a non-Roman as justification of his act sounds insult since he refers to 
traditional Roman values—just to those by which Caesar, too, legitimised the starting of the 
civil war.7 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Cic. off. 3, 32. 
2
 Cic. rep. 2, 48. See also Berti 1963. 
3
 Clark–Ruebel 1985. 61. 
4
 Clark–Ruebel 1985. 62. 
5
 Cic. div. 1, 27. 
6
 Strasburger 1990. 50. 
7
 Caes. civ. 1, 7. 22. Cf. Riemer 2001. 35. 
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Conclusions 
 
In the first chapter, first, we intended to shed light on the historical situation; after that, we 
outlined the statutory background of the crime that provides grounds for the charge; finally, 
we analysed the handling of the facts of the case applied in Pro Roscio Amerino and the 
rhetorical tactics by which he uncovered the real movers of the invented charge and their 
motivation and attained the acquittal of the accused. 
In the second chapter, first, we intended to outline the historical background of the oration, so 
to say, the historical facts of the case; then, we turned our attention to the opportunity of 
applying statutory facts of the case, i.e., lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis. After that—in 
accordance with the system of arguments divided into two of the oratio—we analysed 
handling of the charge of bribe arising in relation to iudicium Iunianum and discussed at 
length, and the counts of the indictment on poisoning commented upon shortly by Cicero, in 
terms of the rhetorical tactics and handling of the facts of the case followed in the speech. 
Finally, we examined the rhetorical tools of Cicero’s strategy to explore how the orator 
handled, modified or distorted the system of the charges and chronology—to support the 
argument, which can be considered brilliant with a lawyer’s eyes too.  
In the third chapter, first, we outlined the historical situation that provides the background of 
the lawsuit; then, after clarifying the events around killing of Clodius, we attempted to 
reconstruct the course of the lawsuit; later, we outlined the structure and legal background of 
the argument. After that, we made an attempt at outlining the reasons, in more details, for 
publishing the revised version of Pro Milone, i.e., a speech delivered in an undoubtedly lost 
case. Finally, we summed up the elements of philosophy of the state that appear in Pro 
Milone, and place them in the entirety of Cicero’s state concept, paying special regard to the 
fact that Pro Milone is the first Ciceronian work in which the motif of killing the tyrant, 
which afterwards returns as a fully developed thought in De re publica and De officiis, 
appears as a right and obligation a responsibly thinking Roman citizen is entitled to and bound 
by. In the course of that, we pointed out the parallels drawn by Cicero between Catilina and 
Clodius.  
In the fourth chapter, first, we described the historical background of the oratio and the 
proceeding; then, we examined the issue if the proceedings against Ligarius can be considered 
a real criminal trial. After the analysis of the genre of the speech, deprecatio we analysed the 
appearance of Caesar’s clementia in Pro Ligario. Finally, we focused on the means of style of 
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irony, and highlight an interesting element of the Caesar—Cicero relation and how the orator 
voices his conviction that he considers the dictator’s power and clementia illegitimate.  
In the fifth chapter, first, we reviewed the charge against King Deiotarus to find out if the 
proceedings conducted against the King can be considered a criminal action de iure at all. 
After that, we intended to analyse Pro rege Deiotaro as a rhetoric work with respect to the 
political program that appears in it and Caesar’s image drawn by Cicero, which also allows 
examination of how Caesar’s “reforms”, that is, the efforts made towards eliminating the form 
of state of the republic, are treated and commented upon in Cicero’s lifework and philosophy 
of the state.  
In the analysis of Cicero’s speeches, one should never forget about two essential 
circumstances. On the one hand, Cicero never published his speeches in the form that they 
were delivered but in a revised and edited form. On the other hand, they are addressed to the 
audience and by no means to the analyser who wants to interpret them word by word or to the 
readers in general; the written text is a dead material, it was made alive by the orator’s voice, 
gestures, the interaction between the speaker and the audience—in the Antiquity versions 
published subsequently were also read out, more precisely, performed continuously and 
aloud. The edited nature of the speeches, as a matter of fact, did not mean what Jules Humbert 
presumed,1 namely, that during the lawsuit Cicero took the floor several times—which can be 
true—and in the published speech these parts can be identified, i.e., can be and should be 
separated, and by this dissection they should be put back to their “original” place in the 
process of the lawsuit;2 instead, it only means that the delivered and the written text is more or 
less identical in terms of its essential content and form; yet, certain differences need to be 
taken into account, however, their extent—except for Pro Milone—is not on the merits: in 
other words, the published speech is not a starting point and raw material for reconstructing 
the delivered oratio. 
When editing the speeches for publication, Cicero, as a matter of fact, might have modified 
the text sometimes in order to spare the sensitivity of the parties concerned in the lawsuit, but 
these modifications must have been by no means considerable, in other words—except for the 
above analysed Pro Milone—did not lead to “forging” the speech. This will be supported if 
we examine Cicero’s intention to publish the speeches. In addition to setting exemplum to 
those who study the craft/art of rhetoric, in several cases, Cicero was undoubtedly driven by 
political intentions to publish his speeches because he wanted to raise a monument to the 
                                                 
1
 Humbert 1925. passim 
2
 See Stroh 1975. 31–54. 
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memory of his own deeds and achievements1 by making his speeches available to “eternity”. 
As, however—and this is increasingly true regarding the oral pleadings—he was led by the 
intention to set exemplum, at most he might have woven certain information into the text that 
seemed to be irrelevant in the lawsuit or was public knowledge but was possibly 
indispensable for the reader of the speech as background information, thus making the speech 
a complete whole. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten: publication of oral pleadings did 
not arise primarily from political motivation, and by a completely rewritten speech the orator 
could have highly shaken his own trustworthiness. The distortions, “shifts of the point” in the 
handling of the facts of the case and the argumentatio, easier to identify in the written version, 
which could not strike the judges who only listened to and did not read the speech and could 
not turn back the pages, were not disturbing either—it was just by this that Cicero (who 
proudly declared that in Cluentius’s case he threw sand, that is, dust into the judges’ eyes2) 
wanted to show to people who read him: that is how one must achieve the goal, have success, 
win a lawsuit!  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 As evidence of Cicero’s awareness of his achievements see Ps.-Sall. Cic. 5. O, fortunatam natam me consule 
Romam! 
2
 Quint. inst. 2, 17, 21. 
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